O TERRORISMO EM GAZA
E A REACÇÃO EUROPEIA

Há semanas que Israel está sob uma chuva permanente de rockets dos terroristas do Hamas, a partir da banda de Gaza. Toda a gente o sabe e há semanas que o podia ver. Dito isto, não vi ninguém precipitar-se a solicitar, fosse de que modo fosse, aos terroristas que parassem o envio de morte e destruição sobre alvos civis e inocentes, em território de israel.

O governo e a opinião pública de Israel fartaram-se de ser bombardeados e reagiram. Ai, Jesus, que não pode ser... Já morreram não sei quantos palestinianos e "civis" (claro, eles são terroristas e não são militares pelo que são "civis"...) e já houve não sei quantos raids aéreos e não pode haver invasão terrestre, senão há muitas mortes e etc.

Até aquelas múmias soviéticas do "Conselho para a Paz" (que eu já julgava mortas e enterradas) fizeram uma conferência de imprensa a exigir que a Europa exija a Israel que... Haja juízo! Então, desde quando é que alguém tem de passar o tempo a levar com rockets em cima da cabeça e de casa e tem que ficar quieto? E desde quando não há direito à defesa?

E quem já esqueceu (e porquê...?) que foi o Hamas que rompeu unilateralmente, antes de dar início à chuva de rockets, as tréguas com Israel?

E porque é que a Europa não tem antes de exigir ao Hamas que páre de vez as suas actividades terroristas? Ou será que estão a pedir que Israel deixe de actuar como estado e passe a actuar à "civil" como o Hamas faz...? Não lhe deveria ser muito difícil... Juízo, senhores, juízo!

Governo flexibiliza ajustes directos em 2009 e 2010

Uma medida inteligente (não só de agilização das trampas burocráticas como de apoio às empresas do mercado interno...) que esperamos não se tranforme apenas num modo de sustentar com o orçamento de Estado os gulosos incompetentes do “complexo neo-corporativo e salazarento”... Eles, é certo e sabido, vão querê-lo e tentar abocanhar tudo!

POR ENQUANTO SÃO SÓ OS ANÉIS...

Espírito Santo Vende Termas e Águas a Grupo de Investidores Internacionais

A Espírito Santo Saúde vendeu as Termas de Monfortinho, as Águas do Vimeiro e a Herdade da Poupa à AA-Iberian Natural Resources & Tourism S.A., um grupo detido por investidores institucionais internacionais, anunciou hoje a empresa em comunicado, citado pela Lusa.

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Jornal de Negócios com Lusa

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A Espírito Santo Saúde vendeu as Termas de Monfortinho, as Águas do Vimeiro e a Herdade da Poupa à AA-Iberian Natural Resources & Tourism S.A., um grupo detido por investidores institucionais internacionais, anunciou hoje a empresa em comunicado, citado pela Lusa.

O valor do negócio, que inclui ainda outros activos, não foi revelado pela 'sub-holding' do Espírito Santo Financial Group para o sector da prestação de cuidados de saúde.

A AA-Iberian Natural Resources & Tourism S.A. é uma sociedade que investe nos sectores do turismo, às energias renováveis, às fontes naturais de água, entre outras, inserindo-se num grupo detido por investidores institucionais internacionais.

A Espírito Santo Health & Spa, sociedade da Espírito Santo Saúde que englobava estes activos, passará a denominar-se Euro Biodiversidade e Desenvolvimento. 

Ver claro

A Coluna dos Sábados, no Correio da Manhã, 27 Dezembro 2008

A França, ao presidir à UE, ressuscitou o ‘Directório’ (agora de quatro ‘grandes’ – França, Alemanha, Inglaterra e Espanha) e relegou a Comissão (e o seu presidente Barroso) a uma espécie de ‘secretariado’ do Conselho dos chefes de governo e de estado.

Berlim prefere, porém, uma coisa mais federalista e teme que o ‘Directório’ reacenda velhos focos de incêndio... Os alemães sabem bem como costumam acabar mal as tentativas de dominação da Europa pelos ‘grandes’!

Os ‘pequenos’, que são larga maioria, têm, com a presidência checa, um tempo de ajuste.

Bruxelas apoia despedidos italianos e o Fundo de Ajustamento à Mundialização, criado em 2007, libertou já 35 milhões para apoio aos desempregados do sector têxtil italiano.

Dumping chinês. Face ao menor crescimento dos últimos 20 anos, a China lança mais apoios à indústria do aço e a exportadores...

Com a taxa de juro já reduzida a zero, só resta à Fed americana accionar a máquina de fazer notas... Consequências?

A OPEP prevê nova baixa da procura do petróleo, em 2009.

Mudanças radicais nas economias e nas sociedades tornam claro que só marcas e empresas que saibam usar a inteligência competitiva e adequadas estratégias de influência, para se dotarem de identidades fortes, sobreviverão à crise. O tradicional deixou de ser suficiente...
 

José Mateus

verclaro.jm@gmail.com

SÓCRATES, A TAXA DE JURO

E UMA ALGAZARRA IDIOTA

A estória das declarações do primeiro-ministro Sócrates sobre a importância das medidas do governo na baixa da taxa de juro é... uma não-estória. Porém a algazarra foi grande e deixou, mais uma vez, claro a enorme miséria local.

O Governo e Sócrates comunicaram mal a coisa; uma série de opinion-makers não entendeu nada e ao querer gozar com Sócrates só mostra que está a leste… E Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa aproveitou a ocasião para nos demonstrar a sua total ignorância da mais básica economia!

Claro que as taxas de juro em Portugal estariam mais caras (via rating da República e o preço a que a banca local conseguiria dinheiro no mercado internacional para conceder aos seus clientes locais…) sem as intervenções do Governo...

E claro que a Euribor não tem transposições mecânicas, não se aplica directamente e nos filtros e outros mecanismos (tipo rating) se pode perder ou ganhar 1 ou 2 ou 3 ou mais pontos…

Conclusão: os opinion-makers devem estudar um bocadinho antes de emitir “opinião”, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa deve rever, numa das suas noites de espertina, uma introduçãozeca a certos mecanismos financeiros bem como informar-se um bocadinho sobre a história e as realidades da banca em Portugal... E Sócrates e o Governo têm de comunicar melhor. E não darem azo a estas patetices!

China in 2009 - the risks

«China has too many problems of its own to be of much help in sorting out global ones. Don’t look for Beijing to assume a constructive role on the global stage.» Gordon Chang

A ler na   janela na web, do Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues

Prendas de Natal

UMAS CANELEIRAS PARA SÓCRATES

Estou farto de ler umas litanias obedientes ao mote “a crise substitui a falta de pensamento de Sócrates”. Não vi ainda, contudo, nos “autores” dessas litanias qualquer pensamento. Não vi naquelas cabecinhas que fazem da repetição da cassete sobre “a falta de pensamento de Sócrates” uma profissão (de fé) qualquer lampejo de pensamento. Não vi. Se o têm, escondem-no muito bem escondido e não mostram sequer um pensamentozinho. Nem réstia! Nem sequer uma luzinha tipo pirilampo… Nada! Uma miséria, uma tristeza!

A recitação de banalidades de base de um embrulhado catecismo da “esquerda anos 70” não é bem, obviamente, aquilo que constitui um pensamento… E, claro, muito menos é um pensamento para o mundo presente e/ou futuro. Essa récita é apenas um resíduo mal reciclado, um vestígio de mamute ou de um qualquer outro ‘dino’ dos idos do “Trotsky Circus”. Mas nesse peditório, quem quis dar, já deu... Quem pensa que pode resolver o futuro com estas irrupções no presente de um passado (triste), está realmente muito equivocado! Equivocado, sobretudo, e... sobre tudo!

Pobre Sócrates que, a esta hora, já está com as canelas todas roídas, quando a procissão só ainda vai no adro... Daqui do Claro, sugere-se-lhe que compre umas boas caneleiras! Ou que alguém lhas ofereça como prenda de Natal... E que ele não se esqueça de as usar!

Sarkozy ralhou de novo aos banqueiros

e aumentou-lhes a pressão para que façam circular o crédito por famílias e empresas... ou ficam sem apoios do Estado e terão de falir!

in Ver claro - a Coluna do Correio da Manhã - de 20 Dezembro 2008 

CORVO... CORVO!

Experiências e estudos recentes mostram-no como senhor de uma avançada e rara inteligência... Claro, não terá sido por acaso que ele foi na velha Lusitânia pré-histórica a "ave da luz" e o "mensageiro do senhor Lug" e ainda se manteve no Cabo de S. Vicente, como mensageiro do santuário local até aos tempos em que Lug vivia sob o avatar de S. Vicente e Afonso Henriques o mandou lá buscar para o seu recém-criado mosteiro de S. Vicente, em Lisboa, garantindo assim para a sua nova grande cidade um carácter sagrado. A permanente presença do corvo na Sé de Lisboa e no Castelo de S. Jorge prolongou até hoje essa ancestral e  sagrada convivência... Até que um ignorante presidente da Câmara de Lisboa, num gesto alarve, mostrou não perceber nada da sua cidade e interrompeu a presença  dos corvos no castelo. E, como não percebia a sua cidade, perdeu as eleições seguintes...

E recordo a minha última viagem, em data, com a Alice, ao Cabo Sagrado, e como ela viu um mensageiro de Lug a vir ao nosso encontro... e o fugaz afastar da cortina do tempo.

Krugman, Stiglitz, Summers e Soros

Sobre a Crise Financeira   

ler Aqui

O EXECUTIVO ‘STRESSADO’ OU UM

CASO EXEMPLAR DE MÁ GESTÃO...

Um alto executivo muito 'stressado' foi um dia ao psiquiatra. Relatou ao médico o seu caso e o psiquiatra, já experiente, logo diagnosticou:

- O Sr. precisa de se afastar, por duas semanas, da sua actividade profissional. O conveniente é que vá para o interior, isole-se do dia-a-dia e busque algumas actividades que o relaxem. Decidido a tratar-se, o executivo procurou seguir as orientações recebidas. Munido de vários livros, CDs e 'laptop', mas sem o telemóvel, partiu para a quinta de um amigo.

Passados os dois primeiros dias, o executivo já havia lido dois livros e ouvido quase todos os CDs. Continuava, porém, inquieto. Pensou que alguma actividade física seria um bom antídoto para a ansiedade que ainda o dominava. Procurou o capataz da quinta e pediu-lhe trabalho para fazer.

O capataz ficou pensativo e, vendo um monte de esterco que havia acabado de chegar, disse ao executivo: “O Senhor Doutor pode ir espalhando aquele esterco em toda aquela área que será preparada para o cultivo”.

Pensou o capataz para consigo próprio: “Ele deverá demorar uma semana com isto...”. Puro engano! No dia seguinte, já o executivo tinha distribuído todo o esterco por toda a área.

O capataz mandou-o então abater 500 galinhas com uma faca. Coisa que se revelou muito fácil para o executivo ansioso: em menos de 3 horas já estavam todos os galináceos prontos para serem depenados! Pediu logo nova tarefa.

O capataz, face a isto, sugere-lhe: “Estamos a iniciar a colheita de laranjas. O Senhor Doutor vá, por favor, ao laranjal e leve consigo três cestos para distribuir as laranjas por tamanhos: pequenas, médias e grandes.”

Passou o dia e o executivo não regressava, nem havia sinais de tarefa cumprida. Preocupado, o capataz dirigiu-se ao laranjal. Viu o executivo, com uma laranja na mão, os cestos totalmente vazios, e a falar sozinho:

- “ Esta é grande. Não, é média. Ou será pequena???  E esta é pequena. Não, é grande. Ou será média??? E esta aqui é média. Não, é pequena. Ou será grande??? “

Quer dizer: Espalhar merda e cortar cabeças é fácil... O difícil é identificar e tomar as decisões acertadas! Cortar cabeças e pôr merda na ventoinha é fácil e rápido, pode disfarçar a coisa e pintar uns números mas é má gestão... Descobrir, identificar e tomar as decisões certas, isso é para quem sabe (quem tem inteligência competitiva...) e até pode levar algum tempo.

O executivo stressado é o equivalente do bêbado que que perdeu a chave e foi procurá-la debaixo de um candeeiro... Porque lá havia luz! Mas isto, sendo o mesmo, já é outra estória!

QUOTATION OF THE DAY

"We’ve made too many promises and asked for too few sacrifices. We’re going to have to change our culture as we know it." GOV. DAVID A. PATERSON, of New York, calling for reduced pension benefits because of budget problems

 

Albert Camus - Misère de la Kabylie

Uma obra que não é vulgar... Um Camus a reencontrar... Um vizinho (do andar de baixo), uma Argélia, a redescobrir !

FINALMENTE…

OS BELGAS PRENDERAM A SUA

”VIÚVA NEGRA” DA AL-QAEDA !

Europe Malika el Aroud, la pasionaria du salafisme belge

Toujours soupçonnée, jamais condamnée! Veuve de l'assassin du commandant Massoud, Malika el Aroud, 48 ans, vient d'être arrêtée en Belgique et mise en(...) 

La Belgique se bat pour ne pas être une base arrière du terrorisme

La vague d'interpellations en Belgique de membres présumés d'Al-Qaïda, qui a débouché vendredi sur l'inculpation de cinq hommes et d'une femme, confirme le rôle de base arrière du terrorisme islamiste joué par le royaume, pourtant combattu depuis des années par les autorités.     la suite

A DROGA COMO CANCRO DO ESTADO

.

A fronteira sul dos USA está em vias de se tornar um complicadíssimo problema de segurança, mesmo uma das grandes ameaças à segurança americana. Se ainda não é um estado falhado, o México está em pleno processo de "feudalização", com os cartéis da droga a assumir o papel de senhores feudais que controlam o espaço e onde o estado de direito desapareceu... Um caso de estudo de como o cancro da droga pode corroer o Estado. Análise da Stratfor:

Mexico and the War Against the Drug Cartels in 2008

By Fred Burton and Stephen Meiners

December 9, 2008

Editor’s Note: This week’s Global Security & Intelligence Report is an abridged version of Stratfor’s annual report on Mexico’s drug cartels. The full report, which includes extensive diagrams depicting the leadership of each cartel, will be available to our members on Dec. 11.
 

Mexico

·                       Part 1: A Critical Confluence of Events

·                       Part 2: A War of Attrition is a Limited Strategy

Related Special Topic Pages

·                       Tracking Mexico’s Drug Cartels

·                       Countries In Crisis

Mexico’s war against drug cartels continued in 2008. The mission President Felipe Calderon launched shortly after his inauguration two years ago to target the cartels has since escalated in nearly every way imaginable. Significant changes in Mexico’s security situation and the nature of the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere also have occurred over the last 12 months.

In this year’s report on Mexico’s drug cartels, we assess the most significant developments of the past year and provide an updated description of the country’s powerful drug-trafficking organizations. This annual report is a product of the coverage we maintain on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo and various other reports.

Mexico’s Drug-Trafficking Organizations

Gulf cartel: As recently as a year ago, the Gulf cartel was considered the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in Mexico. After nearly two years of bearing the brunt of Mexican law enforcement and military efforts, however, it is an open question at this point whether the cartel is still intact. The group’s paramilitary enforcement arm, Los Zetas, was the primary reason for Gulf’s power, but reports of Zeta activity from this past year suggest that the much-feared group now operates independently. Without the Zetas, the Gulf leadership has struggled to remain relevant.

Los Zetas: During the past 12 months, Los Zetas have remained a power to be reckoned with throughout Mexico. The group operates under the command of Heriberto “El Lazca” Lazcano. The organization’s leadership suffered significant losses during 2008, including the April arrest in Guatemala of Daniel “El Cachetes” Perez Rojas, who commanded Zeta operations in Central America. Even more significant, however, was the November arrest of Jaime “El Hummer” Gonzalez Duran, who was captured during a raid in the northwestern city of Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. Gonzalez was believed to rank third in the Zeta chain of command.

Beltran Leyva organization: The Beltran Leyva family has a long history in the narcotics business. Until this past year, the organization formed part of the Sinaloa federation, for which it controlled access to the U.S. border in Sonora state, among other responsibilities. By the time of Alfredo Beltran Leyva’s January arrest, however, the Beltran Leyva organization’s alliance with Sinaloa was over, as it is rumored that his arrest resulted from a Sinaloa betrayal. Since then, the organization has quickly become one of the most powerful drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico, capable not only of smuggling narcotics and battling rivals but also demonstrating a willingness to order the assassination of high-ranking government officials. The most notable of these was the May targeted killing of acting federal police director Edgar Millan Gomez.

Sinaloa cartel: Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman is the most wanted drug lord in Mexico. Despite the turbulence that his Sinaloa cartel has experienced this past year, it is perhaps the most capable drug-trafficking organization in Mexico. This turbulence involved the loss of key allies, including the Carrillo Fuentes organization in Ciudad Juarez, as well as the split with the Beltran Leyva organization. But the loss of these partners does not appear to have affected the cartel’s ability to manage the trafficking of drugs from South America to the United States. On the contrary, the Sinaloa cartel appears to be the most active smuggler of cocaine and has demonstrated the ability to establish operations in new environments like Central America and South America.

Carrillo Fuentes organization: Also known as the Juarez cartel, the Carrillo Fuentes organization is based out of the northern city of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. The cartel is led by Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, who took over after the 1997 death of his brother Amado, the cartel’s former leader. Throughout this year, the Juarez cartel has maintained its long-standing alliance with the Beltran Leyva organization, which has been locked in a vicious battle with the Sinaloa cartel for control of Juarez.

Arellano Felix organization: Also known as the Tijuana cartel, the Arellano Felix crime family has been weakened almost beyond recognition over the past year due to the efforts of both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement to capture several of its high-ranking leaders. Of these, perhaps the most symbolic was the October arrest of Eduardo “El Doctor” Arellano Felix. Fighting among the various elements of the cartel itself has resulted in the splitting of the organization into two factions that continue to do battle on a daily basis.

Calderon’s Success Story

Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderon has undertaken extraordinary measures in pursuit of the country’s drug cartels. The policies enacted by Calderon’s administration saw some progress during his first year in office, although it has only been during the past year that the continued implementation of these policies has produced unprecedented results in the fight against the cartels.

One such result has come in the form of record seizures of illegal narcotics, weapons and drug-manufacturing laboratories, including the July raid of the largest methamphetamine production facility ever discovered in Mexico, where authorities seized some 8,000 barrels of precursor chemicals. The Mexican government also has succeeded in pursuing the cartels’ leadership. Important members of nearly all the country’s drug-trafficking organizations have been arrested over the last 12 months, although the highest-ranking kingpins continue to evade capture. One indication that the government’s crackdown has made it increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs in and out of Mexico is the revelation that many drug traffickers have turned to other illegal activities, such as extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking, to supplement their incomes.

Despite the endemic challenges presented by bureaucratic infighting and rampant corruption, there is simply no denying that the Mexican government has disrupted the cartels’ operations in meaningful ways.

2008: A Year of Flux

One consequence of these achievements has been greater volatility in the balance of power among the various drug-trafficking organizations in the country. Mexican security forces’ relentless focus on the Gulf cartel has severely damaged the organization’s capabilities.

This development presented opportunities to the other criminal groups over the past 12 months, and it has led to even greater turf battles and power struggles. It is premature to predict which cartels will remain on top once the dust has settled.

Historically, the Mexican drug trade has been controlled by two large and competing drug cartels, each of which has had a base of operations in a Mexican city along the U.S. border. A similar outcome after the current flux is certainly possible, but changes in the country’s security environment and shifting areas of cartel operations might add new dimensions to the country’s criminal landscape.

Changing Geography

The year 2008 has seen a shift in the geography of the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere, nearly all of which can be attributed to the situation in Mexico. The United States remains among the primary destinations for drugs produced in South American countries such as Peru and Colombia, and Mexico continues to serve as the primary transshipment route. The path between South America and Mexico is shifting, however.

One of these shifts involves the increasing importance of Central America. After the Mexican government implemented greater monitoring and control of aircraft entering the country’s airspace, airborne shipments of cocaine from Colombia decreased more than 90 percent, according to an October report. Similarly, maritime trafficking reportedly has decreased more than 60 percent over a two-year period. As a result, Mexican smugglers have expanded their presence in Central American countries as they have begun to rely increasingly on land-based shipping routes to deliver drugs from South American producers. In addition — and likely as a result of the more difficult operating environment — Mexican drug-trafficking groups also have increased their operations in South America to begin providing drugs to markets there and in Europe.

The presence of Mexican cartels in Central and South America illustrates two important points. First, there is no question that Mexican groups are now the central figures in the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere. Nothing demonstrates this better than the fact that it is the Mexican traffickers — not the Colombian or Peruvian producers — who are conquering new turf and even expanding to other markets. The second point is that the drug trade does not necessarily have to revolve around U.S. consumers. While the United States remains a top consumer of cocaine, expanding markets in Latin America and Europe, as well as a continued crackdown in Mexico, could produce a more profound shift in drug-trafficking routes.

Deteriorating Security

One apparent paradox for the Calderon administration has been that, even while the government has clearly succeeded in damaging the cartels, the country’s security situation has continued to deteriorate at what appears to be an unstoppable rate. Just last week, the total number of drug-related homicides in Mexico in 2008 surged past 5,000. This puts Mexico on track to more than double the previous annual record of 2,700 killings, set in 2007.

In addition to the drastic rise in the number of killings, the violence has escalated in other important ways that are more difficult to quantify. For one, Mexican cartel violence has remained a brutal enterprise, with this past year registering perhaps the most significant beheading incident. Second, attacks on security forces have increased. Law enforcement and military personnel have represented some 10 percent of cartel casualties, compared to approximately 7 percent during 2007.

In addition, a series of assassinations of high-ranking government officials in Mexico City made it clear that almost anyone can be considered a cartel target. An expansion of the cartels’ arsenals also contributed to the escalation in violence, including the July discovery of explosive-actuated improvised incendiary devices in vehicles near a cartel safe house, and the February failed assassination attempt with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Mexico City.

Finally, 2008 witnessed the first clear case of the indiscriminate killing of civilians, when alleged members of the La Familia crime organization threw two fragmentation grenades into a crowd during Mexico’s Independence Day celebration in Morelia, Michoacan state.

Of particular concern to the United States is how this rampant violence continues to cross the border. No single incident better demonstrates this than the Phoenix home invasion in June. In that incident, cartel hit men armed with assault rifles and wearing Phoenix Police Department raid shirts killed a drug dealer. The assault had all the makings of a Mexican cartel hit, especially in the attackers’ willingness to engage police officers if necessary.

Looking Ahead

The deteriorating security situation certainly has become the top priority for the Calderon administration, with Mexico’s crime problem now officially considered a matter of national security. The government is considering the implications of increasing casualties, not only among security forces but also among civilians.

Moreover, the initial strategy of relying on the military only over the short term appears increasingly unfeasible, as police reforms have proven far more difficult to achieve than the administration anticipated. Despite the costs, Calderon has shown no signs of letting up. Assistance from the United States will begin expanding under the Merida Initiative, but foreign assistance is only one part of the solution. Perhaps recognizing that at present it is the cartels — not the government — that ultimately control the level of violence in the country, the Calderon administration is exploring plans to escalate the military’s commitment to the fight.

Of course, a sudden drop in violence could make such an escalation unnecessary. There is currently no indication that the violence will soon taper off, but it might also be premature to assume that the violence will continue to escalate in the way it has so far. Attacks involving IEDs or the indiscriminate killing of civilians, for example, have yet to be repeated.

Despite this caveat, the obvious danger is that the cartels have shown themselves to be remarkably innovative, vicious and resilient when backed into a corner. Given their powerful arsenals and deep penetration of the country’s institutions, a further increase in attacks against security forces and government officials seems all but inevitable. 

UM PORQUÊ  DA I.C.

Humbert Lesca tem trabalhado nos fundamentos teóricos e no desenvolvimento da Inteligência Competitiva. Aqui, ele enuncia um dos fundamentos necessários (embora não suficientes...) da IC... Por si, a ignorância inconsciente do ambiente económico, social, político e mundial (não apenas nacional...) apenas é um dos factores que justifica a necessidade da IC, não explica a possibilidade da sua existência. Mas sem a existência deste factor necessário (mas não suficiente), a IC dificilmente se justificaria...

«Ce qui caractérise les sociétés, c'est une sorte d'ignorance inconsciente de l'environnement économique, social, politique, et de toute façon mondial et non plus seulement national. Plus encore que l'ignorance de l'environnement, c'est l'ignorance des changements qui se produisent dans cet environnement, de telle sorte que ces sociétés continuent de faire comme elles ont toujours fait, ne voyant pas que peu à peu elles sont rejetées sur la touche, marginalisées et finalement en perdition.»  

Humbert Lesca  

Humbert Lesca a adapté les techniques de l'IE sous le terme de « veille anticipative stratégique », pour accompagner les entreprises dans la vigilance de leur environnement et pour «renseigner les responsables d'entreprise (ou autre organisation) sur les changements pouvant se produire dans l'environnement pertinent pour l'entreprise. » Le renseignement, dit-il, doit permettre aux dirigeants de décider avec les bonnes informations, et surtout anticiper.  

Enfin, Lesca  s'attarde également sur le concept essentiel de «signal faible» et il le définit comme étant une «donnée le plus souvent d'apparence insignifiante et noyée dans une multitude d'autres données (bruit), mais dont la détection et l'interprétation peut nous alerter que se prépare un événement (peut-être pas même amorcé) susceptible d'avoir des conséquences considérables (en termes d'opportunité ou de menace).»

Noticia o El País que o

MAIOR EDITOR DA IMPRENSA

AMERICANA DECLARA FALÊNCIA

«El grupo de medios de comunicación estadounidense Tribune, propietario entre otros activos de los periódicos Los Angeles Times y Chicago Tribune, se ha acogido este lunes a la protección de las leyes de bancarrota del país. No obstante, según ha informado en un comunicado, la compañía seguirá publicando sus cabeceras y gestionando sus canales de televisión y propiedades interactivas sin interrupción durante el periodo de reestructuración de su deuda.» El Pais

O que o El País não noticiou é que o seu grupo já está a vender os anéis para tentar conservar os dedos... Coisa longe de estar garantida! Mas, um destes dias, ainda o irá noticiar. Nem que se já a venda da TVI...

John Robb, no Danger Room Debrief:

How to do Defense,

When the Money's Gone

 

By Noah Shachtman

November 21, 2008 | 3:41:14 PMCategories: Danger Room Debrief  

Today we hear from John Robb, a software entrepreneur and former Air Force special operations pilot. He is the author of Brave New War.

The current global economic and financial meltdown may yet become something worse: a protracted global depression. As with the last century's Depression, which spawned fascism and WWII, it could recast the world at a fundamental level. As such, it may soon represent our biggest security challenge in over 50 years. Here's what a global depression means:

·         A proliferation of hollow nation-states globally. Rampant financial bankruptcy -- the double digit percentage growth in the U.S. national debt late this year bode danger here. Entrenched corruption -- think government employees unused to financial deprivation not getting paid except by graft. An inability to govern territory and a general loss of legitimacy. A global swiss cheese effect from Mexico to Pakistan, where thousands of small holes in the global security system appear with rapidity.

·         A rapid increase in the number and power of criminal guerilla groups that will challenge nation-states. These groups will flourish within the ungoverned spaces that emerge, particularly in urban areas and even within the U.S. The combination of access to global markets, rapidly improving technology, and new methods of warfare mean that these groups will be ascendant militarily until successful strategies emerge to counter them. 

·         Worst of all, these criminal guerrilla groups (collectively known as global guerrillas) will be able to generate wealth via transnational criminal networks and control political services to local populations (through both disruption and parasitically draining national infrastructures), gaining legitimacy that nation-states will not be able to provide. This means that these groups will not only emerge quickly, they will grow stronger over time.

Unfortunately, the U.S. will be forced to navigate this dangerous environment with a small fraction of its former resources. The endless defense budgets of the last century are gone. Which means the development of the new strategies -- not new gear -- to fight this chaotic and complex panoply of non-state foes will become the seminal security challenge of our time.

Can it be accomplished?  It remains to be seen whether a transition from the legacy mindset of 20th Century defense to the new environment can be accomplished.  The array of financial incentives, political interests, and bureaucratic inertia arrayed against it are staggering.

Signs that we are on the right track include: 

1.      A radical reduction in hideously-expensive weapons systems and dreams of automated warfare (i.e. the Future Combat System), geared towards fighting an increasingly-unikely great power war.

2.      A rapid increase in investments geared towards improving nation-state legitimacy. We need an array of technologies and processes that both support the construction of resilient communities. And we need the means to train, manage, and control (or punish, if the need arises) the militias/paramilitaries that will blanket the global landscape. 

3.      A move towards much more flexible military platforms and systems that can be rapidly configured to provide tactical, operational, and strategic advantage.

What does a flexible military platform mean? Due to budget constraints, we are going to see a much greater reliance on civilian hardware, software, and standards of interconnectivity.  To prevent chaos from the influx of off the shelf hardware and software, the military will need to develop platforms that enable all of this externally derived hardware/software to interconnect and act synergistically.  Further, with this platform in place, these technologies can be rapidly and inexpensively stitched together through ad hoc systems design to precisely meets the needs of the emerging situation to generate success. 

Here's an example of ad hoc systems design.  Let's say there's a perceived need by a deployed unit to track interactions with local militias (dozens are operating in its area). Rather than wait years for a centralized solution, the unit builds a simple Web application that operates in a way similar to a civilian sales tracking application (in fact, many of the components used are from the civilian sector).  This new system is quick to deploy and it allows the unit to capture data on every interaction with militia members and track progress. If the system used simple Internet standards for data sharing, the system can be updated, connected, extended, and shared very easily.  In an age of scarcity, that's the approach we have to take.

Comments:

A scary, yet entirely plausible scenario. A return to the middle ages........with cell phones and advanced weaponry in the hands of many...

A Stratfor Analisa : 

Obama: First Moves

By George Friedman

November 24, 2008

Related Special Topic Page

·                       The 2008 U.S. Presidential Race

Three weeks after the U.S. presidential election, we are getting the first signs of how President-elect Barack Obama will govern. That now goes well beyond the question of what is conventionally considered U.S. foreign policy — and thus beyond Stratfor’s domain. At this moment in history, however, in the face of the global financial crisis, U.S. domestic policy is intimately bound to foreign policy. How the United States deals with its own internal financial and economic problems will directly affect the rest of the world.

 One thing the financial crisis has demonstrated is that the world is very much America-centric, in fact and not just in theory. When the United States runs into trouble, so does the rest of the globe. It follows then that the U.S. response to the problem affects the rest of the world as well. Therefore, Obama’s plans are in many ways more important to countries around the world than whatever their own governments might be planning.

 Over the past two weeks, Obama has begun to reveal his appointments. It will be Hillary Clinton at State and Timothy Geithner at Treasury. According to persistent rumors, current Defense Secretary Robert Gates might be asked to stay on. The national security adviser has not been announced, but rumors have the post going to former Clinton administration appointees or to former military people.

 Interestingly and revealingly, it was made very public that Obama has met with Brent Scowcroft to discuss foreign policy. Scowcroft was national security adviser under President George H.W. Bush, and while a critic of the younger Bush’s policies in Iraq from the beginning, he is very much part of the foreign policy establishment and on the non-neoconservative right. That Obama met with Scowcroft, and that this was deliberately publicized, is a signal — and Obama understands political signals — that he will be conducting foreign policy from the center.

 Consider Clinton and Geithner. Clinton voted to authorize the Iraq war — a major bone of contention between Obama and her during the primaries. She is also a committed free trade advocate, as was her husband, and strongly supports continuity in U.S. policy toward Israel and Iran. Geithner comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where he participated in crafting the strategies currently being implemented by U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Everything Obama is doing with his appointments is signaling continuity in U.S. policy.

 This does not surprise us. As we have written previously, when Obama’s precise statements and position papers were examined with care, the distance between his policies and John McCain’s actually was minimal. McCain tacked with the Bush administration’s position on Iraq — which had shifted, by the summer of this year, to withdrawal at the earliest possible moment but without a public guarantee of the date. Obama’s position was a complete withdrawal by the summer of 2010, with the proviso that unexpected changes in the situation on the ground could make that date flexible.

 Obama supporters believed that Obama’s position on Iraq was profoundly at odds with the Bush administration’s. We could never clearly locate the difference. The brilliance of Obama’s presidential campaign was that he convinced his hard-core supporters that he intended to make a radical shift in policies across the board, without ever specifying what policies he was planning to shift, and never locking out the possibility of a flexible interpretation of his commitments. His supporters heard what they wanted to hear while a careful reading of the language, written and spoken, gave Obama extensive room for maneuver. Obama’s campaign was a master class on mobilizing support in an election without locking oneself into specific policies.

 As soon as the election results were in, Obama understood that he was in a difficult political situation. Institutionally, the Democrats had won substantial victories, both in Congress and the presidency. Personally, Obama had won two very narrow victories. He had won the Democratic nomination by a very thin margin, and then won the general election by a fairly thin margin in the popular vote, despite a wide victory in the electoral college.

 Many people have pointed out that Obama won more decisively than any president since George H.W. Bush in 1988. That is certainly true. Bill Clinton always had more people voting against him than for him, because of the presence of Ross Perot on the ballot in 1992 and 1996. George W. Bush actually lost the popular vote by a tiny margin in 2000; he won it in 2004 with nearly 51 percent of the vote but had more than 49 percent of the electorate voting against him. Obama did a little better than that, with about 53 percent of voters supporting him and 47 percent opposing, but he did not change the basic architecture of American politics. He still had won the presidency with a deeply divided electorate, with almost as many people opposed to him as for him.

 Presidents are not as powerful as they are often imagined to be. Apart from institutional constraints, presidents must constantly deal with public opinion. Congress is watching the polls, as all of the representatives and a third of the senators will be running for re-election in two years. No matter how many Democrats are in Congress, their first loyalty is to their own careers, and collapsing public opinion polls for a Democratic president can destroy them. Knowing this, they have a strong incentive to oppose an unpopular president — even one from their own party — or they might be replaced with others who will oppose him. If Obama wants to be powerful, he must keep Congress on his side, and that means he must keep his numbers up. He is undoubtedly getting the honeymoon bounce now. He needs to hold that.

 Obama appears to understand this problem clearly. It would take a very small shift in public opinion polls after the election to put him on the defensive, and any substantial mistakes could sink his approval rating into the low 40s. George W. Bush’s basic political mistake in 2004 was not understanding how thin his margin was. He took his election as vindication of his Iraq policy, without understanding how rapidly his mandate could transform itself in a profound reversal of public opinion. Having very little margin in his public opinion polls, Bush doubled down on his Iraq policy. When that failed to pay off, he ended up with a failed presidency.

 Bush was not expecting that to happen, and Obama does not expect it for himself.

 Obama, however, has drawn the obvious conclusion that what he expects and what might happen are two different things. Therefore, unlike Bush, he appears to be trying to expand his approval ratings as his first priority, in order to give himself room for maneuver later. Everything we see in his first two weeks of shaping his presidency seems to be designed two do two things: increase his standing in the Democratic Party, and try to bring some of those who voted against him into his coalition.

 In looking at Obama’s supporters, we can divide them into two blocs. The first and largest comprises those who were won over by his persona; they supported Obama because of who he was, rather than because of any particular policy position or because of his ideology in anything more than a general sense. There was then a smaller group of supporters who backed Obama for ideological reasons, built around specific policies they believed he advocated. Obama seems to think, reasonably in our view, that the first group will remain faithful for an extended period of time so long as he maintains the aura he cultivated during his campaign, regardless of his early policy moves. The second group, as is usually the case with the ideological/policy faction in a party, will stay with Obama because they have nowhere else to go — or if they turn away, they will not be able to form a faction that threatens his position.

 What Obama needs to do politically, then, is protect and strengthen the right wing of his coalition: independents and republicans who voted for him because they had come to oppose Bush and, by extension, McCain. Second, he needs to persuade at least 5 percent of the electorate who voted for McCain that their fears of an Obama presidency were misplaced. Obama needs to build a positive rating at least into the mid-to-high 50s to give him a firm base for governing, and leave himself room to make the mistakes that all presidents make in due course.

 With the example of Bush’s failure before him, as well as Bill Clinton’s disastrous experience in the 1994 mid-term election, Obama is under significant constraints in shaping his presidency. His selection of Hillary Clinton is meant to nail down the rightward wing of his supporters in general, and Clinton supporters in particular. His appointment of Geithner at the Treasury and the rumored re-appointment of Gates as secretary of defense are designed to reassure the leftward wing of McCain supporters that he is not going off on a radical tear. Obama’s gamble is that (to select some arbitrary numbers), for every alienated ideological liberal, he will win over two lukewarm McCain supporters.

 To those who celebrate Obama as a conciliator, these appointments will resonate. For those supporters who saw him as a fellow ideologue, he can point to position papers far more moderate and nuanced than what those supporters believed they were hearing (and were meant to hear). One of the political uses of rhetoric is to persuade followers that you believe what they do without locking yourself down.

 His appointments match the evolving realities. On the financial bailout, Obama has not at all challenged the general strategy of Paulson and Bernanke, and therefore of the Bush administration. Obama’s position on Iraq has fairly well merged with the pending Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq. On Afghanistan, Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus has suggested negotiations with the Taliban — while, in moves that would not have been made unless they were in accord with Bush administration policies, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has offered to talk with Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and the Saudis reportedly have offered him asylum.

 Tensions with Iran have declined, and the Israelis have even said they would not object to negotiations with Tehran. What were radical positions in the opening days of Obama’s campaign have become consensus positions. That means he is not entering the White House in a combat posture, facing a disciplined opposition waiting to bring him down. Rather, his most important positions have become, if not noncontroversial, then certainly not as controversial as they once were.

 Instead, the most important issue facing Obama is one on which he really had no position during his campaign: how to deal with the economic crisis. His solution, which has begun to emerge over the last two weeks, is a massive stimulus package as an addition — not an alternative — to the financial bailout the Bush administration crafted. This new stimulus package is not intended to deal with the financial crisis but with the recession, and it is a classic Democratic strategy designed to generate economic activity through federal programs. What is not clear is where this leaves Obama’s tax policy. We suspect, some recent suggestions by his aides not withstanding, that he will have a tax cut for middle- and lower-income individuals while increasing tax rates on higher income brackets in order to try to limit deficits.

 What is fascinating to see is how the policies Obama advocated during the campaign have become relatively unimportant, while the issues he will have to deal with as president really were not discussed in the campaign until September, and then without any clear insight as to his intentions. One point we have made repeatedly is that a presidential candidate’s positions during a campaign matter relatively little, because there is only a minimal connection between the issues a president thinks he will face in office and the ones that he actually has to deal with. George W. Bush thought he would be dealing primarily with domestic politics, but his presidency turned out to be all about the U.S.-jihadist war, something he never anticipated. Obama began his campaign by strongly opposing the Iraq war — something that has now be come far less important than the financial crisis, which he didn’t anticipate dealing with at all.

 So, regardless of what Obama might have thought his presidency would look like, it is being shaped not by his wishes, but by his response to external factors. He must increase his political base — and he will do that by reassuring skeptical Democrats that he can work with Hillary Clinton, and by showing soft McCain supporters that he is not as radical as they thought. Each of Obama’s appointments is designed to increase his base of political support, because he has little choice if he wants to accomplish anything else.

 As for policies, they come and go. As George W. Bush demonstrated, an inflexible president is a failed president. He can call it principle, but if his principles result in failure, he will be judged by his failure and not by his principles. Obama has clearly learned this lesson. He understands that a president can’t pursue his principles if he has lost the ability to govern. To keep that ability, he must build his coalition. Then he must deal with the unexpected. And later, if he is lucky, he can return to his principles, if there is time for it, and if those principles have any relevance to what is going on around him. History makes presidents. Presidents rarely make history.

A IMPARÁVEL MUDANÇA

DO MODELO ECONÓMICO 

A economia de mercado atravessa mais uma das suas crises de mudança de modelo (a quinta desde a Revolução Industrial). Nas crises deste tipo (nada a ver com as cíclicas crises conjunturais de ajustamento), muda-se de indústrias motoras, de organização espacial com nova topografia nas relações centro-periferia, novo tipo de concorrência, novo estatuto/dimensão para as empresas... Tudo isto implica a destruição de riqueza e empregos que, simplesmente, ficaram fora de tempo, deixaram de ter o seu tempo pois o tempo deixa de ser o seu. Neste processo, mais ou menos longo, mais ou menos violento, em paralelo com a muito visível destruição do “velho”, emergem pouco a pouco, mas de forma menos clara e evidente, os elementos constitutivos do novo modelo. Veja-se, pela dimensão que o fenómeno adquire na maior economia, onde é que já vai este processo: 

U.S. Loses 533,000 Jobs in November; Joblessness at 6.7%
.

By LOUIS UCHITELLE, EDMUND L. ANDREWS and STEPHEN LABATON

The government’s report of vast job losses in November puts increased pressure on Washington to act quickly on a stimulus package.

DISRUPÇÕES

Disrupções em série – pirataria no Índico, ocupação de aeroportos, ataques a centros nevrálgicos e cortes cirúrgicos de redes – ameaçam a economia global e criam um cenário de fragmentação global.

RESILÊNCIA

Resiliência e conhecimento são os dois conceitos-chave que organizam o novo mundo emergente desta crise de fragmentação global. Um mundo que dá, portanto, uma função axial à Inteligência Competitiva!

Da Coluna dos Sábados, no Correio da Manhã

A DERROTA DE MÁRIO NOGUEIRA 

Mário Nogueira, o antigo professor dos tempos do Prec e look Lisnave 1970, já perdeu a sua guerra. O desfecho da guerra dos professores já não conta para nada. O congresso do PCP, de há uns dias, mostrou o que havia a mostrar nesta matéria. 

Nogueira havia mobilizado as suas tropas da Fenprof para mostrar que era o general duro que era necessário para substituir o amolecido Carvalho da Silva na direcção da Intersindical CGTP. Hoje, pode-se já dizer que foi um ano de guerra totalmente perdido... Nogueira não vai substituir Carvalho da Silva. Apesar das suas demonstrações e manifestações, os sinais enviados pela direcção do PC no Campo Pequeno mostram, de modo bem claro, para quem saiba lê-los (e Nogueira sabe-o bem...), que o “eleito” é...  outro! 

Carvalho da Silva vai, muito provavelmente ainda durante 2009, rumar à Universidade de Coimbra, com seu doutoramento debaixo do braço, vagando assim o lugar de patrão da Inter. Viciados em planeamento, os comunistas não podiam ficar à espera de ver como as coisas se iriam passar num tal cenário. Portanto, “planearam”... E Mário Nogueira ficou fora dos planos! O feliz contemplado é... outro! O nome? Isso é notícia para outro dia...

Delta Force Commander’s Account

of The Hunt For Osama bin Laden

Dalton Fury is the nom de plume of a Delta Force commander who led U.S. troops into Afghanistan's Tora Bora mountains at the end of 2001, when Osama bin Laden was in full flight. Fury's new book, Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man, is a riveting account of one of the most important — but also least understood — battles in the war on terror. It tells of the bravery of the men under his command, but also of the intelligence failures that allowed bin Laden and many top al-Qaeda leaders to escape from the mountains. (Read "Why Can't We Find Bin Laden?"

Fury, who can't use his real name because of security concerns, is now a private citizen. He spoke with TIME world editor Bobby Ghosh on the phone from an undisclosed location. Excerpts:

TIME: When you hear a U.S. presidential candidate saying "I promise we'll kill Osama bin Laden," what runs through your mind?

Dalton Fury: What runs through my mind is that it doesn't really matter who is going to go in the White House next year. If there's no intelligence on where [bin Laden is] located, then you can have Mickey Mouse in the White House. If they had good actual intelligence now, they would have hit him a Hellfire missile, or even potentially sent a special team in there. But it's just not as easy as saying, "When I get elected, I'll kill him," because if we knew where he was now, we would have already made the attempt.

Are we getting better intelligence now?

I think we're always improving. We're trying to build a better mousetrap, but you know, it's hard to fight [al-Qaeda] with conventional weaponry. The answer isn't always money. You can buy a thousand more Predator drones and put them over there and clog the airspace, but they're not stupid — they know when the Predators are up there. So yeah, we're going to make them fly higher and have more powerful cameras and all that stuff, but I think that because [al-Qaeda leaders] live in mud huts and they're barely washing and bathing themselves ... that we somehow treat them as if they are inferior human beings.

How aware were they of your abilities, the abilities of the Delta Force?

I'd be naive to say that they weren't aware of it. I think they're smart enough and have shown a propensity to understand how the Internet works and how to get around being discovered by using various means.

The view that exists in the U.S. is that bin Laden is living in a cave somewhere, that he's cut off from the rest of the world.

Bin Laden garners a lot of support from people because he has the ability and the willpower to live in austere conditions, to live like the average Afghani or the average Pashtun — without a lot of creature comforts. It's hard for a Western mind to realize that bin Laden is perfectly comfortable with a couple of meals a day of flat bread and some rice, as long as he can read the Koran and put out his audio and videotapes when he sees fit. It's hard to imagine anybody, any leader in the West, to have the ability to do that, but he's shown that he can certainly do that.

What have you learned about him, his personality or his lifestyle that surprises you?

My book talks about him surrounding himself with individuals of his blood type, which I thought was very interesting. If he's wounded, then he has a guy with the same blood who can give him a transfusion. But that's completely counter to the legend that bin Laden's bodyguards have been ordered to kill him if he is wounded in a battle. If that was true, in my personal opinion, he would have stayed in Tora Bora and not ran. That surprised me very much. I really thought he would stay and fight as he advertised.

The other thing that surprised me was that [during the fighting in Tora Bora] he actually told his women and children to arm themselves and come out of the caves and fight the Americans. For a man of bin Laden's stature, who puts so much credence in the Koran and the afterlife and paradise, it seemed like he reduced himself to an actual human being, with actual fears and concerns for his own health, his own survival. In his sermons and tapes, he appears above those concerns, yet here he was, asking the women and children to do the fighting for him.

When detectives track a serial killer for a long time, they can sometimes get in his head — and they can anticipate his next move. Do you feel the same way about bin Laden?

I don't think we know that much about his personality, to tell you the truth. He's obviously been very evasive over the years, and you're not getting a lot of people walking in with information.

What is it that people in the U.S. still don't get about bin Laden that you think they ought to?

I think they don't get how powerful this Islamic religion is and how powerful the Koran can be to a very small percentage, a minute percentage, of the Muslim community — people who will, in the name of bin Laden or in the name of jihad or like al-Qaeda ideology, strap on a suicide bomb or get into a bomb-laden vehicle, and blow up a hotel or a checkpoint — all in the name of bin Laden.

I think that he has such enormous magnetism that you almost have to respect it. No American is going to strap a bomb to himself and go kill someone in the name of Barack Obama or John McCain — that's not going to happen.

Many Americans think, Hey, come on, we're offering a reward of $25 million. We've been looking for this guy for seven years — so come on, what's the big deal? How hard can it be? But when you actually get around those people [who shelter the al-Qaeda leaders], you see how honorable they are, how independent they are, how hospitable they are, all according to their religion. It's much different than communism, you know. We never faced that in the Cold War. This truly is a different enemy here.

Where did you come up with Dalton Fury? It's a great name.

Simple Google search: it wasn't taken. It's pretty far from my true name.

What's next for you?

I have no idea. I'm a private citizen, and I think I'll just spend family time and watch the news and see when we finally grab bin Laden. I hope it's a violent death. I hope he doesn't die of old age or health reasons. Personally, I think he needs to die the same way that 3,000 individuals died on 9/11.

You don't want to see him being tried first?

I don't want to see him be tried, no. I don't think anybody does. I think it would be a circus. With Saddam Hussein, it was probably a good idea that he was tried because millions of [Iraqis] hated him — he terrorized the majority of the country. No one in Afghanistan or Pakistan really hates bin Laden, so you don't have those millions of enemies that Saddam had.

Killing him, it might make him a martyr, that's O.K. I think [the terrorists will] soon forget about it. I think they'll lose their stomach for the fight when they see the mighty bin Laden was vulnerable and was finally taken out. I don't think they'll have an easy time replacing him. I know the other top tier [al-Qaeda leadership] can barely get along as it is, they all don't particularly like each other. I don't think there's anybody that can bring the following out like bin Laden can.

ANÁLISE DA STRATFOR: Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack

December 1, 2008

By George Friedman

Related Special Topic Page

·                       Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences

Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.

While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.

Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.

Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.

More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.

An End to New Delhi’s Restraint

The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.

This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.

What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.

The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.

The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.

In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.

Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.

Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington

At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)

Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.

The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.

The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.

It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.

What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.

Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation

That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.

Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.

In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.

By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.

Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.