CLARO

London, February 27 (ANI): Acting legend Clint Eastwood , 79, apparently believes that political correctness has rendered modern society humourless, for he accuses younger generations of spending too much time trying to avoid being offensive.
The Dirty Harry star insists that he should be able to tell harmless jokes about nationality without fearing that people may brand him "a racist".
"People have lost their sense of humour. In former times we constantly made jokes about different races. You can only tell them today with one hand over your mouth or you will be insulted as a racist," the Daily Express quoted him as saying.
"I find that ridiculous. In those earlier days every friendly clique had a 'Sam the Jew' or 'Jose the Mexican' - but we didn't think anything of it or have a racist thought. It was just normal that we made jokes based on our nationality or ethnicity. That was never a problem. I don't want to be politically correct.
We're all spending too much time and energy trying to be politically correct about everything," he added. (ANI)

Não percebo bem que público-alvo o José Eduardo Moniz elegeu para o novo canal, mas depois de ver a noite de hoje uma coisa me parece evidente: a TVI 24 precisa de um refresh... Aquele ar ‘anos 70’ não lhe augura nada de bom. Esse profissionalão que é o Moniz andará distraído...? Como se dizia, em tempos nesta cidade, “você está doente ou está cansado?” Seja como fôr, que seja bem-vindo!

Está no on-line do semanário ‘Sol’ (título que era propriedade do falecido Paradela de Abreu que, por razões de uma velha amizade, o cedeu a Vera Lagoa, numa altura em que o ‘Diabo’ tinha sido compulsivamente suspenso...e que, não sei bem como, foi parar às mãos do arquitecto Saraiva) um artigo de opinião, de um antropólogo, que me parece saído fora de tempo. Eu explico o meu ponto de vista.

Tinha decidido com o meu velho amigo Miguel Reis lançarmos uma “Associação Polis”, pela legalização da poliandria e da poligamia, defendendo a total legalização e legitimação das e dos amantes (palavra que paradoxalmente em português não tem sexo...), pois o amor, todo o amor, só pode ser sempre legítimo.

A nossa posição de partida face às “fracturas” provocadas pelo “casamento gay” é que essa coisa não nos diz respeito e que não vale a pena entrar em polémicas dessa natureza... Deixamos isso para a quem essa coisa interessa.

O que, para nós e para a grande maioria da nação, vale a pena é tratar os assuntos que nos dizem respeito, aproveitando a porta escancarada pela tal decisão político-jurídica de criar o “casamento gay”. Pois se a regra é “cada um come do que gosta”, então queremos que as e os amantes saiam do armário e possam passear-se ao sol nos braços das pessoas que amarem. Queremos as amantes legitimadas e com estatuto legal. Queremos a legalização da poligamia e da poliandria, esta tão bem defendida, aliás, há 2 ou 3 anos, por uma Carla Bruni em várias entrevistas. Queremos o casamento poligâmico e – porque não somos machistas, nem talibans, nem ayatolas – queremos o casamento poliândrico!

Como o Miguel se ausentou para a Ásia por umas semanas (em trabalho e não propriamente visitar amantes...), a constituição da Associação Polis ficou suspensa, até ao seu regresso.

Entretanto, aparece este antropológico artigo... E lá vamos ter de convidar o seu autor para sócio da “Polis”.

No que respeita às polémicas em torno do chamado casamento gay, há uma conspiração de silêncio colectiva em relação ao princípio da universalidade do Direito que recomenda que se legisle o interesse particular em conformidade com o interesse geral e com outros interesses particulares.

O ensaísta Charles Krauthammer escreveu no Washington Post, a propósito das pretensões de legalização da poligamia nos EUA, na esteira do movimento a favor do casamento gay, que o surgimento destas fórmulas de casamento não é a causa mas o sintoma do esboroar do matrimónio tradicional perante a expansão das ideologias individualistas radicais.
Para ele, é juridicamente indefensável discriminar positivamente a união homossexual no momento de alargar as fronteiras conceptuais do casamento, face a outras possibilidades lógicas de união matrimonial não autorizadas. A consequência lógica da extensão do âmbito legal de forma a abarcar os interesses homossexuais, em nome do direito à não discriminação de opções individuais ou culturais, é a abolição dos princípios de monogamia e de proibição de incesto.

Lembremos: a justificação para a proibição de incesto é a eventualidade de dele resultar uma prole geneticamente anómala. Já a premissa monogâmica assenta numa justificação cultural e não biológica. A poligamia carece de fundamento normativo no Ocidente por não ser suportada por preceitos religiosos, ao contrário da lei islâmica, e exprime uma inadmissível assimetria estatutária entre homens e mulheres.

Mas, preceitos e crenças religiosas à parte, os defensores do casamento gay deverão, em nome do princípio de universalidade do direito, defender toda a união incestuosa de que não resulte uma prole geneticamente enfraquecida e toda a união poligâmica (ou melhor, poliamorosa) que não promova assimetria entre sexos.

Legalizar o casamento gay implica negar a exclusividade categorial do casamento tradicional, definido como uma união entre dois indivíduos de sexos opostos e sem laços consanguíneos. Assim, o legislador que equipare aquela união a esta será logicamente forçado a não distinguir entre o direito de dois indivíduos do mesmo sexo, não aparentados entre si, a casar e adoptar filhos, e o direito de três indivíduos consanguíneos e do mesmo sexo à união matrimonial e à adopção. A legalização do casamento homossexual exige, portanto, a regulamentação do seu corolário mais extremo – nomeadamente, o casamento homossexual incestuoso poligâmico.

Se colocamos em causa um dos critérios definidores da noção de casamento (união entre sexos opostos), então que justificação lógica e jurídica haverá para não descartarmos os outros dois (união restrita a dois indivíduos, não consanguíneos)?
O mais curioso, e diríamos paradoxal, em toda esta polémica é a insistência com que as ideologias individualistas radicais, subjacentes ao casamento gay, se afirmam como bandeiras da esquerda, e não da direita.

Face à crise, esqueçam o "crescimento, os empregos e a estabilidade financeira"… O que os Estados (os que puderem...) têm de garantir é comida, abrigo, transportes e segurança. Perspectiva de dois analistas americanos, Dmitry Orlov, autor de ‘Reinventing Collapse’, e de John Robb, de ‘Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization’. Portanto, depois de ‘precário’ (em 2007) e de ‘fragmentação’ (em 2008), mais uma palavra se impõe no nosso léxico da crise: colapso...

China no zero? A China diz que cresceu 6,8% no último trimestre de 2008. Mas Pequim compara um trimestre com todo o ano anterior. Ora, se compararmos com o período homólogo de 2007, a China está a crescer 1% ou mesmo… zero!

Défice dos EUA passa de 482 mil milhões (2008) para mais de um milhão de milhões (7% do PIB), em 2009...

Defesa, alta tecnologia, aeronáutica e nuclear são os sectores com acesso ao Fundo criado por Sarkozy para ajudar empresas a superar a crise. Mas só desde que sejam "economicamente rentáveis..."

Exportar mais, pede Cavaco... Mas de um Presidente economista espera-se mais: que diga como exportar melhor (e não apenas mais), com mais valor acrescentado e maior controlo da cadeia de valor. E para onde...

Irão ameaça anexar o Bahrein, "14.ª província do Irão"... Tensão sobe.

Homem de Putine e da Gazprom, o ex-primeiro ministro alemão Gerhard Schroeder encontrou-se em Teherão com o presidente Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, para “falar de negócios”...

TERRORISMO E GUERRA OU COMO

AS PERCEPÇÕES SÃO CRÍTICAS...

Joseph Henrotin, analisando a vertente ‘Guerre et terrorisme : vers un brouillage des distinctions’, explica como ‘la prégnance de visions technologiquement intensives peut par ailleurs pousser à considérer la notion de sécurité dans son sens mathématique, en tentant de la chiffrer, mais sans véritablement en mesurer le caractère intrinsèquement non-linéaire. C’est une dérive que J. W. Gibson dénonçait déjà comme ayant conduit à la perte de la guerre du Vietnam…’

Henrontin mostra ainda que ‘une perception peut-elle vite devenir une adversaire. Après le 11 septembre et le 11 mars, les interactions de questions-réponses (…) ont modifié ce que nous pensons être la sécurité. Plus que jamais, sa définition devenait problématique, à l’articulation entre les versants internes et externes de l’État, brouillant les référents traditionnels de sa percep¬tion et de la celle du terrorisme. Qu’est-il ? Guerre ? Conflit ? Ayant compris ce brouillage des référents tradition¬nels, Liang et Xiangsui, les auteurs de La guerre hors limites, montrent comment exploiter les vulnérabilités perceptuelles des sociétés occidentales.’

Colocados estes postulados, Henrontin formula a questão decisiva: ‘Continuation d’un projet politique, le terrorisme n’est pas en soi une guerre pour D. Bigo, qui considère que la guerre n’était concevable qu’entre deux États en conflit ouvert. Mais force est aussi de constater que la définition classique des guerres n’est plus pertinente. On ne les déclare plus, tout comme “le front” n’existe plus, mettant à mal tous nos référents en la matière. Aussi, comment caractériser un conflit violent entre des États et des réseaux pour partie avérés, pour partie virtuels (en ce qu’ils demeurent en puissance)?’

E fornece elementos e pistas de resposta a essa questão vital : ‘Au travers d’un ouvrage brillant, le général Francart nous montre que le premier des belligérants qui comprend et qui donne un sens à un conflit prend automatiquement l’avantage sur son adversaire, tout conflit étant d’abord une guerre du sens. De même, pour R. Szafranski, les défis actuels sont épistémologiques et le gagnant est le belligérant qui préserve mieux ses valeurs que l’Autre. Les différentes opérations y sont intrinsèquement de nature psychologique et s’attaquent directement aux croyances, aux cultures et aux valeurs, désorientant pour les réorienter et les reformuler les légitimités et les loyautés [3][30]. Pour le colonel américain, ce type de guerre a un contenu social très fort, y cherchant plus la rupture (disruption) que la destruction.’

Ponto crítico: as percepções. Escrefve Henrontin, ‘corollaire d’une technologisation à outrance de sociétés de plus en plus spécialisées, les perceptions deviennent le plus petit dénominateur commun entre leurs membres. Or, ce sont ces perceptions qui comman¬deront les réactions stratégiques comme tactiques face à la menace. Elles sont à la source de l’action.’ Ou, como já foi dito, em 24 de Julho de 2004, aqui no Claro, “as percepções são críticas… por isso, têm de ser geridas!”
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Ver Dossier: Terrorisme et stratégie, na Revue stratégique

Num momento em que poder marítimo e estratégia naval voltam de novo a ocupar a ordem do dia, vale a pena passar os olhos por esta sistematização da “evolução do pensamento naval" - estabelecida sob a direcção de Hervé Coutau-Begarie, do Institut de Stratégie Comparée e directeur d'études à l'Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes e da Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense - e descobrir algumas coisas interessantes... E, por falar de descobrir, a esta “antologia” não podia faltar o pensamento brilhante do precursor português da estratégia marítima, aqui tratado por Alain Mangin, em Le père Fernando de Oliveira. Talvez valesse a pena ao nosso IDN, que agora parece ressuscitar de um longo sono fatídico, dedicar umas tardes a esta matéria... O Professor António José Telo entende o que quero dizer.

Cette rubrique vous permet d'atteindre des ouvrages ou articles choisis parmi les nombreux documents de ce site (voyez notamment Publications et Revue Stratégique) traitant d'histoire, de stratégie ou de doctrine maritimes.

L'icône : signale les ouvrages dont le texte complet vous est fourni sur ce site. Les autres ouvrages sont présentés par leur sommaire, leur introduction et parfois un index. A ce sujet, consultez la politique de publication de l'ISC sur Internet.
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Les trois premiers volumes de la série "L'évolution de la pensée navale" ont été publiés dans le cadre du programme d’histoire de la pensée navale conduit conjointement par le groupe d’histoire de la stratégie navale de la Commission française d’histoire maritime et le groupe d’histoire des doctrines stratégiques du Centre d’analyse politique comparée de l’Université de Bordeaux, avec le concours du Laboratoire de stratégie théorique de la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale. © FEDN, Hôtel national des Invalides, 75007 PARIS, 1992. L'Institut de Stratégie Comparée a repris les actifs de la FEDN (revues et livres), après dissolution de celle-ci, et en assure aujourd'hui l'exploitation. © ISC 1994.

Cette collection est désormais publiée dans le cadre du programme d’histoire de la pensée navale conduit conjointement par le groupe d’histoire de la stratégie navale de l’Institut de stratégie comparée et le groupe d’histoire des doctrines stratégiques du Centre d’analyse politique comparée de l’Université de Bordeaux, avec le concours de l’Institut d’Histoire de la Défense. © Economica et ISC 1994-2000

Volume I

Volume II

Volume IV

"Parmi les quelque 37 000 journalistes français, nombreux sont ceux qui se considèrent comme des intellectuels plutôt que comme des reporters. Au lieu de simplement rapporter des faits, ils essaient souvent d'influencer les lecteurs à travers leur propre parti pris. En même temps, de nombreux journalistes politiques et économiques ont reçu une éducation élitiste et fréquenté les mêmes établissements universitaires que les hommes politiques dont ils couvrent l'actualité... Par conséquent, ces reporters n'ont guère tendance à considérer leur rôle comme celui d'un chien de garde ou d'un contrepoids aux pouvoirs politique et économique en place".

no prefácio do recente relatório (público) sobre o estado da imprensa em França, ‘Media Guide France 2008’... O que não dirão num trabalho do mesmo tipo sobre Portugal!

A CHINA NA CRISE

A CRISE NA CHINA

A crise económica global não poupa nada nem país algum, a China que no Outono passado se acreditou ao abrigo da crise já descobriu que estava bastante enganada nessa crença e começa a ter medo, muito medo. E é o próprio PCC que começa a ver tremido o seu papel de força dirigente absoluta... A Stratfor analisa:

e Chinese Stimulus Plan

Internal Divisions and th

Due in large part to fears of dire consequences if nothing were done to tackle the economic crisis,

China

rushed through a 4 trillion yuan (US$586 billion) economic stimulus package in November 2008. The plan cobbled together existing and new initiatives focused on massive infrastructure development projects (designed, among other things, to soak up surplus steel, cement and labor capacity), tax cuts, green energy programs, and rural development.

Ever since the package was passed in November, Beijing has recited the mantra of the need to shift

China

’s economy from its heavy dependence on exports to one more driven by domestic consumption. But now that the sense of immediate crisis has passed, the stimulus policies are being rethought — and in an unusual development for

China

, they are being vigorously debated in the Chinese media.

Debating the Stimulus Package

In a country where media restrictions are tightening and private commentary on government officials and actions in blogs and online forums is being curtailed, it is quite remarkable that major Chinese newspaper editorials are taking the lead in questioning aspects of the stimulus package.

The question of stimulating rural consumption versus focusing the stimulus on the more economically active coastal regions has been the subject of particularly fierce debate. Some editorials have argued that encouraging rural consumption at a time of higher unemployment is building a bigger problem for the future. This argument maintains that rural laborers — particularly migrant workers — earn only a small amount of money, and that while having them spend their meager savings now might keep gross domestic product up in the short term, it will drain the laborers’ reserves and create a bigger social problem down the road. Others argue that the migrant and rural populations are underdeveloped and incapable of sustained spending, and that pumping stimulus yuan into the countryside is a misallocation of mo ney that could be better spent supporting the urban middle class, in theory creating jobs through increased middle-class consumption of services.

The lack of restrictions on these types of discussions suggests that the debate is occurring with government approval, in a reflection of debates within the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government itself. Despite debate in the Chinese press, Beijing continues to present a unified public face on the handling of the economic crisis, regardless of internal factional debates. Maintaining Party control remains the primary goal of Party officials; even if they disagree over policies, they recognize the importance of showing that the Party remains in charge.

But, as the dueling editorial pages reveal, the Party is not unified in its assessment of the economic crisis or the recovery program. The show of unity masks a power struggle raging between competing interests within the Party. In many ways, this is not a new struggle; there are always officials jockeying for power for themselves and for their protégés. But the depth of the economic crisis in China and the rising fears of social unrest — not only from the migrant laborers, but also from militants or separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang and from “hostile forces” like the Falun Gong, pro-Democracy advocates and foreign intelligence services — have added urgency to long-standing debates over economic and social policies.

China

, decision-making falls to the president and the premier, currently Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively. They do not wield the power of past leaders like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, however, and instead are much more reliant on balancing competing interests than on dictating policy.

Party and Government Factions

Hu and Wen face numerous factions among the Chinese elite. Many officials are considered parts of several different factional affiliations based on age, background, education or family heritage. Boiled down, the struggle over the stimulus plan pits two competing views of the core of the Chinese economy. One sees economic strength and social stability centered on

China

’s massive rural population, while another sees

China

’s strength and future in the coastal urban areas, in manufacturing and global trade.

Two key figures in the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the center of political power in

China

), Vice President Xi Jinping and Vice Premier Li Keqiang, highlight this struggle. These two are considered the core of the fifth-generation leadership, and have been tapped to succeed Hu and Wen as

China

’s next leaders. They also represent radically different backgrounds.

Li is a protege of Hu and rose from the China Youth League, where Hu has built a strong support base. Li represents a newer generation of Chinese leaders, educated in economics and trained in less-developed provinces. (Li held key positions in Henan and Liaoning provinces.) Xi, on the other hand, is a “princeling.” The son of a former vice premier, he trained as an engineer and served primarily in the coastal export-oriented areas, including Hebei, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and Shanghai.

In a way, Li and Xi represent different proposals for

China

’s economic recovery and future. Li is a stronger supporter of the recentralization of economic control sought by Hu, a weakening of the regional economic power bases, and a focus on consolidating Chinese industry in a centrally planned manner while spending government money on rural development and urbanization of

China

’s interior. Xi represents the view followed by former President Jiang Zemin and descended from the policies of Deng. Under that view, economic activity and growth should be encouraged and largely freed from central direction, and if the coastal provinces grow first and faster, that is just fine; eventually the money, technology and employment will move inland.

Inland vs. the Coast

In many ways, these two views reflect long-standing economic arguments in China — namely, the constant struggle to balance the coastal trade-based economy and the interior agriculture-dominated economy. The former is smaller but wealthier, with stronger ties abroad — and therefore more political power to lobby for preferential treatment. The latter is much larger, but more isolated from the international community — and in Chinese history, frequently the source of instability and revolt in times of stress. These tensions have contributed to the decline of dynasties in centuries past, opening the space for foreign interference in Chinese internal politics.

China

’s leaders are well aware of the constant stresses between rural and coastal

China

, but maintaining a balance has been an ongoing struggle.

Throughout Chinese history, there is a repeating pattern of dynastic rise and decline. Dynasties start strong and powerful, usually through conquest. They then consolidate power and exert strong control from the center. But due to the sheer size of

China

’s territory and population, maintaining central control requires the steady expansion of a bureaucracy that spreads from the center through the various administrative divisions down to the local villages. Over time, the bureaucracy itself begins to usurp power, as its serves as the collector of taxes, distributor of government funds and local arbiter of policy and rights. And as the bureaucracy grows stronger, the center weakens.

Regional differences in population, tax base and economic models start to fragment the bureaucracy, leading to economic (and at times military) fiefdoms. This triggers a strong response from the center as it tries to regain control. Following a period of instability, which often involves foreign interference and/or intervention, a new center is formed, once again exerting strong centralized authority.

This cycle played out in the mid-1600s, as the Ming Dynasty fell into decline and the Manchus (who took on the moniker Qing) swept in to create a new centralized authority. It played out again as the Qing Dynasty declined in the latter half of the 1800s and ultimately was replaced — after an extended period of instability — by the CPC in 1949, ushering in another period of strong centralized control. Once again, a more powerful regional bureaucracy is testing that centralized control.

The economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s led to a three-decade decline of central authority, as economic decision-making and power devolved to the regional and local leadership and the export-oriented coastal provinces became the center of economic activity and power in China. Attempts by the central government to regain some authority over the direction of coastal authorities were repeatedly ignored (or worse), but so long as there was growth in

China

and relative social stability, this was tolerated.

With Hu’s rise to power, however, there was a new push from the center to rein in the worst of excesses by the coastal leaders and business interests and refocus attention on

China

’s rural population, which was growing increasingly disenfranchised due to the widening urban-rural economic gap. In 2007 and early 2008, Hu finally gained traction with his economic policies. The Chinese government subsequently sought to slow an overheating economy while focusing on the consolidation of industry and the establishment of “superministries” at the center to coordinate economic activity. It also intended to put inland rural interests on par with — if not above — coastal urban interests. When the superministries were formed in 2008, however, it became apparent that Hu was not omnipotent. Resistance to his plans was abundantly evident, illustrating the power of the entrenched bureaucratic interests.

Economic Crisis and the Stimulus Plan

The economic program of recentralization and the attempt to slow the overheating economy came to a screeching halt in July 2008, as skyrocketing commodity prices fueled inflation and strained government budgets. The first victim was

China

’s yuan policy. The steady, relatively predictable appreciation of the yuan came to a stop. Its value stagnated, and there is now pressure for a slight depreciation to encourage exports. But as Beijing began shaping its economic stimulus package, it became clear that the program would be a mix of policies, representing differing factions seeking to secure their own interests in the recovery plan.

The emerging program, then, revealed conflicting interests and policies. Money and incentives were offered to feed the low-skill export industry (located primarily in the southeastern coastal provinces) as well as to encourage a shift in production from the coast to the interior. A drive was initiated to reduce redundancies, particularly in heavy industries, and at the same time funding was increased to keep those often-bloated industrial sectors afloat. Overall, the stimulus represents a collection of competing initiatives, reflecting the differences among the factions. Entrenched princelings simply want to keep money moving and employment levels up in anticipation of a resurgence in global consumption and the revitalization of the export-based economic growth path. Meanwhile, the rur al faction seeks to accelerate economic restructuring, reduce dependence on the export-oriented coastal provinces, and move economic activity and attention to the vastly underdeveloped interior.

Higher unemployment among the rural labor force is “proving” each faction’s case. To the princelings, it shows the importance of the export sector in maintaining social stability and economic growth. To the rural faction, it emphasizes the dangers of overreliance on a thin coastal strip of cheap, low-skill labor and a widening wealth gap.

Fighting it Out in the Media

With conflicting paths now running in tandem, competing Party officials are seeking traction and support for their programs without showing division within the core Party apparatus by turning to a traditional method: the media and editorials. During the Cultural Revolution, which itself was a violent debate about the fundamental economic policies of the People’s Republic of

China

, the Party core appeared united, despite major divisions. The debate played out not in the halls of the National People’s Congress or in press statements, but instead in big-character posters plastered around Beijing and other cities, promoting competing policies and criticizing others.

In modern

China

, big posters are a thing of the past, replaced by newspaper editorials. While the Party center appears united in this time of economic crisis, the divisions are seen more acutely in the competing editorials published in state and local newspapers and on influential blogs and Web discussion forums. It is here that the depth of competition and debate so well hidden among the members of the Politburo can be seen, and it is here that it becomes clear the Chinese are no more united in their policy approach than the leaders of more democratic countries, where policy debates are more public.

The current political crisis has certainly not reached the levels of the Cultural Revolution, and

China

no longer has a Mao — or even a Deng — to serve as a single pole around which to wage factional struggles. The current leadership is much more attuned to the need to cooperate and compromise — and even Mao’s methods would often include opportunities for “wayward” officials to come around and cooperate with Mao’s plans. But a recognition of the need to cooperate, and an agreement that the first priority is maintenance of the Party as the sole core of Chinese power (followed closely by the need to maintain social stability to ensure the primary goal), doesn’t guarantee that things can’t get out of control.

The sudden halt to various economic initiatives in July 2008 showed just how critical the emerging crisis was. If commodity prices had not started slacking off a month later, the political crisis in Beijing might have gotten much more intense. Despite competition, the various factions want the Party to remain in power as the sole authority, but their disagreements on how to do this become much clearer during a crisis. Currently, it is the question of China’s migrant labor force and the potential for social unrest that is both keeping the Party center united and causing the most confrontation over the best-path policies to be pur sued. If the economic stimulus package fails to do its job, or if external factors leave

China

lagging and social problems rising, the internal party fighting could once again grow intense.

At present, there is a sense among

China

’s leaders that this crisis is manageable. If their attitude once again shifts to abject fear, the question may be less about how to compromise on economic strategy than how to stop a competing faction from bringing ruin to Party and country through ill-thought-out policies. Compromise is acceptable when it means the survival of the Party, but if one faction views the actions of another as fundamentally detrimental to the authority and strength of the Party, then a more active and decisive struggle becomes the ideal choice. After all, it is better to remove a gangrenous limb than to allow the infection to spread and kill the whole organism.

That crisis is not now upon

China

’s leaders, but things nearly reached that level last summer. There were numerous rumors from Beijing that Wen, who is responsible for

China

’s economic policies, was going to be sacked — an extreme move given his popularity with the common Chinese. This was staved off or delayed by the fortuitous timing of the rest of the global economic contraction, which brought commodity prices down. For now,

China

’s leaders will continue issuing competing and occasionally contradictory policies, and just as vigorously debating them through the nation’s editorials. The government is struggling with resolving the current economic crisis, as well as with the fundamental question of just what a new Chinese economy will look like. And that question goes deeper than money: It goes to the very role of the CPC in

China

’s system.

“O Presidente da República (...) levou muito a sério as afirmações dos dois magistrados, Vítor Magalhães e Paes Faria, que se queixaram de ruídos e interferências nos seus telemóveis e de andarem a ser vigiados por elementos estranhos.” Isto está estampado no “Correio da Manhã” de hoje e é assinado por dois dos mais categorizados e credíveis jornalistas portugueses – Octávio Ribeiro e António Ribeiro Ferreira. A informação tem, portanto, fundamento e é algo que deve ser tomado a sério. Não há leviandade possível numa prosa destes dois jornalistas. E, se isto tem fundamento, a coisa é grave. Põe-nos diante de um grave problema. De facto, um trilema.

Ou o PR não está nem anda bem. Ou os dois magistrados têm graves problemas de personalidade. Ou os serviços de informação da República não estão à altura das suas funções. Por mim, não gostava de acreditar em qualquer uma destas três hipóteses. Mas a prosa de Octávio Ribeiro e António Ribeiro Ferreira – repito, dois dos mais competentes, respeitáveis e credíveis jornalistas – não deixa escapatória. Põe-nos diante da realidade desse trilema.

Mas há uma coisa que me parece demasiado bizarra: será possível que um serviço de informações de um país europeu não seja hoje capaz de fazer intercepções telefónicas sem produzir “ruídos e interferências”? Se tal acontece, um tal serviço deve ir para o livro do Guiness pois é um caso único... Será possível que um serviço de informações de um país europeu não seja capaz de monitorizar alvos (amadores, não profissionais) sem que estes se apercebam? Se tal acontece com os nossos serviços de informação, depois dos treinos na matéria que receberam dos mestres americanos e israelitas, então essa espécie de repartição pública tem de ser fechada já e os seus funcionários despedidos com justa causa por serem uma nulidade.

Nunca tive em grande conta as capacidades dos serviços de informação desta República (sempre dirigidos por magistrados e outros amadores, com a notabilíssima excepção do, infelizmente, já falecido general Pedro Cardoso) mas até em Portugal há limites para a incompetência e, muito francamente, não acredito, é claro, que eles se deixassem apanhar assim por dois magistrados... Parece um filme americano de baixo orçamento e com mau argumento. Mas, no “Correio da Manhã” de hoje, diz-se preto no branco e assinado por dois monstros do jornalismo português, que o Presidente da República avalizou um tal argumento... Estão a ver bem as consequências deste trilema? É um trilema fatal porque, qualquer que seja a resposta certa, é sempre uma gravíssima disfunção no coração do Estado.

Salgado Zenha era advogado de Champalimaud e no gabinete de Mário Soares (o dr. Ferrão, dizem-me) espíritos e cuf eram clientes …

Os advogados deles, dos seus lugares de decisão no Estado, ajudaram-nos no pós 25 de Novembro. E aí se iniciou um ciclo de domínio do “complexo”, que influencia ou mesmo controla os negócios públicos e as políticas económicas (de facto, a política económica foi sempre a mesma com Cavaco ou Soares ou qualquer outro...) e lança uma estratégia de captura do Estado. Obra “patriótica”... Resultados agora bem à vista!

Nas suas formas actuais, o “complexo neo-corporativo e salazarento” tem uma racionalidade muito forte... Mas essa racionalidade não previa o actual tsunami económico (e social...) mundial. A crise pode, assim, desde que haja um mínimo de vontade inteligente, ser o fim deste ciclo do “complexo”... E até o fim do próprio monstro. Esta janela estratégica é o aspecto positivo desta crise. Assim haja vontade e inteligência, isto é, política!

En 2025, les Etats-Unis ne seront plus qu'un des acteurs importants parmi d'autres sur la scène mondiale, même s'ils resteront le plus puissant de tous, y compris dans le domaine militaire, où Washington continuera d'avoir un avantage considérable. [...] Malgré le développement récent de l'antiaméricanisme, les Etats-Unis ne cesseront sans doute pas d'être perçus comme un contrepoids régional indispensable au Moyen-Orient et en Asie. Ainsi, on attendra toujours de l'Amérique qu'elle joue un grand rôle en usant de sa puissance militaire pour contrer le terrorisme mondial. Sur les nouvelles questions comme le changement climatique, le rôle de Washington sera largement perçu comme majeur, le seul moyen de permettre de dégager des solutions communes entre des points de vue divergents. En même temps, la multiplicité des acteurs influents et la méfiance envers les grandes puissances permettra moins à l'Amérique de trancher, sans l'aide de partenaires puissants [...].

En dépit de récents afflux vers des actifs libellés en dollars, la devise américaine, d'ici à 2025, est menacée de perdre son statut de monnaie de réserve mondiale sans équivalent et de devenir un primum inter pares au sein d'un panier de devises. Cela pourrait contraindre les Etats-Unis à réfléchir plus attentivement aux conséquences de leur politique étrangère sur leur monnaie.

L'emploi de plus en plus courant de l'euro est déjà une évidence qui, potentiellement, complique à l'avenir l'exploitation par les Etats-Unis du rôle particulier du dollar dans les échanges commerciaux et les investissements internationaux à des fins politiques. Ainsi, le gel d'actifs et l'entrave aux flux financiers de leurs adversaires-comme récemment avec les sanctions financières contre les dirigeants nord-coréens et iraniens-seront plus difficiles. Les incitations à se tenir à l'écart du dollar seront toutefois tempérées par les incertitudes et l'instabilité du système financier international [...].

Au cours des vingt à vingt-cinq prochaines années, peu de pays seront en position d'avoir davantage d'impact sur le monde que la Chine. Si la tendance actuelle se confirme, en 2025 l'empire du Milieu sera devenu la deuxième économie mondiale et une puissance militaire majeure. Il pourrait aussi devenir le premier importateur mondial de ressources naturelles et un plus gros pollueur qu'il ne l'est aujourd'hui.

[...] Le rythme de la croissance économique de la Chine va certainement baisser. Même de nouvelles réformes visant à apaiser des tensions sociales croissantes dues au creusement des disparités économiques, aux carences de la protection sociale, à des réglementations insuffisantes dans le monde des affaires, à des importations d'énergie, à une corruption persistante et à la dévastation de son environnement n'y suffiraient pas.

[...] En s'attaquant à ces défis, les dirigeants chinois doivent maintenir l'équilibre entre l'ouverture nécessaire au maintien de la croissance économique-essentielle pour que l'opinion publique tolère le monopole du Parti communiste sur le pouvoir-et les restrictions nécessaires à la protection de ce monopole. Face à tant de bouleversements sociaux et économiques, le Parti communiste risque de connaître de nouvelles transformations. En fait, les dirigeants du Parti évoquent eux-mêmes ouvertement la nécessité de trouver de nouveaux moyens de préserver le rôle dominant du Parti. A ce jour, toutefois, l'ouverture du système à des élections et à une presse libre ne semble pas au programme. En outre, il n'est pas envisageable que la pression sociale impose l'avènement de la démocratie en Chine à l'horizon 2025 [...].

Nous pensons qu'en 2025 l'Europe n'aura que lentement avancé dans la concrétisation du projet de ses élites et de ses dirigeants actuels : celui d'un acteur mondial cohérent, intégré et influent, capable d'user en toute indépendance d'une panoplie complète d'outils politiques, économiques et militaires pour défendre les intérêts européens et occidentaux et les idéaux d'universalité. L'Union européenne devra remédier au sentiment croissant d'un déficit démocratique entre Bruxelles et les électeurs, et dépasser le débat interminable sur ses structures institutionnelles.

L'Union européenne sera en position de soutenir la stabilité politique et la démocratisation à la périphérie de l'Europe en accueillant de nouveaux pays membres des Balkans, et peut-être l'Ukraine et la Turquie. Cependant, l'incapacité persistante de persuader une opinion sceptique des bienfaits d'une intégration économique, politique et sociale approfondie et de s'attaquer au problème d'une population vieillissante et déclinante en mettant en oeuvre des réformes impopulaires pourrait faire de l'Union un géant immobilisé, trop occupé à régler ses querelles internes et ses rivalités nationales, et moins capable de transformer son poids économique en influence planétaire [...].

En 2025, le monde se trouvera au milieu d'une transition énergétique fondamentale [...]. La production extérieure à l'Opep d'hydrocarbures liquides ne sera pas capable de répondre à l'augmentation de la demande. Les niveaux de production de nombreux pays-le Yémen, la Norvège, Oman, la Colombie, le Royaume-Uni, l'Indonésie, l'Argentine, la Syrie, l'Egypte, le Pérou, la Tunisie-déclinent déjà. D'autres-le Mexique, Brunei, la Malaisie, la Chine, l'Inde, le Qatar-ont touché le fond. Le nombre de ceux capables d'augmenter leur production de façon significative va se réduire. Six pays-l'Arabie saoudite, l'Iran, le Koweït, les Emirats arabes unis, l'Irak (potentiellement) et la Russie-devraient représenter 39 % de la production pétrolière mondiale en 2025. Les producteurs majeurs seront ceux du Moyen-Orient, où se trouvent environ les deux tiers des réserves mondiales.

[...] En 2025, on s'attend à voir la consommation de gaz naturel augmenter d'environ 60 %, selon les projections de l'Energy Information Agency du département de l'Energie. Si les gisements de gaz naturel ne sont pas nécessairement voisins de ceux du pétrole, ils n'en sont pas moins fortement concentrés. Trois pays-la Russie, l'Iran et le Qatar-détiennent plus de 57 % des réserves mondiales. Si l'on considère à la fois le pétrole et le gaz naturel, deux pays-la Russie et l'Iran-sont les pivots de la production énergétique. L'Amérique du Nord (Etats-Unis, Canada et Mexique) assurera quant à elle une part non négligeable-18 %-de la production mondiale en 2025

Madrid surpresa: A ‘inteligência’ madrilena, autora daqueles relatórios que davam Portugal a poucos anos de cair na bancarrota e implodir em fortes tensões sociais (mesmo “guerra civil”, diziam eles), foi surpreendida pela ultrapassagem que a Espanha nos fez na corrida para o desastre... Continua Aqui

"Sim, vocês podem",diz Cavaco, o Presidente, no Jornal de Notícias,de 15 Fev 2009.

Claro, que podemos! Isso já o sabemos… Portanto, nada de repetições e chover no molhado. Ao menos, se quer falar, que diga como. Isso já poderia ter interesse. Se não sabe, esteja calado. A palavra do PR é demasiado importante para se banalizar deste modo.

É como quando disse que era preciso exportar mais… Perdeu uma excelente ocasião para estar calado. Primeiro, é preciso, sim, exportar melhor. Quer dizer, com mais valor acrescentado e algum controlo da cadeia de valor. O que é muito diferente de exportar mais…

E exportar como? Exportar melhor… o pouco que o contexto permite que exportemos. E isso, só mesmo com muita “diplomacia económica”, assente em boa “inteligência económica”.
Ou Cavaco, um sério economista, poderá ainda não ter percebido qual é o verdadeiro problema das exportações portuguesas e qual é o sarilho global que nos caiu em cima? Não acredito...

O PR não pode, pois, dizer banalidades. Ou acontece-lhe como à “má moeda”... Desvaloriza-se! E não há necessidade... Bem pelo contrário.

OBAMA = GORBACHEV...?

Dmitry Orlov, autor de ‘Reinventing Collapse’, obra em tempo já referida aqui no Claro, tem, na sequência da visão exposta nessa obra, uma visão e uma leitura muito próprias da presidência Obama. Que importa e é fundamental conhecer...

“

Perestroika 2.0 Beta

Congratulations, everyone, we have a new president: a fresh new face, a capable, optimistic, inspiring figure, ushering in a new era of responsibility, ready to confront the many serious challenges that face the nation; in short, we have us a Gorbachev. I don't know about you, but I find the parallel rather obvious.

Obama wishes to save the economy, and to inspire us with words such as "We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories." [Inauguration speech] At the same time, he cautions us that "We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense" -- an echo of Dick Cheney's "The American way of life is non-negotiable." And so we descend from the nonexistent but wonderfully evocative "clean coal" to the more pedestrian "Put a little dirt in your gas tank!"

But these are all euphemisms: the reality is that it is either fossil fuels, which are running out while simultaneously destabilizing the planet's climate and poisoning the biosphere, or the end of industrial civilization, or (most likely) both, happening in that order. According to the latest International Energy Agency projections, the half-life of industrial civilization can be capped at about 17 years: it's all downhill from here. All industrial countries will be forced to rapidly deindustrialize on this time scale, but the one that has spent the last century building an infrastructure that has no future... Continua Aqui

“

OBAMA: SINAIS NA POLÍTICA EXTERNA

Os primeiros sinais da política externa do novo presidente dos USA, Barack Obama, analisados pela Stratfor:

“ The Emerging Obama Foreign Policy

By Rodger Baker February 16, 2009

Related Special Topic Page

· Obama’s Foreign Policy Landscape

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is making her first official overseas visit, with scheduled stops in Tokyo; Jakarta, Indonesia; Seoul, South Korea; and Beijing. The choice of Asia as her first destination is intended to signal a more global focus for U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration, as opposed to the heavy emphasis on the Middle East and South Asia seen in the last years of the Bush administration. It also represents the kickoff of an ambitious travel plan that will see Clinton visiting numerous countries across the globe in a bid to project the image of a more cooperative U.S. administration.

Clinton’s Asian expedition is not the first overseas visit by a key member of the new administration. Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Germany for the Munich Security Conference, where he faced the Russians. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell has finished his first trip to his area of responsibility, and is already planning a return visit to the Middle East. And Richard Holbrooke, special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has visited both South Asian countries in addition to making a “listening” stop in India.

The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy

As with any new U.S. presidency, there will be a period of reshaping policy, of setting priorities, and of balancing internal differences within the Obama administration. The various individuals and visits cataloged above in part reflect the Obama administration’s emerging foreign policy.

A two-pronged Obama foreign policy approach is unfolding. The first prong, relating to the general tenor of foreign relations, involves a modern application of the “speak softly and carry a big stick” approach. The second prong, relating to the distribution of power within the administration, involves a centralization of foreign policy centering on a stronger and expanded National Security Council (NSC) and relies on special envoys for crisis areas, leaving the secretary of state to shape foreign perceptions rather than policy.

The Obama administration faced mixed expectations as it came into office. Perhaps the most far-reaching expectation on the international front was the idea that the Obama administration would somehow be the antithesis of the previous Bush administration. Whereas Bush often was portrayed as a unilateralist “cowboy,” constantly confronting others and never listening to allies (much less competitors), it was thought that Obama somehow would remake America into a nation that withheld its military power and instead confronted international relations via consultations and cooperation. In essence, the Bush administration was seen as aggressive and unwilling to listen, while an Obama administration was expected to be more easily shaped and manipulated.

Anticipation of a weaker administration created a challenge for Obama from the start. While many of his supporters saw him as the anti-Bush, the new president had no intention of shifting America to a second-tier position or making the United States isolationist. Obama’s focus on reducing U.S. forces in Iraq and the discussions during Clinton’s confirmation hearing of reducing the military’s role in reconstruction operations did not reflect an anti-military bias or even new ideas, but something Defense Secretary Robert Gates had advocated for under former U.S. President George W. Bush. A reshaping of the U.S. military will in fact take place over the course of Obama’s term in office. But the decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq is not unique to this administration; it is merely a recognition of the reality of the limitations of military resources.

Diplomacy and Military Power

The new administration has applied this decision as the basis of a strategy to refocus the military on its core competencies and rebuild the military’s strength and readiness, using that as the strong and stable framework from which to pursue an apparently more cooperative foreign policy. U.S. diplomatic power needs a strong military, and operations in Iraq have drained U.S. military power — something highlighted by the U.S. inability to act on its policies when the Russians moved in on Georgia.

It is not only U.S. political power that is reinforced by military power, but U.S. economic strength as well. Control of the world’s sea-lanes — and increasingly, control of outer space — is what ensures the security of U.S. economic links abroad. In theory, the United States can thus interdict competitors’ supply lines and economic ties while protecting its own.

Despite globalization and greater economic ties, physical power still remains the strongest backer to diplomacy. Ideology alone will not change the world, much less the actions of so-called rogue states or even pirates along the Somali coast. The first principal of Obama’s foreign policy, then, will be making sure it has big stick to carry, one freed from long-term reconstruction commitments or seemingly intractable situations such as Iraq. Only with an available and effective military can one afford to speak softly without being trod upon.

Rebuilding U.S. military readiness and strength is not going to be easy. Iraq and Afghanistan remain to be taken care of, and there are years of heavy activity and at times declining recruitment to recover from. While there are substantial benefits to a battle-hardened military accustomed to a high deployment tempo, this also has its costs — reset costs will be high. A very real domestic military shake-up looms on the one- to two-year horizon in order to bring the Pentagon back into line with fiscal and procurement realities, coupled with concerns about midlevel officer retention. But the Pentagon’s thinking and strategic guidance already have moved toward cooperative security and toward working more closely with allies and partners to stabilize and manage the global security environment, with an emphasis on requiring foreign participation and burden-sharing.

A Greater Security Role for Allies and a Centralized Foreign Policy

Obama will also work on managing the U.S. image abroad. Opposition to Bush and opposition to the war in Iraq often became synonymous internationally, evolving intentionally or otherwise into broader anti-war and anti-military sentiments. Rebuilding the military’s image internationally will not happen overnight. Part of the process will involve using the sense of change inherent in any new U.S. administration to push allies and others to take on a greater role in global security.

In Asia, for example, Clinton will call on Tokyo and Seoul to step up operations in Afghanistan, particularly in reconstruction and development efforts. But Tokyo and Seoul also will be called on to take a greater role in regional security — Seoul on the Korean Peninsula and Tokyo as a more active military ally overall. The same message will be sent to Europe and elsewhere: If you want a multilateral United States, you will have to take up the slack and participate in multilateral operations. The multilateral mantra will not be one in which the United States does what others say, but rather one in which the United States holds others to the task. In the end, this will reduce U.S. commitments abroad, allowing the military to refocus on its core competencies and rebuild its strength.

A strong military thus forms the foundation of any foreign policy. Obama’s foreign policy approach is largely centralized in a bid for a wider approach. Taking China as an example, for the last half-dozen years, U.S. policy on China was based almost entirely on economics. The U.S. Treasury Department took the lead in China relations, while other issues — everything from Chinese military developments to Beijing’s growing presence in Africa and Latin America to human rights — took a back seat. While the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (or something similar) will remain a major pillar of U.S.-China relations under Obama, equally important parallel tracks will focus on military and security issues, nontraditional threats, politics and human rights. This multifaceted approach will require close co operation among numerous departments and divisions to avoid the chaos seen in things like U.S. policy on North Korea.

This coordination will take place in an expanded NSC, one that brings in the economic elements on equal footing with security and political concerns. Combined with the appointment of special envoys for critical regions, this is intended to ensure a more unified and complete approach to foreign policy. This way, Obama retains oversight over policy, while his erstwhile rival Clinton is just one voice at the table. The State Department’s role thus becomes more about image management and development.

Accordingly, Clinton’s foreign travels are less about shaping foreign policy than shaping foreign images of the United States. She is demonstrating the new consultative nature of the administration by going everywhere and listening to everyone. Meanwhile, the hard-hitting foreign policy initiatives go to the special envoys, who can dedicate their time and energy to just one topic. Holbrooke got South Asia, Mitchell got the Middle East, and there are indications that managing overall China strategy will fall to Biden, at least in the near term.

Other special envoys and special representatives might emerge, some technically reporting through the State Department, others to other departments, but all effectively reporting back to the NSC and the president. In theory, this will mitigate the kind of bickering between the State Department and NSC that characterized Bush’s first term (a concern hardly limited to the most recent ex-president). And to keep it busy, the State Department has been tasked with rebuilding the U.S. Agency for International Development or an equivalent program for taking reconstruction and development programs, slowly freeing the military from the reconstruction business.

As Clinton heads to Asia, then, the expectations of Asian allies and China of a newfound American appreciation for the Far East might be a bit misplaced. Certainly, this is the first time in a long while that a secretary of state has visited Asia before Europe. But given the role of the vice president and the special envoys, the visit might not reflect policy priorities so much as a desire to ensure that all regions get visits. Clinton’s agenda in each country might not offer an entirely accurate reading of U.S. policy initiatives for the region, either, as much of the policy is still up for review, and her primary responsibility is to demonstrate a new and more interactive face of American foreign policy.

Clinton’s Asia visit is significant largely because it highlights a piece of the evolving Obama foreign policy — a policy that remains centralized under the president via the NSC, and that uses dedicated special envoys and representatives to focus on key trouble spots (and perhaps to avoid some of the interagency bickering that can limit the agencies’ freedom to maneuver). Most importantly, this policy at its core looks to rebuild the sense and reality of American military strength through disengaging from apparently intractable situations, focusing on core competencies rather than reconstruction or nation-building, and calling on allies to take up the slack in security responsibilities. This is what is shaping the first priority for the Obama administration: withdrawal from Iraq not just to demonstrate a different approach than the last president, but also to ensure that the military is ready for use elsewhere. “

Duas mil garrafas de champanhe Moet et Chandon e Borlinger '61; 500 garrafas de whisky Johnnie Walker Blue Label 12 anos e Chivas; 8 mil lagostas; 100 quilos de gambas; 3 mil patos; 4 mil doses de caviar; 8 mil caixas de Ferrero Rocher; 16 mil ovos; 3 mil bolos de chocolate e baunilha; 4 mil embalagens de salsichas de porco; 500 quilos de queijo; 4 mil pacotes de bolachas...

Ementa para a festa dos 85 anos de Robert Mugabe, “presidente” do Zimbabwe

País onde 98% da população está desempregada, sete milhões de pessoas sobrevivem graças à caridade internacional e há mais de mil e trezentos mortos de cólera...

Comentários para quê? Está tudo bem claro... A festa de um é a fome do país!