DIVERGÊNCIAS DE INTERESSES

ESTRATÉGICOS E ECONÓMICOS

Três cimeiras, nos próximos dias, irão (por decisão ou por omissão) definir muito (para o bem ou então para o mal) do que será o mundo nos próximos anos. A cimeira do G20 em Londres, de que já aqui falámos, a cimeira da NATO em Estrasburgo e Khel e o meeting com a União Europeia são também a estreia de Obama na Europa, numa altura em que, analisa a Stratfor, “Germany’s interests and American interests are diverging somewhat”...

The United States, Germany and Beyond

By George Friedman  March 30, 2009

Related Link

·                       Part 2: The Obama Administration and Europe  

Three major meetings will take place in Europe over the next nine days: a meeting of the G-20, a NATO summit and a meeting of the European Union with U.S. President Barack Obama. The week will define the relationship between the United States and Europe and reveal some intra-European relationships. If not a defining moment, the week will certainly be a critical moment in dealing with economic, political and military questions. To be more precise, the meeting will be about U.S.-German relations. Not only is Germany the engine of continental Europe, its policies diverge the most sharply from those of the United States. In some ways, U.S.-German relations have been the core of the U.S.-European relationship, so this marathon of summits will focus on the United States and Germany.

Although the meetings deal with a range of issues — the economy and Afghanistan chief among them — the core question on the table will be the relationship between Europe and the United States following the departure of George W. Bush and the arrival of Barack Obama. This is not a trivial question. The European Union and the United States together account for more than half of global gross domestic product. How the two interact and cooperate is thus a matter of global significance. Of particular importance will be the U.S. relationship with Germany, since the German economy drives the Continental dynamic. This will be the first significant opportunity to measure the state of that relationship along the entire range of issues requiring cooperation.

Relations under Bush between the United States and the two major European countries, Germany and France, were unpleasant to say the least. There was tremendous enthusiasm throughout most of Europe surrounding Obama’s election. Obama ran a campaign partly based on the assertion that one of Bush’s greatest mistakes was his failure to align the United States more closely with its European allies, and he said he would change the dynamic of that relationship.

There is no question that Obama and the major European powers want to have a closer relationship. But there is a serious question about expectations. From the European point of view, the problem with Bush was that he did not consult them enough and demanded too much from them. They are looking forward to a relationship with Obama that contains more consultation and fewer demands. But while Obama wants more consultation with the Europeans, this does not mean he will demand less. In fact, one of his campaign themes was that with greater consultation with Europe, the Europeans would be prepared to provide more assistance to the United States. Europe and Obama loved each other, but for very different reasons. The Europeans thought that the United States under Obama would ask less, while Obama thought the Europeans would give more.

The G-20 and Divergent Economic Expectations

Begin with the G-20 summit of 20 of the world’s largest economies, which, along with the Americans and Europeans, include the Russians, Chinese and Japanese. The issue is, of course, the handling of the international financial crisis. In contrast to the G-20 meetings held in November 2008, the economic situation has clarified itself substantially — itself an improvement — and there are the first faint signs in the United States of what might be the beginning of recovery. There is still tremendous economic pain, but not nearly the panic seen in October.

There is, however, still discord. The most important disagreement is between the United States and United Kingdom on one side and France and Germany on the other. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have selected a strategy that calls for strong economic stimulus at home. The Anglo-American side wants Europe to match it (though the United Kingdom has begun tempering its demands). It fears that the heavily export-oriented Germans in particular will use the demand created by U.S. and British stimulus on their economies to surge German exports into these countries as demand rises. Germany and France would thus get the benefit of the stimulus without footing the bill, enjoying a free ride as the United States builds domestic debt. We must focus here on Germany and the United States because Germany is the center of gravity of the European economy just as the United States is of the Anglo-American bloc. Others are involved, but in the end this comes down to a U.S.-German showdown.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that Germany could not afford the kind of stimulus promoted by the Anglo-Americans because German demographic problems are such that the proposed stimulus would impose long-term debt on a shrinking population, an untenable situation. Germany and France’s position makes perfect sense, whether it is viewed as Merkel has framed it, or more cynically, as Germany taking advantage of actions Obama already has taken. Either way, the fact remains that German and U.S. national interest are not at all the same. As Merkel put it in an interview with The New York Times, “International policy is, for all the friendship and commonality, always also about representing the interests of one’s own country.”

Paralleling this is the issue of how to deal with the Central European financial crisis. Toxic U.S. assets did not create this problem, internal European practices did. Western European banks took dominant positions in Eastern Europe in the past decade. They began to offer mortgages and other loans at low interest rates denominated in euros, Swiss francs and yen. This was an outstanding deal unless the Polish zloty and the Hungarian forint were to plunge in value, which they have over the past six months. Loan payments soared, massive defaults happened, and Italian, Austrian and Swedish banks were left holding the bag.

The United States viewed this as an internal EU matter, leaving it to European countries to save their own banks. Meanwhile, the Germans — who had somewhat less exposure than other countries — helped block a European bailout, arguing that the Central European countries should be dealt with through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was being configured to solve such problems in second-tier countries. From the German point of view, the IMF was simply going to be used for the purpose for which it was created. But Washington saw this as the Germans trying to secure U.S. (and Chinese and Japanese) money to deal with a European problem.

Add to this the complexity of Opel, a German carmaker owned by GM, which Germany wants the United States to bailout but which the United States wants nothing to do with, and the fundamental problem is clear: While both Germany and the United States have a common interest in moving past the crisis, Germany and the United States have very different approaches to the problem. Embedded in this is the hard fact that the United States is much larger than any other national economy, and it will be the U.S. recovery (when it comes) pulling the rest of the world — particularly the export-oriented economies — out of the ditch. Given that nothing can change this, the Germans see no reason to put themselves in a more difficult position than they are already in.

The Germans will not yield on the stimulus issue and Obama will not press, since this is not an issue that will resonate politically. But what could be perceived as a massive U.S. donation to the IMF would resonate politically in the United States. The American political system has become increasingly sensitive to the size of the debt being incurred by the Obama administration. A loan at this time to bail out other countries would not sit well, especially when critics would point out that some of the money will be going to bail out European banks in Central Europe.

European Fragmentation

Obama will need something in return from the Europeans, and the two-day NATO summit will be the place to get it. The Obama administration laid out the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan last Friday in preparation for this trip. Having given on the economic issue, Obama might hope that the Europeans would be forthcoming in increasing their commitment to Afghanistan by sending troops.

But there is almost no chance of Germany or France sending more troops, as public opinion in those countries is set against it and they have vastly limited military resources. During the U.S. presidential debates, Obama emphasized that he would be looking to the Europeans to increase aid in Afghanistan (the “good” war) while Iraq (the “bad” war) ends. The Germans will make some symbolic gestures — aid to Pakistan, reconstruction workers — but they will not be sending troops.

This will put Obama in a difficult position. If he donates money to the IMF, some of it earmarked for Europe, while the Europeans not only refuse to join the United States in a stimulus package but refuse to send troops to Afghanistan, the entire foundation of Obama’s foreign policy will start becoming a public issue. Obama argued that he would be more effective in building cooperation with European allies than Bush was or U.S. Sen. John McCain would have been. If he comes home empty-handed, which is likely, the status of that claim becomes uncertain.

Which brings us to the third meeting: the Obama-EU summit. We have been speaking of Germany as if it were Europe. In one sense, it is, as its economic weight drives the system. But politically and militarily, Europe is highly fragmented. Indeed, one of the consequences of German nationalism in dealing with Europe’s economy is that Europe’s economy is fragmented as well. Many smaller EU members, which had great expectations of what EU membership would mean, are disappointed and alienated from Germany and even the European Union itself largely due to the lack of German willingness to help them in their time of need.

More Fertile Ground for Obama

These are the waters Obama can go fishing in. Clearly, NATO is no longer functioning as it was a generation ago. Reality has shifted, and so have national interests. The international economic crisis has heightened — not reduced — nationalism as each nation looks out for itself. The weaker nations, particularly in Central Europe, have been left to fend for themselves.

The Central European countries have an additional concern: Russia. As Russia gets bolder, and as Germany remains unwilling to stand in Moscow’s way due to its energy dependence on Russia, countries on the EU periphery will be shopping for new relationships, particularly with the United States.

Obama’s strategy of coming closer to the Franco-German bloc appears to be ending in the same kind of train wreck in which Bush’s attempts ended. That is reasonable since these are not questions of atmospherics but of national interest on all sides. It therefore follows that the United States must consider new strategic relationships. The countries bordering Russia and Ukraine are certainly of interest to the United States, and share less interests with Germany and France than they thought they did. New bilateral relations — or even multilateral relations excluding some former partners like Germany — might be a topic to think about at the EU summit, even if it is too early to talk about it.

But let’s remember that Obama’s trip doesn’t end in Europe, it ends in Turkey. Turkey is a NATO member but has been effectively blocked from entry into the EU. It is doing relatively well in the economic crisis, and has a substantial military capability as well. The United States needs Turkey to extend its influence in Iraq to block Iranian ambitions, and north in the Caucasus to block Russian ambitions. Turkey is thus a prime candidate for an enhanced relationship with the United States. Excluded from Europe out of fears of Turkish immigration, economically able to stand on its own two feet, and able to use its military force in its own interest, it doesn’t take a contortionist to align U.S. and Turkish policies — they flow naturally.

However planned, Obama’s visit to Turkey will represent a warning to the Germans and others in its orbit that their relationship with the United States is based, as Merkel put it, on national interest, and that Germany’s interests and American interests are diverging somewhat. It also drives home that the United States has options in how to configure its alliance system, and that in many ways, Turkey is more important to the United States than Germany is.

Obama has made the case for multilateralism. Whatever that means, it does not have to mean continued alignment with all the traditional allies the United States had. There are potential new relationships and potential new arrangements. The inability of the Europeans to support key aspects of U.S. policy is understandable. But it will inevitably create a counter pressure on Obama to transfer the concept of multilateralism away from the post-World War II system of alliances toward a new system more appropriate to American national interests.

From our point of view, the talks in Europe are locked into place. A fine gloss will be put on the failure to collaborate. The talks in Turkey, on the other hand, have a very different sense about them.

C como Crise

Origem da palavra e conteúdo do conceito: ver Aqui

FORTES TENSÕES NO G20

A tensão sobe na véspera da reunião de Londres do G20 e, depois da polarização Obama-Merkel (a recordar-nos velhas oposições de lógicas de potências continentalistas contra potências marítimas... veja-se como a Alemanha aparece alinhada com a China e a Rússia e o grande aliado de Obama é, de novo, o primeiro inglês...) agora é Sarkozy que também em oposição a Merkel ameaça bater com a porta nesta reunião que tudo o indica está destinada ao fracasso como ontem já aqui no Claro se tinha escrito.

La France menace de claquer la porte du G20

BRASIL POTÊNCIA

Desde que António Guterres ‘redescobriu’ o Brasil e que os brasileiros ‘invadiram’ Portugal, o Brasil tornou-se tema corrente nos media portugueses. Infelizmente, os media portugueses não têm jornalistas especializados no Brasil (como não têm especialistas do Japão ou da China, nem da África Austral - ficou célebre o caso da pivot de televisão que não encontrava no mapa o “país do apartheid”... - como não têm sequer da Europa) e, portanto, o nível das notícias sobre o Brasil anda ao nível da bola chutada nos “relvados” ou ao nível do rabo nos desfiles de samba. Ou ainda das aventuras dos portugueses nas praias de Fortaleza ou dos tiroteios nas favelas. Ora, acontece que o Brasil é muito, mesmo muito, mais que esse folclore. E, sobre isso, os media portugueses não apresentam grande coisa. Ou mesmo nada. Nos últimos anos, com a presidência de Lula, o Brasil soube passar de “potência do futuro” a “potência do presente”, mesmo se continua a apresentar grandes vulnerabilidades e a sofrer de constrangimentos para que não apresenta ainda soluções. O século XXI pode ser o século da liderança do Brasil na América do Sul e no Atlântico Sul (basta ver o tipo de plataformas de armamento que o Brasil está a adquirir...). A última edição da Foreign Policy faz uma interessante análise de:

The 'Axis of Lula' vs. the 'Axis of Hugo'

Best enemies: Lula consistently supports Chávez's most grandiose plans while quietly working to undermine them.
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By Moisés Naím Posted March 2009

Latin American leaders face a choice between provocation and progress.

The same weekend that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez celebrated Mauricio Funes's election as El Salvador's new president, his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama. The election in El Salvador and the meeting at the White House are manifestations one of the most important trends that will shape Latin American politics in coming years.

Funes was the candidate of the former guerrilla movement, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, and his election marked the peaceful transition from two decades of government by its archrival, the Arena party. Thus a right-wing government closely allied with the United States handed power to a leftist party whose most prominent leaders have a long history of confrontation with Washington. As significantly, Obama's invitation to da Silva marks the end of a long period of estrangement between the United States and Latin America and opens new possibilities for rebuilding tattered relations between Washington and the region.

According to Chávez, Funes's victory "consolidates the historical current that has been rising in Latin America in this first decade of the 21st century," referring to the left's ascent to power in several countries of the hemisphere.

Does this mean that El Salvador is the newest member of the "Axis of Hugo"? In addition to Venezuela and Cuba, the core of that axis is formed by Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Honduras and Paraguay are also part of this alliance, though their governments have an internal opposition that prevents their leaders from becoming full-fledged members.

While the axis countries build their anti-Yankee alliance and try to implement what the Venezuelan president calls "21st-century socialism," the Brazilian government is successfully developing a very different geopolitical project: ensuring Brazil's presence at the table when the world's most important decisions are negotiated. Brazil has thus become an indispensable voice in the debates concerning the rules governing international trade, energy, the environment, and the redesign of the international financial system.

So, while Hugo Chávez spends his time and oil revenues trying to influence countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, da Silva hangs out with leaders in India, South Africa, and Europe.

The Brazilian government does not carry out this strategy in direct competition with Chávez's axis. It maintains close and friendly relations with the axis governments and goes out of its way to praise Venezeula's president. It has also been very effective in containing Chávez's more extreme international gambits, such as his enthusiastic support for Colombia's FARC guerrillas, and moderating his propensity for conflict. Brazil has enthusiastically supported his grandiose plans (the transcontinental gas pipeline, the Bank of the South, the merging of the Venezuelan and Brazilian oil companies, Venezuela's entry into Mercosur) while subtly sabotaging them and ensuring that none of them come to fruition. (None have.)

This frictionless coexistence between the Axis of Lula and the Axis of Hugo is going to become harder to sustain as the Brazilian president deepens his ties with Obama's White House. Hopefully, Obama's overture to Brazil signals a change in the long-held propensity of the United States to spend all of its time on Latin America's smallest countries and issues while neglecting the continent-size country in the middle. If the Obama administration were to give Brazil the time and political capital usually spent by the U.S. government on Cuba, it would find much higher rates of return.

And here is where El Salvador's election becomes such an interesting gauge of larger trends. Sooner rather than later, countries like El Salvador will have to choose. Do they want to join an alliance predicated on the willingness of the Venezuelan president to give away large chunks of his country's (declining) oil income, and constant confrontations with the United States? Or would they rather get as close as possible to Brazil -- a giant continental ally that has good and improving relations with the United States and a real influence in the global forums where decisions that affect Latin America are made?

The new president of El Salvador now faces this dilemma. Although he claims to be a moderate, his party's leadership is to his left and strongly pro-Chávez. They will push hard to tilt the new government toward the Axis of Hugo. Moreover, despite the fall in oil revenues, Chávez still has enough money to influence the internal politics of a small country like El Salvador, and there is no doubt that he will try. President Funes surely knows this and is also likely to understand that his best bet is to be as friendly as possible with Chávez without becoming another of his satellites.

To pull off this difficult balancing act, he can count on the Axis of Lula. And perhaps because he knows this, his first decision as president-elect was to travel to Brazil. "For me, President Lula and his government are my reference of a leftist, democratic government that can instill confidence in foreign investors," Funes said in Brazil. Let's see what he says when he visits Hugo.

Moisés Naím is editor in chief of Foreign Policy.

A version of this article appeared in Spanish in El País.

‘CAMPANHAS NEGRAS’ E

GESTÃO DA REPUTAÇÃO

As “campanhas negras” existem. E sabe-se o que são. Estão bem estudadas e tipificadas. Hoje, são ataques informacionais. E são mesmo um negócio. Muito lucrativo. As “campanhas negras” são, nas sociedades mediáticas, o lado negro das técnicas de gestão de reputação. Dada a sua natureza, são bastante mais caras que a simples "gestão de reputação"... Nos sítios civilizados, isto aprende-se em escolas. Em Portugal, dado o que as escolas são, aprende-se da pior maneira.

Não estamos, portanto, perante casos de marketing institucional ou mesmo político, mas perante a aplicação de certos princípios da guerra de informação a alvos determinados.

Uma actividade tão complexa e transversal como a política repousa sempre sobre as artes do “saber” e do “saber fazer crer”, pelo que não dispensa (ou não deveria dispensar...) uma reflexão sobre este tipo de conflito informacional, suas vias e seus meios.

O nome técnico das “campanhas negras” é “ataque informacional”.  A Inteligência Económica ou Competitive Intelligence tem estudado o problema, no âmbito da sua vertente “Perceptions Management”.

François-Bernard Huyghe, um dos grandes especialistas europeus da matéria, escreveu recentemente sobre o problema, num  estudo com o título Intelligence économique et influence:

«En intelligence économique, l’influence, constitue un troisième volet, à côté de la protection du patrimoine informationnel et des processus purement cognitifs de détection des menaces et opportunités pour l’activité économique dans l’environnement. Il s’agit cette fois de la capacité de modifier cet environnement en agissant sur les perceptions des partie prenantes (stakeholders). Cela passe par une très vaste gamme de méthodes positives (politique de réputation) ou négatives (déstabilisation, décrédibilisation), et cela va depuis une simple campagne de persuasion ou d’argumentation jusqu’à des processus à vaste échelle, impliquant l’action politique et visant jusqu’au « formatage » durable… »

O Tribunal de Estrasburgo também, nos últimos tempos, teve de se defrontar com casos de “ataques informacionais” e começou a fazer alguma jurisprudência neste tema recente e inovador.

Para a Inteligência Económica, estes ataques informacionais não têm qualquer mistério e são um caso de uso de técnicas bem conhecidas...

E de repente...

A COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE!

Parece que agora, por estes dias, há um grande interesse pela Competitive Intelligence, em Portugal. Da Lapa (sede do Plano Tecnológico de Zorrinho) à Avenida da Ilha da Madeira (sede do CEMGFA), passando pela Alexandre Herculano (SIS) e pela Gomes Freire (Academia Militar). Óptimo. Já dizia a minha avó Luzia que tarde é o que nunca vem. Mas há um problema. Ninguém sabe lá muito bem o que é isso da CI. Porém, eu que estou nisto desde o princípio, posso dizer, com grande à vontade, que há solução. E em português de Portugal. Sem necessidade de tradução. Há saber. Mesmo saber universitário, embora muito à revelia desta pobre universidade (que um dia destes vai ter de o acolher…). Mas, então, quem é que sabe disto, da CI, do que ela é mesmo e das suas metodologias específicas? Olhando à volta, eu só vejo, realmente, quatro pessoas qualificadas: o Doutor André Magrinho (ISEG e UBI), a Mestre Alice Mateus (EGE e Dauphine), o Mestre Pedro Santos (EGE) e o Mestre André Nunes (UCL).

G20 sem Plano de Relançamento

Já a 13 de Março aqui se tinha referido que não havia grande coisa a esperar deste G20, do início de Abril. Não é que seja no dia das mentiras mas... é logo a seguir. Aqui era explicado porquê. Não me espantam, portanto, as notícias de hoje... O G20 vai produzir um pequeno conjunto de boas declarações de óptimas intenções. E vai, verbalmente, zurzir nos “off-shores” e nos dirigentes malandros, malignos e gulosos, de algumas corporations.

Gordon Brown e Obama já tiveram, de resto, o cuidado de minimizar as esperanças de um acordo à altura, como se pode ver aqui.
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Daqui a uns meses (ou uns anos...), os alinhamentos globais de forças já estarão mais clarificados (com maior identificação do binário vencedores/vencidos) e já permitirão aos vencedores tomar decisões... Por enquanto, está tudo demasiado embrulhado e esse nevoeiro não permite distinguir “quem é quem” e impede a afirmação de interesses e consequentes tomadas de decisão. Avançamos, portanto, cheios de optimismo, rumo à... depressão.

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Veja-se, três dias antes da reunião, a notícia do L'Express sobre o projecto de comunicado final da reunião:  

Le G20 n'accouchera pas d'un nouveau plan de relance
Par LEXPRESS.fr, publié le 30/03/2009 11:44 - mis à jour le 30/03/2009 12:21

OH FUCK, NO “ECONOMIST”

Sem Qualquer Comentário Porque É Desnecessário...

JOHN ROBB:   PARASITIC PREDATION

Some Boydian logic -- a new construct for decision making -- to brighten your day. Not likely.  However, the aim of this brief is not to convince you. Instead, it is to get you thinking in new ways, to challenge assumptions, and spur creativity -- all of which is essential to our collective long term success…  Ver Aqui

Obama em Luanda

in Ver Claro , a Coluna dos sábados no "Correio da Manhã"

LUÍS AMADO FALA SOBRE O PAPEL DE PORTUGAL NOS TEMPOS QUE CORREM

Espantoso! Jamais visto, desde os pré-históricos tempos de Gama (o Jaime), temos um ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros com pensamento de Estado e, claro, com inteligência estratégica. Na conferência do IDN, sobre os 60 anos da Aliança Atlântica, Luís Amado disse em meia-dúzia de frases claras e consistentes muito mais do que foi dito em várias conferências sobre visões e estratégias para Portugal.

Daria Werbowy

AS CURVAS DA ECONOMIA

E AS CURVAS FEMININAS

É uma miúda canadiana que se distingue dos ‘cabides’ andantes que têm ocupado as passereles por ter... curvas! E, mal chegou, está a arrasar. Colecciona capas da Vogue, tem Hollywood rendida a seus pés e já varreu do seu caminho várias ‘históricas’ .

Substituiu Gisele Büdchen na campanha da 'Vogue Eyewear' e tirou as Pepe Jeans a Sienna Miller... E também tomou conta da Lancome, Chanel e outras.

Chama-se Daria Werbowy e vamos vê-la muito e muito ouvir falar dela nos próximos anos. 

Porque, como é bem conhecido, em tempos de dura crise económica, as curvas femininas se tornam muito populares e porque as  curvas de Daria Werbowy  são a antítese das actuais curvas da economia, ela está mesmo 'condenada' a continuar a ser um enorme sucesso nos próximos anos.

A crise, alguma coisa de bom havia de trazer!

LOIRA BURRA... NÃO É?

UMA GRANDE MALDADE FEITA A

FRANCE GALL POR GAINSBOURG  

«Lorsque le sucre d’orge/ Parfumé à l’anis/ Coule dans la gorge d’Annie/ Elle est au paradis».

Letra de Serge Gainsbourg gravada, em 1966, por France Gall, então com 19 anos e que disse, depois, não ter percebido o significado das palavras que Gainsbourg lhe metia na boca...

Catherine Ribeiro

LA PORTUGAISE

 

 

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« Catherine Ribeiro est une actrice et chanteuse française d'origine portugaise, née en 1941 à Lyon. Humaniste, militante, follement éprise de liberté, on l'a souvent surnommée dans la presse la « passionaria rouge » ou la « grande prêtresse de la chanson française ». Elle commence à chanter dans les années 1960. Dans les années 1970, elle crée le groupe Alpes avec Patrice Moullet. Elle s'est installée dans les Ardennes. »

NOVAS CENSURAS

A censura não se reduz aos clássicos “lápis azuis”. Isso foi um ponto forte do momento salazarento da censura. Há outras formas.  E nessas há as formas cunhalentas. Durante as décadas da ditadura, estas formas cunhalentas (embora diferentes) foram tão ou mais eficientes que as oficiais com seus “lápis azuis”. E também, por vezes, mais violentas e letais... Hoje, democracia mediática oblige, usam versões mais “soft”. Como esta que usaram contra a RDP/RTP, visto não puderem mandar a respectiva administração para os lugares clássicos do comunismo: o hospital psiquiátrico (para onde um embaixador russo em Lisboa ainda quis mandar Mário Soares...) e a Sibéria. Pitigrili dissecou e escreveu sobre a coisa:

O anúncio até falava verdade...

A RTP cedeu ao apelo dos partidos da Oposição e retirou do ar o anúncio de promoção da manhã informativa da Antena 1, que ontem foi alvo de polémica no Parlamento. A estação pública explicou, em comunicado, que o spot faz parte de um conjunto de três filmes de autopromoção mas que, “tendo em consideração as diferentes interpretações, o Conselho de Administração da RTP decidiu retirá-lo da emissão”.

No anúncio em causa, no ar na RTP 1 desde 26 de Fevereiro, a subdirectora da Antena 1, Eduarda Maio, informa um condutor que está parado no meio do trânsito devido a uma manifestação. E diz que é contra ele e "contra quem quer chegar a horas". Os partidos da oposição PSD, CDS-PP, BE e PCP só ontem viram o spot na internet e logo exigiram que o mesmo saísse do ar. "É um atentado contra a liberdade de expressão e de manifestação contemplados na Constituição", disse ao CM o deputado social-democrata Luís Campos Ferreira, que pediu ainda "a demissão da direcção da rádio e uma resposta da tutela por se tratar de um acto de gestão". Também os sindicalistas da CGTP se manifestaram contra o anúncio e apresentaram queixa ao Conselho de Opinião da RTP, aos provedores da rádio e TV e à ERC. O regulador vai apreciar as queixas sobre o anúncio. (Notícia do Correio da Manhã)

Ora acontece que o texto do anúncio ilustra exactamente o que o cidadão comum pensa das manifestações feitas nas principais artérias da cidade de Liaboa. Porque não está em causa o direito de manifestação nem a eficácia das mesmas. A manifestação mais eficaz feita até hoje em Lisboa aconteceu na Fonte Luminosa, promovida pelo Partido Socialista e que teve como consequência dar suficiente força aos partidários da democracia para acabarem com o domínio do PCP e extrema esquerda nos governos provisórios - sem impedir o trânsito nem prejudicar "os cidadãos que querem chegar a horas". E se é para facilitar a contagem dos milhares de aderentes, a Fonte Luminosa prestou-se a isso, sem que fosse preciso estender artificialmente manifestantes por vários quilómetros.

No entanto, o politicamente correcto faz com que todos os representantes partidários se mostrem indignados...

Posted by Pitigrili at 3:19 PM 0 comments

AMÉRICA: HUMOR FACE À CRISE

O EQUÍVOCO SMART POWER

O smart power que H. Clinton colocou no centro do debate sobre a política externa americana (e a própria imagem dos USA) gera alguns equívocos. Consoante o lugar de onde é percepcionado, se é de Wshington ou de uma capital do centro da Europa ou do Médio Oriente ou de Moscovo ou de Pequim, o smart power aparece de diferentes formas, com diferentes perfis e mesmo concepções diversas. A InfoGuerre  analisou o assunto, numa perspectiva específica:

Le «smart power» et l’Europe

21-03-2009 dans France Europe Puissances  

Le « smart power » promet d’être le nouveau serpent de mer de la politique étrangère américaine. Présenté par Hillary Clinton comme l’outil des relations extérieures de l’Administration Obama, il est plein des promesses de changement attendues sur la scène internationale.

« Pour faire face à un monde où les crises s’accumulent — disait Madame Clinton lors de son audition devant la commission sénatoriale- nous devons avoir recours à ce qui a été appelé ‘ le pouvoir de l’intelligence’, l’ensemble des outils à notre disposition : diplomatiques, économiques, militaires, politiques, légaux, et culturels — il faut choisir le bon outil, ou la bonne combinaison d’outils, la mieux adaptée à chaque situation ».

Le terme smart power, qui n’est pas innocemment choisi [1], est l’emblème d’une rupture avec l’unilatéralisme agressif de l’Administration Bush. La maternité du concept revient à Suzanne Nossel, qui l’a théorisé en 2004 dans la prestigieuse revue américaine Foreign Policy. Ce nouvel outil, représenté outre-Atlantique comme une synthèse entre la contrainte (hard power) et l’incitation par l’exemple (soft power) est accueilli avec enthousiasme par les penseurs américains des relations internationales. En Europe, on espère qu’il sera l’outil du changement par rapport à l’ère Bush.

Jacques Charmelot, chroniqueur pour l’AFP, propose, dans une étude récente, une vision intéressante de la notion. L’auteur défend l’idée selon laquelle cette ouverture américaine vers le reste du monde est une chance que le vieux continent doit saisir rapidement. Il doit prendre la mesure de ce changement pour être en mesure d’y participer.

Si, en effet, l’Europe ne trouvait pas de réponse appropriée à la posture américaine, il craint qu’elle ne devienne un fardeau, voire un obstacle à celle-ci. Après une courte présentation à Munich, les pays européens vont rencontrer le nouveau visage de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis lors du 60ème sommet de l’OTAN. Ce sera pour eux l’occasion de saisir la « balle au bond » et de nouer une sérieuse relation de partenariat avec la nouvelle administration américaine. Si les Européens attendent beaucoup d’elle, l’inverse doit être tout aussi vrai.

Cette vision volontariste est partagée par un rapport de Terra Nova, qui prêche toutefois pour une position européenne plus affermie sur la scène internationale. Une position qui prendrait en compte le rôle laissé vacant par la désaffection pour l’attitude américaine ; où l’Europe serait à l’initiative plus qu’elle ne serait suiveuse. A l’heure où l’Amérique souffre, aussi bien économiquement qu’en termes d’image, il ne lui a pas échappé qu’elle a une place particulière à prendre auprès des Américains.

JB

1] Il ne faut pas en effet traduire ce terme par intelligent mais le comprendre comme astucieux, ingénieux.

5º CANAL: SEGUNDA GRANDE

VITÓRIA DO DR. BALSEMÃO

É a segunda grande vitória de Balsemão em poucas meses e qualquer das duas lhe valeu um balúrdio. Esta ‘sorte’ é melhor que jogar no Euromilhões!

A primeira foi no BPP, o mal chamado banco privado português pois que é aos dinheiros públicos que recorre para se salvar das suas trapalhadas, senão mesmo ilegalidades. Balsemão, um dos grandes accionistas do BPP, vê o banco salvo pela decisão governamental de cobrir a injecção de centenas de milhares de euros no BPP...

Agora, Balsemão não queria o 5º Canal de televisão (pois isso iria ter para ele duas consequências: reduzir a quota da SIC no mercado da publicidade e baixar o valor de mercado da SIC numa possível venda da estação) e a decisão é: não há 5º Canal...

Os deuses estão-lhe muito favoráveis... E salvam-no duas vezes seguidas de situações complicadíssimas. Gostava de saber a que santinha Balsemão reza e que promessas lhe faz... À Senhora de Fátima não deve ser pois ele não frequenta a Cova da Iria!

INVASÃO DO PASSADO OU

MISTÉRIOS DO ATLÂNTICO

Parece que surgem vozes do passado a querer ressuscitar o “triângulo de ferro” e mais o “oceano moreno” e outras inanidades mais que já, no seu tempo, não faziam (nem fizeram...) qualquer sentido. Quanto mais hoje!

Portugal, claro, não é possível sem uma política do Atlântico. Sem uma inscrição forte do Atlântico na sua estratégia, pois o Atlântico é uma das principais componentes de uma das duas coordenadas da sua estratégia. Mas tem de ser uma política das realidades do século XXI e não a evolução na continuidade de idiotices e insanidades “estratégicas” do passado… Até porque nem têm já a justificação dos constrangimentos que então se abatiam sobre o regime proscrito de Lisboa.  Ou seja, anda por aí gente, com acesso aos media, a falar de estratégia ignorando tudo das coordenadas de qualquer estratégia: tempo e espaço!

Será isto falta de conhecimento, falta de inteligência ou simplesmente preguiça intelectual...? Mistérios...

LAMENTAÇÕES DA MUITA

FALTA DE INTELIGÊNCIA

Leio comentadores de fim de semana e tropeço na prosa de um dos mais novos. E só me ocorre dizer:

“Tão novinho e… é já mais um a comentar os seus próprios lamentos!”

Não consigo identificar que raio de vírus atacou esta gente que regularmente nos bombardeia com o comentário ao seu próprio lamento (variações à guitarra e à viola do velho tema “vejam como eu tanto sofro...” ou “andava a desgraçadinha no gamanço a pedir pró paizinho esbreculoso...”) e ignoram soberanamente tudo o restante, toda a realidade para além do seu umbigo! Falta-lhes em inteligência o muito que lhes sobra em “lamentação” e “sofrimento”... E que só aborrece.

PERIGO DA IGNORÂNCIA ATREVIDA

 Uma História do Felacio...
.
O livro...? Há na FNAC, claro! E tem na capa um belo desenho, de 1903, de um senhor que viria a tornar-se, tempos depois, muito conhecido: Pablo Picasso.

O autor, Thierry Leguay, « professeur et auteur de livres remarqués (« L'Obsolète et la Petite Fabrique de Littérature »), a accompli un extraordinaire travail de recherche qui permet désormais de répondre à toutes les questions que posait Bernard Pivot. »

Sobre o trabalho, diz o editor que Thierry Leguay «a accompli avec « Histoire raisonnée de la fellation » un travail formidable de recherche qui permet de répondre à toutes les questions que l'on peut se poser sur le sujet. Voici donc un livre complet sur cette caresse amoureuse, son histoire, ses variantes, ses perversions, sa philosophie et sa sociologie. Truffé d'exemples et de citations, le livre passe en revue les mots pour le dire, de San-Antonio à Gainsbourg, les interdits qui planent sur cette pratique, sa représentation dans les films classés X et même sa technique. L'ouvrage, unique en son genre, brise donc enfin la chape de silence qui occultait ce sujet pourtant universel.»

Se a elaboração desta « Histoire raisonnée de la fellation” é de autoria de um homem, o editor achou por bem – e em boa hora o fez – pedir a uma senhora o “avant propos”.

 

Encarregou-se disso Françoise Rey, autora «best-seller de la littérature érotique, a bien voulu rédiger l'avant-propos de cet ouvrage pour y exprimer sa sensibilité de femme sur un sujet qui ne peut laisser ses semblables indifférentes».

NAS CALDAS...

HÁ 35 ANOS !  

SANTANA... SANTANA...!

Que coisa é esta das contas da gestão Santana Lopes...? Expliquem-me lá bem, mesmo muito bem e em detalhe, esta ‘estória’ que eu não estou a entendê-la...

A Coluna dos Sábados no “Correio da Manhã”

.Ver claro

14 Março 2009

AMEAÇA À BANCA

Para os grandes bancos europeus, o iminente colapso da banca do leste europeu será uma catástrofe pior que a crise do subprime...

FRÁGIL!

A queda das exportações brasileiras, a crise financeira russa, o fracasso da 'segurança' indiana em Bombaim e a crise social da China geram enorme insegurança e afugentam cérebros e capitais! Revela-se a fragilidade oculta dos BRIC...

QUE ACORDO!

Depois de severa investigação do Senado americano, o Liechtenstein cedeu e vai 'colaborar', entregando toda a informação exigida… Muita gente, por todo o globo, claro, ficou, de repente, muito nervosa...

PROTECCIONISMO

Michel Rocard pode, aos 79 anos, falar claro. E que diz o meu velho amigo político, da Paris dos meus 20 anos? 'O mundo suicidou-se, os financeiros fizeram crimes contra a humanidade e agora temos de instaurar um proteccionismo sectorial e temporário. Senão…'

BRONCA NUCLEAR

A Siemens rompeu (em Fevereiro) a sua aliança com os franceses na Areva, líder europeu do nuclear, e ligou-se (em Março) a um partner russo, a Rosatom. A queda da Alemanha para leste muda todo o xadrez energético (e não só...) da Europa.

JAPÃO AVISA

Em vésperas de lançamento de 'satélite' norte-coreano, que abaterá qualquer foguetão lançador que invada o seu espaço...

verclaro.jm@gmail.com 

José Mateus

Fashion Weeks: Le chic français…

Quando parece que há moda por Lisboa, vale a pena dar uma espreitadela aos desfiles de fashion weeks destes dias em Paris... Um exercício de benchmarketing, digamos. A espreitar Aqui

À ESPERA DO G20

A próxima reunião do G20, em Londres, não parece poder fornecer soluções à altura dos problemas. E nem sequer à altura das expectativas que tem suscitado. Como bem explica Nicolas Baverez, num texto notável de clareza, inteligência e boa informação:

Nicolas Baverez, no Le Point:

LE G20 EST MAL PARTI

La réunion du G20 à Londres marquera un tournant dans le déroulement de la crise. La première conférence du G20 au niveau des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement, tenue le 15 novembre 2008 à New York, constituait en soi une innovation majeure et s'est limitée pour le reste à des déclarations d'intention. Après le temps des discours, le sommet de Londres doit être placé sous le signe des actes et des décisions. Il intervient à un moment critique où la récession peut dégénérer en dépression, avec une croissance mondiale en baisse de 1,4 %, une chute du commerce mondial de 3 % et une explosion du chômage qui va toucher 51 millions de personnes supplémentaires. Il permettra surtout de juger de l'efficacité des politiques économiques, qui déterminent désormais le redressement ou l'effondrement de la confiance. Et ce à travers trois éléments clés : le degré de coordination des mesures de sauvetage des banques et des plans de relance ; la régulation des institutions et des marchés financiers ; la réalité de l'engagement contre le protectionnisme. Le G20 est donc bien le pendant de la conférence de Londres de 1933. Son échec précipita la désintégration des échanges et des paiements mondiaux sous le choc des dévaluations en chaîne. En 2009, c'est de nouveau à Londres que vont se décider les chances d'une stratégie concertée de lutte contre la déflation mondiale.

Or force est de constater que le G20 est mal parti.

Les seuls engagements pris à New York portaient sur la conclusion des négociations commerciales du cycle de Doha et sur la mise hors la loi du protectionnisme ; ils sont restés lettre morte et ont été largement transgressés avec la multiplication des dévaluations compétitives, la nationalisation du crédit, les aides sectorielles, le renforcement des contrôles sur les importations pour ce qui est du protectionnisme. Partout, l'appel massif à la garantie des contribuables a pour contrepartie la protection des activités et des emplois nationaux. Plus la crise s'aggrave et plus la politique économique est arrêtée et mise en oeuvre sur une base strictement nationale. Or, face à la crise d'un capitalisme devenu universel, l'approche pays par pays est aussi inadaptée que l'approche établissement par établissement qui a failli face au risque systémique pesant sur le système bancaire. Alors que la mondialisation requiert des institutions et des règles universelles, chaque nation privilégie sa souveraineté et renforce ses organes et ses procédures de régulation. Le G20 converge donc vers le plus petit dénominateur commun, qui mêle la dénonciation de boucs émissaires commodes (hedge funds, paradis fiscaux, agences de notation, traders...) et la consolidation des dispositifs existants (doublement au demeurant souhaitable des ressources du FMI). Il s'apprête en revanche à éluder les questions déterminantes pour la stabilisation de l'économie mondiale, à savoir la supervision internationale des institutions financières, le contrôle du cycle du crédit et des risques, la redéfinition des règles juridiques, comptables et prudentielles.

Le G20 risque ainsi d'avorter là où il est le plus indispensable.

L'administration Obama se consacre tout entière à la réalisation du plan de relance de 789 milliards de dollars et à la nationalisation de fait de la majorité des banques et des assurances, imitant le Royaume-Uni de Gordon Brown, dont la stratégie répond au triptyque dévaluation-monétisation du déficit-nationalisation. Le monde anglo-saxon accorde la priorité aux mesures d'urgence, reste prudent en matière de régulation compte tenu du poids de l'industrie financière dans la richesse nationale et conserve une hostilité vigilante envers les institutions multilatérales. Loin d'avancer un schéma alternatif d'organisation du système financier, l'Europe continentale se déchire sur la restauration du bilan des banques ou les plans de soutien à l'automobile, ne s'accordant que sur la renationalisation de la politique économique. Enfin les pays émergents estiment que c'est au monde développé, qui a provoqué la crise, de lui trouver un remède et d'en supporter les coûts.

Le demi-échec annoncé du G20 est lourd de conséquences.

L'absence de stratégie concertée crédible éloigne la sortie de crise et renforce le risque protectionniste. L'incapacité d'imaginer des institutions et des règles adaptées au capitalisme universel va accélérer l'émergence d'un duopole sino-américain : les Etats-Unis et la Chine, en étant seuls à mettre en oeuvre des plans de relance à la dimension de la crise (déficit de 1 752 milliards de dollars en 2009, soit 12 % du PIB pour l'administration Obama, mobilisation de 1 000 milliards d'euros en Chine), affichent leur ambition de coréguler l'économie du XXIe siècle. L'Europe, qui disposait d'une remarquable occasion de combler le terrain perdu face aux erreurs de l'Amérique, est en passe de confirmer son déclassement. Elle fait la preuve de son incapacité à réagir à un choc économique du fait de la faiblesse des plans de relance (1,5 % du PIB), de l'absence de solidarité entre les membres de l'Union, enfin de la rigidité des règles de la monnaie unique et du grand marché. Au total, le nouveau Bretton Woods risque de s'achever en Munich économique pour avoir rêvé d'une chimérique moralisation du capitalisme au lieu de travailler à sa réforme

·         Le G20 veut des propositions concrètes d'ici au 31 mars 2009

·         Relance et réforme : même combat

·         À Berlin, les Européens unis pour la régulation de la finance internationale

·         Le G20, première étape vers une réforme de la finance mondiale

·         L'Europe en route vers la stagdéflation

A Crise nos Estados Unidos

REPORTAGEM EM CLEVELAND

Ler Aqui

CHINA: UMA APAIXONANTE QUESTÃO 

A questão chinesa está a tornar-se o problema central da chamada “globalização” e um dos mais apaixonantes problemas do nosso tempo. A China tem uma milenar tradição de fechamento ao mundo exterior (assente talvez na sua geografia em forma de penico) e uma imensa vontade de conquista e de domínio total. Após a queda do império soviético e no meio do barulho da precipitação dos acontecimentos que se lhe seguiram, a China entrou em silêncio (para ver se ninguém reparava nela) no mundo da economia de mercado, num momento de apoteose da globalização. Esta abertura ao mundo fazia-se com todas as cautelas e controlos (que mantém) e reduziu-se ao económico. Mas houve abertura e um inédito incremento das trocas comerciais. A China quis (para começo de conversa...) tornar-se a fábrica do mundo e também a sua horta. Penso, sempre me pareceu, que os chineses não estavam preparados para tal e que isso pode mesmo ter sido traumático. A crise veio agir como revelador do que os chineses ocultavam na sua exposição (relativa) ao mundo. Revelou mesmo a incapacidade chinesa (ou deveremos dizer a sua ingenuidade e falta de experiência/conhecimento...?) para ler a crise e se posicionar face a ela. Daí as posições contraditórias que ao longo dos últimos sete ou oito meses nos têm chegado de Pequim. Posições que revelam não saber Pequim em que pé dançar esta música bizarra do descalabro do sistema económico mundial. E que, via peso das exportações e outros linkages entretanto criados, lhe entra pela casa dentro e lhe assola toda a arrumação... Tudo isto coloca a direcção comunista chinesa face a desafios titanescos que ainda há um ano eram impossíveis de imaginar. Incluindo a fragmentação daquele grande asiático, trabalhado por forças centrífugas, cuja unidade Pequim só consegue manter com garras de aço. Como vão conjugar-se a frustração e a revolta dos chineses com essas forças centrífugas (que estão longe de se reduzir ao imenso Tibete) é um problema muito interessante. Como vão os males da crise agir sobre a contradição chinesa clássica fechamento/abertura é outro problema tão ou mais interessante. É isto (mas não só) que torna a questão chinesa apaixonante.

John Robb não se engana ao dar à China uma grande atenção e ao colocar a sua grande questão:

 

JOHN ROBB: Will China Survive a Depression? Don't bet on it...

SARKOZY... SARKOZY...

como surprendes os distraídos!

Ruralentas e de sacristia, quase toda a direita e boa parte da esquerda deste sítio, têm dificuldade em enxergar muitas evidências. Além desta cegueira congénita, têm ainda a presunção de imaginar (não digo “pensar” porque não pensam...) que a direita (ou a esquerda) é algo parecido com eles! Não conhecem sequer o seu carácter provinciano, periférico, patético e pobrezinho, de coisa própria de um mundo que já não há. Para visualizar o que digo, imagine-se como um fulaninho da “nossa” direita dos anos 40 veria o maçon Churchill... Transpondo isto para 2009, é assim que esta agitada direita peripatética vê o Sarkozy... Ou seja, não vê nada!

O PARAÍSO À MODA DE PEQUIM

Há muita coisa que não sabemos sobre a China. Temos de ir aprendendo... Hoje, ficámos a saber qual é a ideia chinesa de “paraíso”. A ideia que Pequim tem para criar um paraíso na Terra para a Humanidade. E, digo-vos, é notável, absolutamente notável! Aposto que ninguém fora da China seria capaz de uma ideia destas! Ora vejam e para ler tudo sobre esta prometedora concepção basta clicar no link abaixo e, depois de lerem, reparem bem nas carinhas e nas asas dos "anjos" do "paraíso":

TIBET - La Chine estime que le Tibet est un "paradis" sur terre

RECORDAR JONVELLE

Jean-François Jonvelle foi fotógrafo de moda e fotógrafo do instante. Fotógrafo de olhar a vida. E mostrar o que estando diante de todos os olhos só ele via. Algumas das suas campanhas ainda são recordadas. Vinte, mesmo, trinta anos depois. Mas, melhor que descrevê-lo, é vê-lo aqui ou aqui . No Claro, Jonvelle tinha já sido homenageado aqui e aqui

PEQUIM TEM MESMO UM

GRANDE PROBLEMA!

Lembro-me bem da teoria e do discurso de Pequim (que retomavam as posições de Estaline e as ‘abrilhantavam’ com uns adereços da conferência de Bandung) sobre as “zonas das tempestades” e o “direito dos povos à auto-determinação” e o inalienável direito a disporem de si mesmos... Obnubilada pelas “três leis da dialéctica”, a direcção do PCC (Mao Tsé Tung, Chu Té, Lin Piao, Chu en Lai e mesmo o então excomungado Ping) não estava disponível para estudar essa outra lei, mais metafísica, que é a do “eterno retorno”. Não estava, não esteve e não está... Mas não é por se ignorar uma “lei” que se escapa ao seu alcance... E a lei do “eterno retorno” não parece ter esquecido Pequim. Dos uigures, que se inserem no mundo islâmico, aos budistas tibetanos, há vários povos naquilo que chamamos China a lutar pelo direito à auto-determinação, pelo direito a disporem deles mesmos... Enfim, a criarem as suas “zonas de tempestades”. Por enquanto, a coisa parece ainda muito amadora, mas confirma que há gente disposta a ir em frente. E isso significa que, com alguma prática e aprendizagem e acumulação de conhecimento, podem rapidamente chegar aos ensinamentos de John Robb... E, se chegarem aí, Pequim fica permanentemente sob “tufões” e não meras “tempestades”! E vai lamentar os ventos que andou a semear nos anos sessenta e setenta... Como vão, daqui a algum tempo, lamentar não terem negociado com o Dalai Lama quando este tinha a hegemonia entre os tibetanos!

Notícia de hoje:

CHINE - Tibet : attentat à la bombe contre la police chinoise

E ainda esta que é muito interessante não só por revelar a verdadeira dimensão do problema (que os chineses sempre negam ou, pelo menos, diminuem grandemente) mas também por desocultar o velhíssimo e bem enraizado traço chinês de resolver os problemas pelo fechamento...

·                                 Tibet : Pékin veut édifier une "Grande muraille"

Dans Le Nouvel Observateur

·                                 "La Chine, machine à laver les cerveaux", par Ursula Gauthier (02/10/08)

·                                 "Ségolène Royal en croisade pour le Tibet", par Stéphane Arteta (21/08/08)

·                                 "La Chine a un problème...", par Ursula Gauthier (21/08/08)

·                                 "Qui sont les bouddhistes ?", par Ursula Gauthier (14/08/08)

·                                 "Tibet : la révolte de la dernière chance", par Ursula Gauthier (20/03/08)

Sur Internet

·                                 La Chine populaire de 1945 à nos jours

·                                 L'histoire du Tibet

·                                 Biographie du dalaï lama

·                                 Le site officiel du dalaï lama

·                                 Une page présentant l'agence Chine nouvelle

·                                 Le site du gouvernement chinois

·                                 Le site du gouvernement tibétain en exil (en anglais)

·                                 Un blog d'informations sur le Tibet

·                                 Le bouddhisme  

VIOLAÇÃO: CASO EXEMPLAR EM ISRAEL

Tivesse alguém ainda dúvidas sobre a genética e personalidade democráticas do Estado de Israel e esta notícia de hoje seria suficiente para as varrer:

ISRAËL - L'ex-président Katzav va être inculpé pour viol

O OLHAR CERTEIRO DE VPV

“Mesmo com mais de 30 anos de democracia e 20 de "Europa" a saloiice indígena continua sólida.”

 Vasco Pulido Valente, no Público

Stratfor: Security Implications of the Global Financial Crisis

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart


As anyone with a stock portfolio knows, it is a rough time for the markets. With many portfolios down 50 percent or more, this large loss of equity and wealth has been very difficult on individuals and corporations. The problems, of course, have not been confined to the stock markets. With property values plunging and variable-rate mortgages ballooning, many homeowners are also caught in a bad situation — the number of homeowners behind in their mortgage payments has been increasing and the number of foreclosures has grown. Unemployment is also an issue. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in January 2009 there were 2,227 mass layoff actions in the United States involving 237,902 workers.

Significantly, the financial crisis is not just restricted to the United States — it is a global event that is also having a severe impact on economies in Europe, Asia and the developing world. Things are tough all over, and this financial strain will create some large security problems for corporations and governments.


Threats to the Bottom Line

During times of financial hardship, companies often have to make cuts like the aforementioned layoffs. When companies plan cuts, they often focus on eliminating those corporate functions that do not appear to be contributing to the company’s profitability. And one of the first functions cut during tough times often is corporate security. A security department typically has a pretty substantial budget (it costs a lot for all those guards, access-control devices, cameras and alarms), and security is usually viewed as detracting from, rather than contributing to, the company’s bottom line. The “fat” security budget is seen as an easy place to quickly reduce costs in an effort to balance the profit-and-loss statement.

This view of security is due to a number of factors. First, it must be recognized that there are certainly some security programs that are indeed bloated and ill-conceived that have consumed far too many corporate resources for the results they produce. Furthermore, there is a long tradition of corporate security directors who are not good communicators and who do not take the effort to educate upper management about ways their programs contribute to corporate goals. However, even when a security director has an effective program and is a good communicator, it can be very difficult to quantify the losses that the corporation did not suffer due to the presence of effective security measures. The lack of losses and incidents due to a robust security program can be interpreted by some to mean that there is no threat to guard against. Indeed, effective security can make it appear that there is no need for security, a paradox we have also seen in the historical pattern of U.S. government security funding — a pattern that has resulted in a number of disastrous attacks against U.S. embassies.

In times of economic hardship, the relentless focus on operating expenses and even corporate cutbacks can lead to definite security challenges. As we discussed last November, one of these problems is workplace violence, but during times when people are hurting financially, issues such as employee theft, fraud and product theft by non-employees must also be carefully monitored.

However, while the theft of a tractor-trailer full of computers or flat screen televisions can quickly get someone’s attention, there is a far more subtle, and no less dangerous, threat lurking just under the surface. That threat is espionage — both corporate and state-sponsored.


The Human-Intelligence Process

Espionage is always a problem corporations must face. Competitors, criminals and even foreign governments often seek ways to gather proprietary information from companies, sometimes to boost their own operational capacities (e.g., to apply critical or emerging technologies to their weapons programs) and sometimes to sell on the open market.

Once a company has been identified as having the information sought, the first thing the human-intelligence practitioner will do is look for weak links in the targeted company’s operations. If the required information is readily available, there is no need to undertake a time-intensive and costly operation to retrieve it. Indeed, it is shocking to see the amount of sensitive and critical information that is openly available on the Internet and in research libraries, or that is freely given out at technical conferences.

When open source collection efforts fail, more invasive measures must be employed. Sometimes the required information can be obtained via technical surveillance. A faulty information technology system, for example, can expose the company’s secrets via remote electronic intrusion conducted from a continent away. Other times, information can be obtained by eavesdropping on telephone calls made by corporate leaders or by using other technical surveillance measures.

However, technical surveillance has its limitations, and sometimes critical information must be obtained through human intelligence, which means obtaining the required data from an employee working within the targeted company. Due to human nature, human-intelligence practitioners use the same time-tested principles in the recruitment of corporate sources that they use when recruiting sources in the government sector. (The risks associated with obtaining unclassified proprietary information from private companies are often far less than those associated with obtaining classified information from government agencies or national research laboratories.)

The first step in the human-intelligence process is called spotting. This is when the human-intelligence practitioner attempts to identify those workers who have access to the required information. Then the practitioner conducts a thorough examination of the backgrounds and situations of the employees who have that access in an effort to determine which employee is most vulnerable to exploitation. Employees who are in dire need of extra cash to maintain extravagant lifestyles or to support drinking, drug or gambling habits, or those who are hiding extramarital affairs or other secrets that can be used for blackmail, make prime candidates. A background check might also reveal that a certain worker is angry with his or her employer over issues of salary or placement in the company. There also are employees who disagree ideologically with the product their company makes or the process the company uses to produce it. Finally, there are the employees whose egos are so big that they might be willing to risk committing industrial espionage just to prove they can get away with it. Robert Hanssen, an ex-FBI special agent accused of selling secrets to Russia, was motivated by the belief that he was above the system and could commit espionage without being caught.

Of the four major motivations for committing espionage — money, ideology, compromise and ego (known to security officials as MICE) — money has proven to be the No. 1 motivation, though two or more motivations can be used to turn an employee. More often than not, simple bribery is sufficient to obtain the desired information, especially if the employee is living beyond his or her means for one reason or another. Outside agents looking to turn an employee can also use blackmail (“compromise” in the MICE acronym). Demanding proprietary information in exchange for not exposing a personal secret, for instance, is a cost-effective approach that also allows the agent to return again and again to the same source. This method is a bit riskier, however, since it can cause more resentment than other means and make the source more likely to rebel. However, sexual entrapment and blackmail is still widely used as a recruitment tactic, one that has been used with great success in recent years by the Chinese government against targets such as Japanese and Taiwanese government officials, FBI special agents — and foreign businessmen.


Emphasizing the ‘M’

Once the practitioner has identified the weakest link, decided on the approach to take and made a specific plan on how to proceed, the next step in the human-intelligence process is to actually approach the employee and “pitch” him or her. This step is often a gradual effort to establish a relationship of trust between the practitioner and the employee, and contact can begin gradually with requests for small, seemingly harmless bits of information such as internal phone numbers. In this approach, known as the “little hook,” the employee is offered “gifts” in exchange for these favors. The requests gradually become greater in scope until the targeted information is obtained. Other times, the pitch is far more blatant and the human-intelligence practitioner does not take the time to establish a relationship or gradually recruit the target. Instead the practitioner makes a flat-out cash offer for the required goods or shows the target the e vidence that will be used for blackmail.

In the current economic environment, with many 401(k) plans now more like 201(k)s, stock options severely underwater and homeowners facing foreclosure, cold hard cash — the M in MICE — is an even more attractive approach. In fact, with employees seeing their investment accounts decline dramatically, and perhaps even facing the possibility of home foreclosure, it is not at all unreasonable to anticipate that companies and foreigners will face a windfall of walk-in sources who will volunteer to sell critical information — and in such a buyer’s market, information can often be bought at fire-sale prices. Employees attempting to sell proprietary information are somewhat common; one of the most publicized examples of this in recent years was the disgruntled Coca-Cola Co. employee who was arrested in July 2006 after attempting to sell Coke’s recipe to rival soft drink company Pepsi.

Mass layoffs also complicate the equation, especially when some of the employees being laid off have access to critical information. If measures are not taken to ensure that the information is protected, the information could easily find itself in the hands of competing companies or even foreign intelligence services.


Not Just a Corporate Concern

The current financial crisis — and vulnerability to espionage — is not just confined to the private sector. There are many federal government employees in the United States who have watched their investments in the stock-based funds of the government’s Thrift Savings Plan wither on the vine over the past two years, and judging from the performance of foreign stock exchanges, the investments of employees in other governments have followed suit. Additionally, government employees tend to live in places with very expensive real estate, like Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo. This means that a foreign intelligence officer armed only with a briefcase full of dollars, euros or yen can make a substantial amount of money. With many corporate security departments being cut to the bone, many internal security services focused on the counterterrorism mission and many law enforcement agencies chasing white-collar criminals, it is a good time to be in the intelligen ce business.

One day we will look back on this time through a counterintelligence lens and see that, although it was a time of bear stock markets, it was a tremendous bull market for practitioners of human intelligence.


by Stratfor, the global intelligence news service

TIMN – A ‘GRELHA’ DE RONFELDT

Uma interessante “grellha” de leitura esta TIMN (tribal, institutional, markets and networks) que David Ronfeldt propõe para uma “Overview of social evolution (past, present, and future)”, que elucide “how and why people's space-time-action orientations (STA) affect their mindsets. How and why four major forms of organization — tribes, hierarchical institutions, markets, and networks (TIMN) — affect social evolution”.

A descobrir Aqui e a avistar nos quadros abaixo:

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Volkoff... Mas que sorte!

Uma senhora muito inteligente e muito bonita passeia-se pelos ‘bouquinistes’ de Paris e tropeça num exemplar da primeira edição  (1979) de ‘Le Retournement’, do saudoso Vladimir Volkoff... E, como é rápida a perceber e a decidir, compra-o, imediatamente. E para quem o compra...? A quem decide oferecê-lo...?  A mim, a este apreciador (há décadas, há décadas...) do velho professor Volsky... Obrigado, miúda, muito obrigado! A próxima vez que for aí, convido-te para ir comer à Lipp e depois atravessamos o boulevard e vamos beber café ao “deux magots”... Combinado? E, olha, ainda outra vez, obrigado!

VLADIMIR PUTINE, CLARO...

ou de como o hábito faz, definitivamente, o monge!

"A perturbação da ordem pública"

O "Público", há dias, titulava, a propósito da acção voluntarista e "profilática" da PSP de Braga: "A perturbação da ordem pública". E não houve jornal gratuito ou pago que não fizesse uma incursão pela "Origem do Mundo"... E um dos poucos grandes cartoonistas portugueses aproveitou para incursar na pintura de Gustave Courbet.

Como um quadro da casa de campo de Lacan (dado pelos herdeiros em pagamento de imposto sucessório ao Estado francês) agitou mais as mentes e os fundilhos dos portugueses do que o autor do Seminaire alguma vez ousaria conceber… E como ele colocou estes náufragos da ocidental praia lusitana em contacto com a pintura do “novecento” francês! Formidável…  Apetece dizer: Viva a acção cultural e psicanalítica da PSP de Braga! Ou de como “Deus escreve direito por linhas tortas”.

Mylène Farmer: ‘A poil ou rien’

(Paródia)

O humor, o mistério de ser capaz de não se tomar a sério, de saber brincar com tudo, incluindo o muito sério, incluindo-se a si, não é definitivamente para qualquer um (sobretudo, se fôr português salazarentamente cultivado)... Mas é para a Mylène Farmer. Uma estrela a sério capaz de humor e de viver o humor consigo mesma e  e de... tudo!

Mylene Farmer: Que mon coeur lache

(Hot Version)

O COLAPSO E SUAS CONSEQUÊNCIAS

"I think it's astonishing, they're (the big bankrupt banks and their government enablers) ruining the US economy, they're ruining the US government, they're ruining the US central bank and they're ruining the US dollar...

You are watching something in front of our eyes, very historically, which is basically the destruction of New York as a financial center and the destruction of America as the world's most powerful country.

The idea that you have too much debt, too much borrowing and too much consumption and you're going to solve that problem with more debt, more consumption and more borrowing? These people are nuts.

Power is shifting now from the money shifters, the guys who trade paper and money, to people who produce real goods. What you should do is become a farmer, or start a farming network."

Jim Rogers, lendário investidor de Wall Street, (via CNBC) 

E isto leva, claro, a perguntar (John Robb):  Wall Street Icon Jim Rogers calls for Resilient Communities? E a comentar: He's getting to the nut of the idea behind resilient communities.

ONDE NOS LEVA ESTA MUDANÇA?

John Robb tem sido, há anos, um dos mais atentos observadores das mudanças em curso no sistema global e das suas diversas consequências. Aqui, no Claro, temos seguido em permanência a evolução das análises e propostas de Robb pois cedo reconhecemos o seu carácter precursor e o interesse dos horizontes que elas abrem. Hoje, divulgamos uma recente e interessante análise sobre a crise (ou o colapso) em curso e as mudanças que induz:

SOCIETAL EVOLUTION AND RONFELDT's TIMN

A systemic crisis is usually a catalyst for transformational societal change, and it's likely that the current crisis of global capitalism is large enough to play this role.  However, if change is coming, where is it bringing us? David Ronfeldt, a global guerrilla guru, has an interesting take on this from an organizational perspective.  He calls the model TIMN.  It's composed of four organizational forms:

• Tribes
• Institutions 
• Markets 
• Networks 

Societies, within this framework, began with tribal structures (99.9% of our history as human beings was spent in tribal structures) and expanded into institutional structures (nation-state bureaucracies) and finally into markets. Previous forms weren't abandoned, instead, they were enhanced by the addition of a new form.  Ronfeldt argues that the tri-form structure of tribes, institutions and markets are now nearly universal. Here's his description of the evolutionary process: At first, when a new form arises, it has subversive effects on the old order, before it has additive effects that lead to a new order. Bad actors may prove initially more adept than good actors at using a new form... As each form takes hold, energizing a distinct set of values and norms for actors operating in that form, it generates a new realm of activity — for example, the state, the market. As a new realm gains legitimacy and expands the space it occupies within a social system, it puts new limits on the scope of existing realms. At the same time, through feedback and other interactions, the rise of a new form/realm also modifies the nature of the existing ones.

The implications of this model, and I'm giving it short shrift given its richness, is that this crisis will show us the value of networked organizational forms.  For example: innovation/tinkering networks, resilient communities, and cyberdemocracy efforts.  The objective of a successful society should be to incorporate the value of networked forms into the existing TIM (tribal, institutional, and market) framework that already exists.  Ronfeldt again:

Societies that can elevate the bright over the dark side of each form and achieve a new combination become more powerful and capable of complex tasks than societies that do not. Societies that first succeed at making a new combination gain advantages over competitors and attain a paramount influence over the nature of international conflict and cooperation.

This model is very useful for analysis of our current situation.  However, there are a couple twists that may make its application problematic.  Here's a critique:

• If the crisis is too severe, it can force society backwards into tribal or TI (tribal plus institutional) structures.  Neo-feudalism and totalitarian states.
• This model assumes that countries, defined as discrete bordered geographies, are the only container within which these organizational forms exist.   It's possible that the elevation of markets to a global level, beyond the nation-state or country container, has left nation-states vulnerable to predation.  In that globalized system, market participants (who define themselves solely within context) prey on organizationally weak nation-states (T plus I).
• Global markets are supercharging tribal, institutional (corporate), and networked organizational types.  As a result, they are likely to prey upon nation-states too.

Posted by John Robb on Wednesday, 04 March 2009 at 07:36 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sócrates, Intruso e Perturbador

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa está - ele o diz no "Sol" - com "dúvida subliminar" (seja lá isso o que fôr...) sobre Sócrates. E, logo de seguida, tem de reconhecer que "os fatcos não permitem comprovar"... E conclui que só pode dizer que "Sócrates nasceu com expediente e sorte na vida". Grande Pecado, portanto!

A questão, claro, é outra. Esta marcelenta inveja, que rói o filho do governador-geral de Moçambique e afilhado do presidente do conselho de ministros, ex-patrão da mocidade portuguesa e violento arruaceiro e censor de Fernando Pessoa, tem outra natureza. O "fidalgo" Marcelo vê-se como herdeiro natural do País e vê, naturalmente, Sócrates como um intruso, um perturbador da ordem natural que o “fidalgo” Marcelo tem das coisas...

De facto, Sócrates não é filho do regime de Salazar nem afilhado do Caetano. Não é um “filho d’algo” do antigo regime, não pertence à miserável “fidalguia” saloia e salazarenta. A de Marcelo! E esse é o problema... O resto são acidentes, paisagem e pretextos para estas manifestações de inveja. Marcelentas e/ou outras. Misérias de um fidalgote do "complexo neo-corporativo e salazarento"...

United Against Nuclear Iran

ESQUEÇAM O “EIXO DO MAL”

VEM AÍ OUTRO BEM PIOR...

“The Axis of Upheaval
By Niall Ferguson  Foreign Policy

Forget Iran, Iraq, and North Korea -- Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” Today's most dangerous countries are the places where economic calamity meets political and social turmoil. “

A F.P. descobre assim o que há tempos aqui se chama de “Tortilla's Revolution”... Ver também, sobre esta matéria, as análises e os interessantes conceitos produzidos pelos trabalhos, dos últimos anos, de John Robb e de Tom Barnett.

O que ameaça a Rússia e

o que a Rússia ameaça...

Poderes e problemas do império de Putine analisados pela Stratfor

The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength

By Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan  March 3, 2009

 Related Link

·                       The Russian Resurgence

·                       Putin’s Consolidation of Power

·                       Russian Energy and Foreign Policy

·                       Russia’s Military

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has been re-establishing much of its lost Soviet-era strength. This has given rise to the possibility — and even the probability — that Russia again will become a potent adversary of the Western world. But now, Russia is yet again on the cusp of a set of massive currency devaluations that could destroy much of the country’s financial system. With a crashing currency, the disappearance of foreign capital, greatly decreased energy revenues and currency reserves flying out of the bank, the Western perception is that Russia is on the verge of collapsing once again. Consequently, many Western countries have started to grow complacent about Russia’s ability to further project power abroad.

But this is Russia. And Russia rarely follows anyone else’s rulebook.

The State of the Russian State

Russia has faced a slew of economic problems in the past six months. Incoming foreign direct investment, which reached a record high of $28 billion in 2007, has reportedly dried up to just a few billion. Russia’s two stock markets, the Russian Trading System (RTS) and the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), have fallen 78 and 67 percent respectively since their highs in May 2008. And Russians have withdrawn $290 billion from the country’s banks in fear of a financial collapse .

One of Moscow’s sharpest financial pains came in the form of a slumping Russian ruble, which has dropped by about one-third against the dollar since August 2008. Thus far, the Kremlin has spent $200 billion defending its currency, a startling number given that the currency still dropped by 35 percent. The Russian government has allowed dozens of mini-devaluations to occur since August; the ruble’s fall has pushed the currency past its lowest point in the 1998 ruble crash.

The Kremlin now faces three options. First, it can continue defending the ruble by pouring more money into what looks like a black hole. Realistically, this can last only another six months or so, as Russia’s combined reserves of $750 billion in August 2008 have dropped to just less than $400 billion due to various recession-battling measures (of which currency defense is only one). This option would also limit Russia’s future anti-recession measures to currency defense alone. In essence, this option relies on merely hoping the global recession ends before the till runs dry.

The second option would be to abandon any defense of the ruble and just let the currency crash. This option will not hurt Moscow or its prized industries (like those in the energy and metals sectors) too much, as the Kremlin, its institutions and most large Russian companies hold their reserves in dollars and euros. Smaller businesses and the Russian people would lose everything, however, just as in the August 1998 ruble crash. This may sound harsh, but the Kremlin has proved repeatedly — during the Imperial, Soviet and present eras — that it is willing to put the survival of the Russian state before the welfare and survival of the people.

The third option is much like the second. It involves sealing the currency system off completely from international trade, relegating it only to use in purely domestic exchanges. But turning to a closed system would make the ruble absolutely worthless abroad, and probably within Russia as well — the black market and small businesses would be forced to follow the government’s example and switch to the euro, or more likely, the U.S. dollar. (Russians tend to trust the dollar more than the euro.)

According to the predominant rumor in Moscow, the Kremlin will opt for combining the first and second options, allowing a series of small devaluations, but continuing a partial defense of the currency to avoid a single 1998-style collapse. Such a hybrid approach would reflect internal politicking.

The lack of angst within the government over the disappearance of the ruble as a symbol of Russian strength is most intriguing. Instead of discussing how to preserve Russian financial power, the debate is now over how to let the currency crash. The destruction of this particular symbol of Russian strength over the past ten years has now become a given in the Kremlin’s thinking, as has the end of the growth and economic strength seen in recent years.

Washington is interpreting the Russian acceptance of economic failure as a sort of surrender. It is not difficult to see why. For most states — powerful or not — a deep recession coupled with a currency collapse would indicate an evisceration of the ability to project power, or even the end of the road. After all, similar economic collapses in 1992 and 1998 heralded periods in which Russian power simply evaporated, allowing the Americans free rein across the Russian sphere of influence. Russia has been using its economic strength to revive its influence as of late, so — as the American thinking goes — the destruction of that strength should lead to a new period of Russian weakness.

Geography and Development

But before one can truly understand the roots of Russian power, the reality and role of the Russian economy must be examined. From this perspective, the past several years are most certainly an aberration — and we are not simply speaking of the post-Soviet collapse.

All states economies’ to a great degree reflect their geographies. In the United States, the presence of large, interconnected river systems in the central third of the country, the intracoastal waterway along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, the vastness of San Francisco Bay, the numerous rivers flowing to the sea from the eastern slopes of the Appalachian Mountains and the abundance of ideal port locations made the country easy to develop. The cost of transporting goods was nil, and scarce capital could be dedicated to other pursuits. The result was a massive economy with an equally massive leg up on any competition.

Russia’s geography is the polar opposite. Hardly any of Russia’s rivers are interconnected. The country has several massive ones — the Pechora, the Ob, the Yenisei, the Lena and the Kolyma — but they drain the nearly unpopulated Siberia to the Arctic Ocean, making them useless for commerce. The only river that cuts through Russia’s core, the Volga, drains not to the ocean but to the landlocked and sparsely populated Caspian Sea, the center of a sparsely populated region. Also unlike the United States, Russia has few useful ports. Kaliningrad is not connected to the main body of Russia. The Gulf of Finland freezes in winter, isolating St. Petersburg. The only true deepwater and warm-water ocean ports, Vladivostok and Murmansk, are simply too far from Russia’s core to be useful. So while geography handed the United States the perfect transport network free of charge, Russia has had to use every available kopek to link its country together with an expensive road, rail and canal network.

One of the many side effects of this geography situation is that the United States had extra capital that it could dedicate to finance in a relatively democratic manner, while Russia’s chronic capital deficit prompted it to concentrate what little capital resources it had into a single set of hands — Moscow’s hands. So while the United States became the poster child for the free market, Russia (whether the Russian Empire, Soviet Union or Russian Federation) has always tended toward central planning.

Russian industrialization and militarization began in earnest under Josef Stalin in the 1930s. Under centralized planning, all industry and services were nationalized, while industrial leaders were given predetermined output quotas.

Perhaps the most noteworthy difference between the Western and Russian development paths was the different use of finance. At the start of Stalin’s massive economic undertaking, international loans to build the economy were unavailable, both because the new government had repudiated the czarist regime’s international debts and because industrialized countries — the potential lenders — were coping with the onset of their own economic crisis (e.g., the Great Depression).

With loans and bonds unavailable, Stalin turned to another centrally controlled resource to “fund” Russian development: labor. Trade unions were converted into mechanisms for capturing all available labor as well as for increasing worker productivity. Russia essentially substitutes labor for capital, so it is no surprise that Stalin — like all Russian leaders before him — ran his population into the ground. Stalin called this his “revolution from above.”

Over the long term, the centralized system is highly inefficient, as it does not take the basic economic drivers of supply and demand into account — to say nothing of how it crushes the common worker. But for a country as geographically massive as Russia, it was (and remains) questionable whether Western finance-driven development is even feasible, due to the lack of cheap transit options and the massive distances involved. Development driven by the crushing of the labor pool was probably the best Russia could hope for, and the same holds true today.

In stark contrast to ages past, for the past five years foreign money has underwritten Russian development. Russian banks did not depend upon government funding — which was accumulated into vast reserves — but instead tapped foreign lenders and bondholders. Russian banks took this money and used it to lend to Russian firms. Meanwhile, as the Russian government asserted control over the country’s energy industries during the last several years, it created a completely separate economy that only rarely intersected with other aspects of Russian economic life. So when the current global recession helped lead to the evaporation of foreign credit, the core of the government/energy economy was broadly unaffected, even as the rest of the Russian economy ingloriously crashed to earth.

Since Putin’s rise, the Kremlin has sought to project an image of a strong, stable and financially powerful Russia. This vision of strength has been the cornerstone of Russian confidence for years. Note that STRATFOR is saying “vision,” not “reality.” For in reality, Russian financial confidence is solely the result of cash brought in from strong oil and natural gas prices — something largely beyond the Russians’ ability to manipulate — not the result of any restructuring of the Russian system. As such, the revelation that the emperor has no clothes — that Russia is still a complete financial mess — is more a blow to Moscow’s ego than a signal of a fundamental change in the reality of Russian power.

The Reality of Russian Power

So while Russia might be losing its financial security and capabilities, which in the West tend to boil down to economic wealth, the global recession has not affected the reality of Russian power much at all. Russia has not, currently or historically, worked off of anyone else’s cash or used economic stability as a foundation for political might or social stability. Instead, Russia relies on many other tools in its kit. Some of the following six pillars of Russian power are more powerful and appropriate than ever:

1. Geography: Unlike its main geopolitical rival, the United States, Russia borders most of the regions it wishes to project power into, and few geographic barriers separate it from its targets. Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states have zero geographic insulation from Russia. Central Asia is sheltered by distance, but not by mountains or rivers. The Caucasus provide a bit of a speed bump to Russia, but pro-Russian enclaves in Georgia give the Kremlin a secure foothold south of the mountain range (putting the August Russian-Georgian war in perspective). Even if U.S. forces were not tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States would face potentially insurmoun table difficulties in countering Russian actions in Moscow’s so-called “Near Abroad.” Russia can project all manner of influence and intimidation there on the cheap, while even symbolic counters are quite costly for the United States. In contrast, places such as Latin America, Southeast Asia or Africa do not capture much more than the Russian imagination; the Kremlin realizes it can do little more there than stir the occasional pot, and resources are allotted (centrally, of course) accordingly.
2. Politics: It is no secret that the Kremlin uses an iron fist to maintain domestic control. There are few domestic forces the government cannot control or balance. The Kremlin understands the revolutions (1917 in particular) and collapses (1991 in particular) of the past, and it has control mechanisms in place to prevent a repeat. This control is seen in every aspect of Russian life, from one main political party ruling the country to the lack of diversified media, limits on public demonstrations and the infiltration of the security services into nearly every aspect of the Russian system. This domination was fortified under Stalin and has been re-established under the reign of former President and now-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This political strength is based on neither financial nor economic foundations. Instead, it is based within the political institutions and parties, on the lack of a meaningful opposition, and with the backing of the military and security services. Russia’s neighbors, especially in Europe, cannot count on the same political strength because their systems are simply not set up the same way. The stability of the Russian government and lack of stability in the former Soviet states and much of Central Europe have also allowed the Kremlin to reach beyond Russia and influence its neighbors to the east. Now as before, when some of its former Soviet subjects — such as Ukraine — become destabilized, Russia sweeps in as a source of stability and authority, regardless of whether this benefits the recipient of Moscow’s attention.
3. Social System: As a consequence of Moscow’s political control and the economic situation, the Russian system is socially crushing, and has had long-term effects on the Russian psyche. As mentioned above, during the Soviet-era process of industrialization and militarization, workers operated under the direst of conditions for the good of the state. The Russian state has made it very clear that the productivity and survival of the state is far more important than the welfare of the people. This made Russia politically and economically strong, not in the sense that the people have had a voice, but in that they have not challenged the state since the beginning of the Soviet period. The Russian people, regardless of whether they admit it, continue to work to keep the state intact even when it does not benefit them. When the Soviet Uni on collapsed in 1991, Russia kept operating — though a bit haphazardly. Russians still went to work, even if they were not being paid. The same was seen in 1998, when the country collapsed financially. This is a very different mentality than that found in the West. Most Russians would not even consider the mass protests seen in Europe in response to the economic crisis. The Russian government, by contrast, can count on its people to continue to support the state and keep the country going with little protest over the conditions. Though there have been a few sporadic and meager protests in Russia, these protests mainly have been in opposition to the financial situation, not to the government’s hand in it. In some of these demonstrations, protesters have carried signs reading, “In government we trust, in the economic system we don’t.” This means Moscow can count on a stable population.
4. Natural Resources: Modern Russia enjoys a wealth of natural resources in everything from food and metals to gold and timber. The markets may take a roller-coaster ride and the currency may collapse, but the Russian economy has access to the core necessities of life. Many of these resources serve a double purpose, for in addition to making Russia independent of the outside world, they also give Moscow the ability to project power effectively. Russian energy — especially natural gas — is particularly key: Europe is dependent on Russian natural gas for a quarter of its demand. This relationship guarantees Russia a steady supply of now-scarce capital even as it forces the Europeans to take any Russian concerns seriously. The energy tie is something Russia has very publicly used as a political weapon, either by raising prices or by cutting off supplies. In a recession, this lever’s effectiveness has only grown.
5. Military: The Russian military is in the midst of a broad modernization and restructuring, and is reconstituting its basic warfighting capability. While many challenges remain, Moscow already has imposed a new reality through military force in Georgia. While Tbilisi was certainly an easy target, the Russian military looks very different to Kiev &# 8212; or even Warsaw and Prague — than it does to the Pentagon. And even in this case, Russia has come to rely increasingly heavily on its nuclear arsenal to rebalance the military equation and ensure its territorial integrity, and is looking to establish long-term nuclear parity with the Americans. Like the energy tool, Russia’s military has become more useful in times of economic duress, as potential targets have suffered far more than the Russians.
6. Intelligence: Russia has one of the world’s most sophisticated and powerful intelligence services. Historically, its only rival has been the United States (though today the Chinese arguably could be seen as rivaling the Americans and Russians). The KGB (now the FSB) instills fear into hearts around the world, let alone inside Russia. Infiltration and intimidation kept the Soviet Union and its sphere under control. No matter the condition of the Russian state, Moscow’s intelligence foundation has been its strongest pillar. The FSB and other Russian intelligence agencies have infiltrated most former Soviet republics and satellite states, and they also have infiltrated as far as Latin America and the United States. Russian intelligence has infiltrated political, security, military and business realms worldwide, and has boasted of infiltrating many former Soviet satellite governments, militaries and companies up to the highest level. All facets of the Russian government have backed this infiltration since Putin (a former KGB man) came to power and filled the Kremlin with his cohorts. This domestic and international infiltration has been built up for half a century. It is not something that requires much cash to maintain, but rather know-how — and the Russians wrote the book on the subject. One of the reasons Moscow can run this system inexpensively relative to what it gets in return is because Russia’s intelligence services have long been human-based, though they do have some highly advanced technology to wield. Russia also has incorporated other social networks in its intelligence services, such as organized crime or the Russian Orthodox Church, creating an intricate system at a low price. Russia’s intelligence services are much larger than most other countries’ services and cover most of the world. But the intelligence apparatus’ most intense focus is on the Russian periphery, rather than on the more expensive “far abroad.”
 

Thus, while Russia’s financial sector may be getting torn apart, the state does not really count on that sector for domestic cohesion or stability, or for projecting power abroad. Russia knows it lacks a good track record financially, so it depends on — and has shored up where it can — six other pillars to maintain its (self-proclaimed) place as a major international player. The current financial crisis would crush the last five pillars for any other state, but in Russia, it has only served to strengthen these bases. Over the past few years, there was a certain window of opportunity for Russia to resurge while Washington was preoccupied with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This window has been kept open longer by the West’s lack of worry over the Russian resurgence given the financial crisis. But others closer to the Russian border understand that Moscow has many tools more potent than finance with which to continue reasserting itself.

Freida Pinto
LISBOA – INDIA - HOLLYWOOD

O sucesso de F. Pinto é meteórico e parece garantido. Segundo o jornal brasileiro ‘A TARDE On Line’, Freida Pinto confirma participação em filme de Woody Allen. ‘Após o sucesso no filme "Quem Quer Ser Um Milionário?", que ganhou oito estatuetas do Oscar, a atriz indiana Freida Pinto, que participou do longa, se prepara para um novo trabalho. Ele foi escalada para o elenco do novo filme de Woody Allen.

‘A atriz confirmou a participação em um programa de rádio norte-americano. As filmagens começam em julho. Freida Pinto, que começou a carreira como modelo, também agradeceu ao britânico Danny Boyle pela visibilidade que ele deu a ela em Hollywood.’

PONTO CRÍTICO

Uma entrevista a ler e bem ponderar antes que seja demasiado tarde e todos os recursos disponíveis (e mais alguns...) sejam estafados nesse insaciável queimador de notas em que se tornou a banca tradicional, um autêntico Moloch global do sistema económico.

De Jorge Nasciomento Rodrigues, na Janelanaweb.com, an interview with financial analyst and management guru Peter Cohan

Analyst Peter Cohan on the zombies’crisis:

«I would suggest use taxpayer money to create new banks»

VERÃO 2009

cenário de John Robb

THE QUICK ROAD TO GLOBAL INSURGENCY

Notes on this century's global depression (D2) and the wars that will emerge from its onset.  Here's one potential scenario.  Enjoy.

The summer of 2009 will see protests in the 'West' as the newly financially destitute vent their anger at both the incompetence (unable to anticipate events or formulate plans that work) and corruption (due to looting of government coffers by firms like AIG, RBS, an Citibank) of their respective governments.  However, this phase of the crisis will likely quickly pass as:

1. The realization that peaceful protest, from marches and placard waving, has ceased to be effective tool of political change.   Efforts are lost in the noise. 
2. Regulations on protest have neutered it.   Protesters can't even get within earshot of 'protected' targets -- from the President to targeted firms.
3. Police departments will crack down on protesters.   From the use of counter-insurgency tactics and legal pressure against organizers to a rapid escalation to violence in the street (as the police in London are planning -- as in, no repeat of Athens here). 

The unanticipated result will be that as protest quickly fades and the depression deepens, an open source insurgency will begin as groups form based on new primary loyalties (global guerrillas).  A plethora of groups, from criminal to nationalist to family to religious to ethnic, will form in an attempt to address the needs of specific/targeted populations.  Many of these groups, as we have seen elsewhere, will quickly resort to violence in order to advance their interests.  

This will create a 'long or fat tail' of violent groups, made possible by the growing weakness and demonstrated failure (in that it can't protect its population from the harshness of the now dominant global market system and its financial predators)  of the nation-state as a system of governance.*  The common themes of these groups, will be opposition to the ineffectual state and the advancement of the group's economic interests.  The result will be: 

1. the rapid proliferation of temporary autonomous zones as these groups take control of localities (as in, co-opt or cow police/local governance and coerce local populations not in the group membership), 
2. new forms of 'off the grid' economic activity (black market, smuggling, etc.) flourishes, and
3. an open insurgency, mostly disruptive events meant to coerce and distract, between these groups and the national government that is trying to regain control.  

The Resilient Community Alternative

The option for those not interested in advancing economic interests through the projection of violence, is to disconnect or firewall your community via efforts at resilience.  The most critical element of that effort in the short term is a tremendously difficult judo move:  

How do you prevent the undertow of the failing global financial system from gutting your community via foreclosure/bankruptcy and debt (and thereby driving the development of global guerrillas) while at the same time building alternative forms of local commercial and/or cooperative endeavor?  That's the big question.

*  One thing that makes this "fat tail" of small violent groups interesting is that cumulative violence it can project is much greater than the modern nation-state can project.  Why?  Nation-state power is confined in a 'box' of its own making -- a combination of moral limits, legal restrictions, and global financial pressure enforce the walls of the box.

BELA QUESTÃO II…

John Robb:

“(…) can nation-states adapt successfully to the twin pressures of the new global environment?  Here's what I mean.  Nation-states are now caught between two irresistible and strengthening forces…”

Posted by John Robb on Thursday, 26 February 2009 at 10:25 AM | Permalink | Comments (6)

BELA QUESTÃO…

Elite Taxes

If this many of the vetted cabinet officers are failing tax scrutinty…shouldn’t we, y’know, check the rest of the establishment’s taxes?

Tuesday, February 3, 2009   Shlok Vaidya’s Thinking On markets, technology, states and disruptive innovation

O BURLESCO E O SEU BRADO

“ Frases que deram brado

"Os donos do capital vão estimular a classe trabalhadora a comprar bens caros, casas e tecnologia, fazendo-os dever cada vez mais, até que se torne insuportável.
O débito não pago levará os bancos à falência, que terão que ser nacionalizados pelo Estado"

( Karl Marx, in Das Kapital, 1867)    “

Desde que um comunista (espanhol e analfabeto) foi há dias buscar esta citação a um jornal satírico americano que ela não pára de ser citada por intelectuais de esquerda e, às tantas, até algum de direita. Não me espanta. Cá pelo sítio, os intelectuais de direita formaram-se nas cartilhas de OPAN (organização política e administrativa da nação) e no catecismo (com graves dissidências no pós e no ante Vaticano II), (com)fundiram o Tomás de Aquino com uns precursores franciscanos e idem para Santo Hobbes com um bispo de Cartago. Tudo com umas gotas de molho de Carl Schmitd traduzido para português do Mondego, que a ler o original ainda tropeçavam na directiva dos 3K… Quanto aos intelectuais de esquerda, com muito ‘que fazer’, o tempo para leituras tem-lhes sido escasso… E muito menos lhes chega para penetrar “dialécticas da mercadoria” e todo o blindado linguajar da metafísica da fase barroca do romantismo alemão. Portanto, parece-me normal que nenhum tenha sentido após a leitura das primeiras seis palavras da frase que Karl Heinrich Marx nunca escreveria assim (mas enfim o tradutor poderia ter sido traidor…) e, após os segundos que a leitura da citação lhes tivesse tomado, percebido que a lógica ali contida não é a do autor da “Miséria da Filosofia”… A miséria aqui é outra!

O americano autor desta história burlesca deve, a esta hora, doer-lhe a barriga de tanto se rir dos sábios e superiores intelectuais europeus… Depois do Sartre do Pedro Passos Coelho, só nos faltava mesmo este Marx!

Ver Claro

A Coluna dos Sábados no "Correio da Manhã", 28 Fevereiro 2009

Implosão

Défices record e recessão na Alemanha, no Japão, na Inglaterra e nos EUA (Obama já nem sabe que fazer) acompanhados pela escalada do desemprego. Será esta globalização da implosão a implosão da globalização? 2009 é mesmo o "ano negro" que aqui previmos no início de 2008.

Duração. Banca avara e mudança no consumo determinam esta recessão que ninguém sabe quando terminará. A Stratfor já admite... 2020!

Compensação. A erosão da economia exige reforço de outras componentes de potência. Tóquio, Pequim, Moscovo, Paris, Madrid, Washington, apostam na inteligência económica e estratégica e nas ‘tecnológicas’ de Defesa e Segurança.

Precisão. Para atingir os seus objectivos, Obama quer ‘informação oportuna, credível e coerente’ da CIA e demais intelligence...

Transformação. Reorganização, novo estatuto e duplicação orçamental fazem dos ‘serviços’ franceses uma máquina de ‘intelligence’ para ‘saber e antecipar’.

Modernização tecnológica: o KGB recebeu novos armamentos, sistemas de comunicação e transportes, alojamentos e aumento de salários.

Incompreensão. Mexidas à vista nas ‘tecnológicas’ da Defesa mostram-nos em contraciclo e incapazes de aprender com quem sabe (americanos ou franceses) como fazer a defesa da Economia com a economia da Defesa e garantir o upgrade das arcaicas Defesa e Economia... 

José Mateus

Consultor de Inteligência Competitiva

verclaro.jm@gmail.com

No Canal da Inteligência Económica  TVAEGE

Conférence “La diplomatie française et  

la défense de nos intérêts économiques”

Discours de clôture de l’Université d’été de l’Intelligence Économique, par Alain Juillet