A CHINA CADA VEZ MAIS

EMBRULHADA NO TIBETE

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A China, como ontem aqui  se escrevia, já começou a oficializar as prisões de tibetanos, com várias condenações a prisão perpétua. A reacção ocidental de Londres e Washington é de claro "descontentamento"... Os chineses continuam a poluir os Jogos Olimpicos com os seus hábitos e práticas de barbárie política. Tornam assim cada vez mais difícil aos ocidentais virar a cara para o lado, fazer que não estão a ver e fazer como se tudo fosse normal... Estará Pequim (depois da "diplomacia do sorriso") a desafiar o mundo mostrando-se como "infrequentável"? Será estratégia ou apenas falta de modos? Seja como fôr, cada me parece mais que estes comunas chineses não são herdeiros de Sun Tzu mas sim de qualquer pequeno déspota asiático... 

Londres et Washington "mécontents" de l'attitude de la Chine au Tibet

 

 

Pékin reconnaît avoir tué un "insurgé" tibétain... 

“Cada vez admiro mais

 o comunismo chinês”

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explica o Jumento:

CHINA: MILHARES DE CRIANÇAS VENDIDAS A FÁBRICAS

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«Miles de niños de un pobre municipio chino fueron vendidos para trabajar en régimen de esclavitud en fábricas del próspero sur del país. Los miembros de una banda de crimen organizado engañaban a los menores, con edades comprendidas entre los siete y los quince años, en el municipio de Liangshan, en la provincia suroccidental de Sichuan, y los vendían a fábricas de provincias como Cantón o Fujian, según el diario Southern Metropolis Newspaper.» [20 Minutos]

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CHINA QUER ALUGAR TERRAS ARÁVEIS NOUTROS PAÍSES 

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«O governo da China estuda a possibilidade de adotar uma série de políticas para encorajar suas empresas a alugar terras cultiváveis em outros países. Segundo informações do jornal Beijing Morning, autoridades do Ministério da Agricultura chinês afirmaram que o governo está procurando criar novas políticas para encorajar o arrendamento ou mesmo a compra de terras cultiváveis na América Latina, na Austrália, na Rússia e nas repúblicas da antiga União Soviética.» [BBC Brasil]

SAIU DA SOMBRA E QUEIMOU-SE

«Cunha Vaz tem uma agência de comunicação. As agências de comunicação deviam chamar-se agências de convicção, servem para convencer os clientes que convencem o mundo. Por profissão, Cunha Vaz é convincente. Com Vicente, com Menezes, com quem pagar: por exemplo, quando da liderança do BCP, Cunha Vaz estava com Santos Ferreira e com Luís Filipe Menezes que acusava Santos Ferreira de ser um pau-mandado do Governo. Com profissão de sombra, Cunha Vaz deu, ontem, uma entrevista de quatro páginas ao Público. Para dizer, por exemplo, sobre um assunto qualquer, que o seu cliente Menezes mentiu. Enfim, não foi bem assim. Cunha Vaz disse que ele "deixou cair [uma mentira]..." O entrevistador insistiu: "Menezes não disse a verdade?" Ao que Cunha Vaz respondeu: "Não. Colocaram-lhe a pergunta e ele quis ser simpático." Essa é outra função das agências de comunicação: saber valorar a imagem o cliente. Este não pode passar por mentiroso. Já tonto, pode.» Ferreira Fernandes, in Diário de Notícias

OBAMA NO PURGATÓRIO...

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Obama’s Break With Ex-Pastor Sets Sharp Shift in Tone

Do “Complexo”...

Francisco Sarsfield Cabral

"Décadas e décadas de isolamento internacional deixaram a sua marca, claro. Mas, de um modo geral, os portugueses que emigraram integraram-se bem noutros ambientes e noutras culturas. Mostraram uma abertura ao diferente que já se manifestara nos Descobrimentos. Só que nós somos descendentes dos que ficaram por cá...

Esta (nossa) mentalidade fechada e provinciana é fatal num mundo onde os transportes e comunicações progrediram vertiginosamente. No passado, ela trouxe duas consequências aparentemente opostas: um complexo de inferioridade perante tudo o que é estrangeiro (automaticamente valorizando o que se faz "lá fora") e a rejeição dos "estrangeirados", isto é, dos que pretenderam modernizar Portugal. No presente, o provincianismo dificulta a nossa afirmação económica e cultural num mundo cada vez mais globalizado. Implica ficarmos à margem.»

Francisco Sarsfield Cabral, in Público

A CHINA CONDENA TIBETANOS

E TENTA DEGELO COM TÓQUIO

As primeiras condenações de tibetanos, a prisão perpétua, depois da revolta de Março são conhecidas no mesmo dia em que se anuncia uma visita a Tóquio de Hu Jintao, o presidente chinês.

Tibet: premières condamnations après les émeutes

A China já condenou os primeiros 17 tibetanos, alguns a prisão perpétua, acusados de participarem nas manifestações de 14 de Março, em Lassa, segundo noticia hoje o L’Express.

“(…) Ces 17 accusés ont été les premières personnes à être condamnées depuis les émeutes.

Contacté par l'AFP, un responsable du tribunal a affirmé que les détails des jugements seraient annoncés publiquement plus tard dans la journée.

“(…) Les manifestations anti-chinoises avaient démarré le 10 mars à Lhassa, jour anniversaire de la révolte anti-chinoise de 1959, avant de dégénérer le 14 mars, puis de s'étendre à d'autres régions où vivent des minorités tibétaines, dans l'ouest de la Chine.

“Les dirigeants tibétains en exil affirment que la répression chinoise a fait plus de 150 morts et que plus de 2.000 personnes ont été arrêtées. La police chinoise avait annoncé l'arrestation de 400 personnes pour leur participation aux émeutes de Lhassa. “ 

Chine-Japon: La diplomatie du ping-pong 

"Le président chinois Hu Jintao se rendra au Japon du 6 au 10 mai pour une visite officielle annoncée ce mardi matin par Pékin. Il s'agit de la seconde visite de l'histoire pour un chef d'Etat chinois, la première depuis dix ans. La visite de Hu Jintao interviendra dans un contexte de réchauffement des relations entre les deux pays, très tendues pendant l'ère du Premier ministre japonais Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006). Entre les deux géants d'Asie, est-ce l'amorce d'un dégel?

Rien ne vaut une partie de ping-pong pour s'entendre avec la Chine. Les Etats-Unis en ont joué pour la visite historique à Pékin, en 1972, de Richard Nixon. Et le Japon s'y met à son tour : durant son séjour à Tokyo, du 6 au 10 mai, le président Hu Jintao devrait échanger quelques balles avec le Premier ministre Yasuo Fukuda, histoire de détendre une atmosphère toujours pesante entre les deux pays.

Certes, la période de glaciation des années 2001-2006 semble révolue. Depuis le départ de Junichiro Koizumi de la tête du gouvernement nippon, et l'arrêt des visites au sanctuaire nationaliste Yasukuni, les dirigeants de part et d'autre se rencontrent à nouveau. Fukuda, partisan d'un rapprochement avec Pékin, s'est déjà rendu en Chine il y a quatre mois. Hu lui rend la politesse. Une première, pour un dirigeant chinois, depuis dix ans.

Mais les contentieux restent nombreux. D'abord, Yasuo Fukuda ne manquera pas de demander à son invité de résoudre la crise tibétaine par le dialogue : les échanges annoncés entre Pékin et le dalaï-lama seront surveillés de près. Ensuite, le différend sur la frontière maritime entre les deux pays, qui complique depuis quatre ans l'exploitation des gisements gaziers en mer de Chine orientale, ne devrait pas être résolu. Pas plus que l'affaire des gyoza, ces raviolis chinois à l'origine d'une intoxication au Japon: une enquête est en cours, sans résultat pour l'instant. Ce dernier point est jugé si sensible qu'il a déjà provoqué un report de la visite de Hu...

Enfin, le Japon s'inquiète toujours des dépenses militaires de la Chine et des problèmes environnementaux dont souffre son grand voisin. Bref, entre les deux géants de l'Asie, les motifs de fâcherie demeurent. Et il faudra plus qu'une partie de ping-pong pour en venir à bout.”

SOBRE A GUERRA NO SÉCULO XXI

A guerra do século XXI anuncia-se totalmente diferente das suas formas conhecidas no século XX. Face a isto, alguns estados (EUA, França e pouco mais) estão já a procurar doutrina e dispositivos capazes de enfrentar as  formas e teatros novos de conflito que percepcionam. Alguns pensadores e ensaístas têm também, nos últimos anos, procurado pensar e racionalizar a questão. John Robb, por exemplo, cujos trabalhos o CLARO tem seguido com atenção. Hoje, damos conta da reflexão de um autor, normalmente mais dado a tratar temas económicos, Nicolas Baverez, que na sua definição de "guerre eclatée" vai, curiosamente, muito ao encontro de certas noções de John Robb, mesmo se as suas conclusões não são coincidentes. O que não espanta nada face às diferenças de vida e de experiências entre o jurista/economista francês e o ex-comandante da Força Delta e actual consultor de empresas e governos...

Faire la guerre au XXIe Siècle

Nicolas Baverez, no Le Point

Le XXIe siècle est placé sous le signe de la mondialisation , qui inaugure l'ère de l'histoire universelle. La dernière décennie du XXe siècle, toute à l'euphorie de l'achèvement de la guerre froide et de l'effondrement du soviétisme, a cultivé les illusions sur la fin de la violence. Elles ont été tragiquement enterrées en 2001 dans les ruines du World Trade Center, confirmant le jugement de Platon selon lequel « seuls les morts voient la fin de la guerre ». La mondialisation n'a pas davantage éradiqué la guerre que les crises économiques ou les révolutions, au grand dam des démocraties, régimes fondamentalement pacifiques, et plus encore de l'Europe, hantée par les conflits mondiaux du XXe siècle qu'elle engendra et qui provoquèrent sa ruine matérielle et morale. Mais elle a provoqué une nouvelle mutation de ses formes.

Trois faits récents éclairent les transformations de la guerre. La mort, le 12 mars, de Lazare Ponticelli, le der des ders des poilus, a ravivé la mémoire de la Grande Guerre, qui vit une France de 39 millions d'habitants perdre 1,3 million des siens, le carnage atteignant jusqu'à 27 000 victimes pour la seule journée du 22 août 1914. Le 19 mars, l'intervention américaine en Irak est entrée dans sa sixième année, avec des pertes s'élevant à 4 000 morts et quelque 29 000 blessés pour une population de plus de 300 millions d'habitants. En dépit d'un corps expéditionnaire fort de 155 000 Américains et 5 000 Britanniques, d'un budget évalué entre 600 et 3 000 milliards de dollars pour les seuls Etats-Unis, l'Irak n'est ni pacifié, ni contrôlé, ni reconstruit. Le 3 avril, à l'occasion du sommet de l'Otan à Bucarest, Nicolas Sarkozy a confirmé l'envoi de 700 soldats français dans l'est de l'Afghanistan.

La guerre est donc revenue au premier plan de l'histoire et de la vie des démocraties, y compris en Europe, continent qui n'a plus été le théâtre de conflits armés depuis soixante ans, à l'exception de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Elle est une réalité durable de la mondialisation pour trois raisons. D'abord, la mondialisation repose sur un mouvement dialectique entre la diffusion universelle du capitalisme et des technologies, d'une part, l'exacerbation des conflits de valeurs, d'identités et de cultures, d'autre part. Ensuite, l'interdépendance des économies et des sociétés alimente la propagation des crises et des conflits. Enfin, des ambitions rivales se manifestent pour le contrôle des ressources rares (énergie, matières premières, eau) ou de nouveaux espaces stratégiques (stratosphère - voir les tirs de satellites effectués par la Chine et les Etats-Unis -, fonds marins, cyberespace - voir l'attaque russe qui a provoqué la paralysie de l'Estonie en 2007).

La guerre obéit à des principes et à des logiques de plus en plus hétérogènes. Le XVIe siècle fut celui des guerres de Religion ; le XVIIIe, celui des guerres limitées ; la Révolution française et l'Empire inventèrent la guerre d'anéantissement au confluent de la souveraineté des nations et des débuts de l'industrie ; le XXe siècle s'organisa autour de la guerre totale ; le XXIe siècle expérimente la guerre éclatée à l'état endémique, qui se distingue de plus en plus difficilement de la paix en même temps que les frontières s'estompent entre le civil et le militaire, le national et l'international. Ainsi coexistent des séquelles de la guerre froide (Corée, Cuba, guérillas marxistes), des crises liées au démembrement des empires (Caucase, Balkans), des guerres civiles à fort potentiel d'internationalisation (Maghreb, Afrique), des foyers de déstabilisation liés à des Etats effondrés (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Darfour), des conflits de légitimité et de territoires (Moyen-Orient), des rivalités de puissance (Asie), des opérations de police internationale conduites sous l'égide des Nations unies.

Asymétrique ou symétrique , d'intensité variable, la guerre au XXIe siècle est chaude et non pas froide, réelle et non pas contournée par la compétition, ou technologique ; elle obéit à une logique opérationnelle d'emploi dans les différents espaces et temps où elle se déploie. Logique qui s'applique aux armées françaises, avec plus de 11 000 soldats en opérations extérieures. Dans l'ordre géopolitique comme dans l'ordre économique avec la crise financière, l'ère de transition par laquelle débute le XXIe siècle évolue dans des zones largement inconnues, conjuguant forte instabilité et risques de rupture. C'est pourquoi il est fondamental pour les démocraties de chercher à maîtriser la spirale de la violence et à réguler la guerre en conjurant deux périls : l'exalter, à l'instar de l'idéologie néoconservatrice aux Etats-Unis-dont les dépenses militaires atteignent au moins 600 milliards de dollars, soit la moitié du total mondial ; occulter sa réalité et négliger les moyens de la puissance qui permettent de la contrôler. Une tentation à laquelle succombe l'Europe, dont l'effort de dépense plafonne à 1,2 % du PIB. La prévention de la guerre repose plus que jamais sur la conscience et l'engagement des citoyens des nations libres. Comme le rappelle René Girard, « il faut réveiller les consciences endormies. Vouloir rassurer, c'est toujours contribuer au pire »

O TRISTE FIM DE CARTER

NOS BRAÇOS DO HAMAS

"DIÁLOGO DAS CIVILIZAÇÕES",

RÉGIS DEBRAY QUEBRA O MITO

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Vaca sagrada dos politicamente correctos e outros estafadores de grilos, o "diálogo de civilizações" estava à espera de quem pudesse e se atrevesse a mostrar que a transparência da coisa é de facto a nudez deste rei de um certo modismo. Está feito. Régis Debray tratou disso e o CNRS acaba de colocar o trabalho à disposição 

“QUINTO IMPÉRIO”

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O ISLÃO  dossier

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L’islam, historiquement troisième religion monothéiste, revendique plus d’un milliard de fidèles. Ce poids démographique et son expansionnisme religieux inquiète l’occident, à tort ou à raison."

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continua no Le Point

OS SUBMARINOS NA

CHICANA PARTIDÁRIA

Teixeira dos Santos, o ministro das Finanças, falou na AR de submarinos… Mal. Tem de se informar melhor, antes de se pronunciar sobre matérias que não são dos seus pelouros.

Os submarinos, senhor ministro das Finanças, não devem servir para chicana partidária… Estes dois escassos submarinos são o principal instrumento de soberania deste Estado de que é ministro. E soberania é das poucas coisas valiosas (e que o uso não desgasta…) e bem rentáveis que a este Estado restam. Ora, pense lá bem senhor ministro…

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E além da soberania, pense ainda em coisas mais comezinhas como, por exemplo, aproveitar bem as contrapartidas económicas que os dois escassos submarinos proporcionam. Isso é o Estado tem de fazer bem… E não tem feito! Como, de resto, ficou bem claro quando o então ministro da Defesa Paulo Portas negociou (muito mal) as contrapartidas e, de facto, as cedeu numa bandeja a um grupo económico privado, as submeteu a uma lógica de interesses particulares e as retirou do quadro do interesse nacional. Mas isso é um problema de política… e não dos submarinos! E fazer esta chicana partidária é manter a coisa nesse nível politiqueiro e renunciar a ter sobre a matéria pensamento de Estado (que é o que, regra geral, falta aos políticos e que excepções, como José Sócrates ou Luís Amado, não chegam para resolver).

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Mas isto prova ainda que o PS continua sem ter um pensamento construído sobre a questão da Defesa e não estabeleceu ainda uma concepção clara sobre a questão simples (de enunciar mas, pelos vistos, de resposta difícil) de saber para que serve hoje a Defesa. E um partido de governo, na área ocidental, não se pode dar hoje ao luxo deste tipo de vulnerabilidades... Que lhe comprometem toda a credibilidade e ameaçam toda a sua política. E, na prática, isso representa o entregar a Defesa ao velho "complexo neo-corporativo e salazarento" , quando o que se espera de um governo PS é precisamente o contrário: libertá-la do amplexo fatal desse bafiento "complexo".

Creio que o senhor ministro se deixou levar pelo entusiasmo da polémica parlamentar, mas perdeu uma ocasião para afirmar-se como o homem de Estado que, nas suas matérias próprias, parece ser…

AR: Ministro das Finanças admite que submarinos podem "comprometer desígnio de baixar impostos"

Lisboa, 24 Abr (Lusa) -- O ministro das Finanças, Fernando Teixeira dos Santos admitiu hoje, no Parlamento, que a compra de dois submarinos pelo Estado português pode vir a comprometer o "desígnio de baixar os impostos".

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O ministro das Finanças, Fernando Teixeira dos Santos admitiu hoje, no Parlamento, que a compra de dois submarinos pelo Estado português pode vir a comprometer o "desígnio de baixar os impostos".

"Há dois submarinos que vamos ter que pagar. Não sei até que ponto é que não compromete esse desígnio de baixar os impostos", afirmou Teixeira dos Santos em resposta ao CDS-PP, durante o debate de urgência do PSD sobre a evolução orçamento e política fiscal, na Assembleia da República.

O ministro fora questionado por Diogo Feio, líder parlamentar do CDS-PP, sobre a política fiscal e a possibilidade de descida de impostos pelo Governo.

Perante os protestos da bancada do CDS, e com o líder do partido e ministro da Defesa na altura em que foi decidida a compra dos submarinos, Paulo Portas, ausente da bancada, Teixeira dos Santos deixou uma pergunta sem resposta: "Se ficaram incomodados, digam porquê?".

A compra dos dois submarinos ao consórcio alemão GSC vai custar, no total, mais de mil milhões de euros. " NS. - Lusa/Fim 

OPERAÇÃO "OPEN GATE"

Há 34 anos... Sucesso total! Parabéns a quem concebeu e a quem executou esta operação que pôs termo a quase cinco décadas de miserável, bafienta e inquisitorial ditadura de sacristia.

Dezanove meses mais tarde, a operação "Closed Gate" pôs termo às derivas, a que a primeira dera azo, e estabeleceu a Democracia.

Vou aproveitar o comemorativo feriado para ler Dominique de Roux e o seu (nosso) "Quinto Império"...

BRONCA... BIG BRONCA!

Via  Doug Ross @ Journal

Terrorist fundraisers for Obama 

Another big Barack Obama supporter: Hatem El-Hady, former chairman of the Toledo-based Islamic charity Kindhearts, closed by the US government in 2006 for terrorist fundraising: Terrorist Fundraisers for Obama.

El-Hady has now devoted himself to raising money for Barack Obama; he has a page at the official Obama campaign web site, with three “friends” listed on it: “Rick,” “Fatima from Toledo, Ohio,” and ... Michelle Obama.

Note: when someone is listed as a “friend,” it means they specifically chose it. In other words, Michelle Obama’s name isn’t there because El-Hady put it there — it’s there because she chose to be listed as his friend."

CIBERCRIME

reportagem no L'Express

Voyage au pays du cybercrime

Phishing, virus, cyberterrorisme, espionnage industriel… Au début du mois, la cybercriminalité s'est invitée au menu du Conseil de l'Europe. Laurence Ifrah, chercheur à l’université Paris II, détaille pour LEXPRESS.fr les menaces qui rodent sur le web.

continua aqui

Placing the Terrorist Threat to

the Food Supply in Perspective

análise da Stratfor a uma ameaça fatal...

April 22, 2008

 

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

High food prices have sparked a great deal of unrest over the past few weeks. Indeed, the skyrocketing cost of food staples like grain has caused protests involving thousands of people in places such as South Africa, Egypt and Pakistan. These protests turned deadly in Haiti and even led to the ouster of Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis.

With global food supplies already tight, many people have begun once again to think (and perhaps even worry) about threats to the U.S. agricultural system and the impact such threats could have on the U.S. — and global — food supply. In light of this, it is instructive to examine some of these threats and attempt to place them in perspective.

A Breakdown of Potential Threats

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, there have been many reports issued by various government and civilian sources warning of the possibility that terrorists could target the U.S. food supply. At the most basic level, threats to a country’s food supply can come in two general forms: attacks designed to create famine and attacks designed to directly poison people.

Attacks designed to create famine would entail the use of some agent intended to kill crops or livestock. Such agents could include pathogens, insects or chemicals. The pathogens might include such livestock diseases as Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly called mad cow disease, or hoof-and-mouth disease. Crop diseases such as Ug99 fungus or molds also pose a threat to supplies.

Attacks designed to poison people could also be further divided into two general forms: those intended to introduce toxins or pathogens prior to processing and those intended to attack finished food products. Attacks against foodstuffs during agricultural production could include placing an agent on crops in the field or while in transit to a mill or processing center. Attacks against finished foodstuffs would entail covertly placing the toxin or pathogen into the finished food product after processing.

It must be noted that an attack against people could also be conducted for the purposes of creating a mass disruption — such action would not be designed to cause mass casualties, but rather to create fear, unrest and mistrust of the government and food supply, or to promote hoarding. In fact, based on historical examples of incidents involving the contamination of food products, such an attack is far more likely to occur than a serious systematic attack on the food supply.

Attack Constraints

While attacks against the food supply may appear simple in theory, they have occurred infrequently and for good reason: When one considers the sheer size of the U.S. agricultural sector, conducting a productive assault proves difficult.

As seen by the cocoa and marijuana eradication efforts by the United States and its partners in Mexico, Central America and the Andes, the logistical effort needed to make any substantial dent in agricultural production is massive. Even the vast resources the United States has dedicated to drug eradication tasks in small countries –- overt plane flights spraying untold thousands of gallons of herbicides for decades — have failed to create more than a limited effect on marijuana and cocoa crops. Obviously, any sort of meaningful chemical attack on U.S. agriculture would have to be so massive that it is simply not logistically feasible.

This is where pathogens — agents that can, at least in theory, be introduced in limited amounts, reproduce and then rapidly spread to infect a far larger area — enter the picture. In order to be effective, however, a pathogen must be one that is easily spread and very deadly and has a long incubation period (in order to ensure it is passed along before the host dies). It is also very helpful to the propagation of a disease if it is difficult to detect and/or difficult to treat. While a pathogen that possesses all of the aforementioned traits could be devastating, finding such an agent is difficult. Few diseases have all the requisite characteristics. Some are very deadly, but act too quickly to be passed, while others are more readily passed but do not have a long incubation period or are not as virulent. Other pathogens, such as the Ug99 wheat fungus, are easy to detect and kill. There is also the problem of mutation, meaning that many pathogens tend to mutat e into less virulent actors. It is also important to note that genetically engineering a super bug — one that possess all the characteristics to make it highly effective — is still much harder in real life than it is on television.

Even if such an effective pathogen is found, someone intending to use it in an attack must isolate the virulent strain, manufacture it in sufficient quantities to be effective, ship it to the place of the planned attack and then distribute it in a manner whereby it is effectively dispersed. The infrastructure required to undertake such an endeavor is both large and expensive. Even in past cases where groups possessed the vast monetary resources to fund biological weapons efforts and amassed the scientific expertise to attempt such a program — Aum Shinrikyo comes to mind — virulent pathogens have proven very difficult to produce and effectively disperse in large quantities.

Another factor making these sorts of attacks difficult to orchestrate is the very nature of farming. For thousands of years, farmers have been battling plant and animal diseases. Most of the pathogens that are mentioned in connection with attacks against agriculture include elements already existing in nature such as hoof-and-mouth disease, H5N1 bird flu or a fungus like Ug99. As a result, farmers and governmental organizations such as the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service have systems in place to monitor crops and animals for signs of pathogens. When these pathogens appear, action is taken and diseased crops are treated or eradicated. Animals are treated or culled. Even in past cases where massive eradication and culling efforts occurred — BSE in the United Kingdom, citrus canker in Florida or the many bird flu outbreaks over the past few years –- the measures have not crippled or affected the country’s agricultural sector or the larger economy.

Creating famine and poisoning the food supply are also difficult, given the sheer quantity of agricultural products grown. Applying some sort of toxin before the raw food is processed is difficult, given the volume produced. In fact, much grain is diverted to uses other than human consumption, as when corn is used to produce ethanol or feed livestock. Therefore, if a truckload of corn is poisoned, it might never funnel into the human food chain. Furthermore, even if a truck of contaminated grain were destined for the food chain, by the time it made its way through the process it would likely be too diluted to have any effect. During the production process, contaminated corn would first have to combine with other grain, sit in a silo, be moved and stored again, ground and finally made into a finished food product such as a loaf of cornbread — an unlikely source of poisoning for the end user. Processing, washing, cooking, pasteurizing and refining may all also serve to further dilute, cleanse or damage the pathogen in the targeted product. At this point, food is also inspected for naturally occurring pathogens and toxins. Such inspections could help spot an intentional contamination.

Besides, even contaminating one truckload of grain would require a large amount of toxin. Producing that much toxin would require a substantial infrastructure –- one that would require a great deal of time and money to build. Not to mention the difficulty inherent in transporting and delivering the toxin.

Past Attacks Prove Few and Far Between

Actual attacks against food are very rare. And due to the considerations enumerated above, nearly every food attack we are aware of was an attempt to directly poison people and not cause famine. Furthermore, almost all of these attacks involved processed foods or raw foods packaged for human consumption.

While people are frequently sickened by pathogens in food such as E. coli or salmonella bacteria, most incidents are not intentional. One of the few known successful attempts at using a biological agent to contaminate food in the United States occurred in 1984 in the small Oregon town of The Dalles. Followers of cult leader Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, attempting to manipulate a local election, infected salad bars in 10 restaurants with Salmonella typhimurium, causing about 751 people to become ill.

A second contamination attempt occurred in October 1996, when 12 laboratory workers at a large medical center in Texas experienced severe gastrointestinal illness after eating muffins and doughnuts left in their break room. Laboratory tests revealed that the pastries had been intentionally infected with S. dysenteriae, a pathogen that rarely occurs in the United States. An investigation later determined that the pathogen came from a stock culture kept at the lab.

While many people recall the 1989 Chilean grape scare — when two grapes imported to the United States were injected with cyanide — few recall that the perpetrator in the case made several calls to the U.S. Embassy warning of the contamination and was therefore not seriously attempting to harm people, but rather attempting an action designed to draw attention to social injustice in Chile. The warning calls allowed agricultural inspectors to find the damaged and discolored grapes before they were eaten.

In a lesser-known case that took place in 1978, a dozen children in the Netherlands and West Germany were hospitalized after eating oranges imported from Israel. The Arab Revolutionary Council, a nom de guerre used by the Abu Nidal Organization, deliberately contaminated the fruit with mercury in an attempt to damage the Israeli economy.

Potential Players and the Public Impact

Such attacks could potentially be conducted by a wide array of actors, ranging from a single mentally disturbed individual on one end of the spectrum to sovereign nations on the other end. Cults and domestic or transnational terrorist groups fall somewhere in the middle. The motivation behind these diverse actors could range from monetary extortion or attempts to commit mass murder to acts of war designed to cripple the U.S. economy or the nation’s ability to project power.

Of these actors, however, there are very few who possess the ability to conduct attacks that could have a substantial impact on the U.S. food supply. In fact, most of the actors are only capable of contaminating finished food products. While they all have this rudimentary capability, there is also the question of intent.

Documents and manuals found in Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S.-led invasion revealed an al Qaeda interest in conducting chemical and biological attacks, although this interest was not a well-developed program. From a cost-benefit standpoint, it would be much cheaper and easier to use explosives to create disruption than it would be to execute a complicated plot against the food supply. Besides, such a target would not produce the type of spectacular imagery the group enjoys.

While we do not foresee any huge attempt by the Russians or Chinese, and food supply is not a part of al Qaeda’s preferred target set, it is possible that a lone wolf or a smaller extremist organization could attempt to conduct such an attack. While any such offensive will likely have limited success, it could have far wider societal repercussions. At the present time, the public has become somewhat accustomed to food scares and recalls over things such as contaminated spinach, ground beef and green onions. Even warnings over lead and other harmful chemicals in food imported from China have caused concern. However, if even a relatively unsuccessful attack on the food supply were conducted by a terrorist group, it could create significant hysteria — especially if the media sensationalized the event. In such a case, even an ineffective terror plot could result in a tremendous amount of panic and economic loss.

Perhaps the best recent example of this type of disruptive attack is the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. Although the attacks only claimed the lives of five victims, they caused a huge, disproportionate effect on the collective American and world psyche. The public fears that arose from the anthrax attacks were augmented by extensive media discussions about the use of the agent as a weapon. The public sense of unease was further heightened by the fact that the perpetrator was never identified or apprehended. As a result, countless instances surfaced in which irrational panic caused office buildings, apartment buildings, government offices and factories to be evacuated. Previously ignored piles of drywall dust and the powdered sugar residue left by someone who ate a donut at his desk led to suspicions about terrorists, who suddenly seemed to be lurking around every corner. It did not matter, in the midst of the fear, that the place where the “anthrax” was found cou ld have absolutely no symbolic or strategic value to the Islamist militants that most Americans pictured in their minds. The sense of threat and personal vulnerability was pervasive.

In the years since 2001, thousands of hoax anthrax letters have been sent to companies, government offices, schools and politicians in the United States and abroad. Many of these hoaxes have caused psychosomatic responses, resulting in victims being hospitalized, and further economic losses in terms of lost production time, emergency hazmat response costs and laboratory tests.

In the end, the most probable attack against the food supply is unlikely to create a significant death toll, but the panic such an attack may evoke can cause repercussions that are far greater than the death toll itself."

Santana Lopes PSD: "Estou aqui mais uma vez disponível para o combate"

Lisboa, 24 Abr (Lusa) - O ex-presidente do PSD Pedro Santana Lopes terminou hoje o seu discurso perante o Conselho Nacional do partido afirmando-se "mais uma vez disponível para o combate".

.

Irão: 6 meses de prisão e 10 chicotadas para activista feminista

ayatholas e outros talibans demonstram grande “criatividade” na sua relação com as mulheres… Misogenia? Bom, vendo bem, eles até gostam muito de andar de mãos dadas… uns com os outros! Agora, leia-se atentamente esta pérola da “tolerante” cultura islâmica a que as feministas ocidentais têm andado pouco atentas:

Teerão, 23 Abr (Lusa) - Uma terceira activista iraniana, Nahid Jafari, foi condenada a uma pena suspensa de seis meses de prisão e a dez chicotadas pelo Tribunal Revolucionário do Teerão, anunciou hoje o diário reformador Etemad.

"O tribunal absolveu a minha cliente das acusações de risco à segurança nacional e ao desrespeito de uma ordem dada pela polícia, mas reconheceu-a culpada da tentativa de perturbação da ordem pública", declarou o advogado Zohreh Arzani segundo o jornal diário. Esta pena é acompanhada de uma suspensão de dois anos.

Nahid Jafari foi presa em Março de 2007 em companhia de 32 outras feministas à frente do Tribunal Revolucionário de Teerão, onde deviam ser julgadas outras cinco activistas por terem participado numa manifestação em Junho de 2006.

A jornalista, Nasrin Afzali, outra militante feminista, foi condenada à mesma pena segunda-feira passada, tal como Marzieh Mortazi Langueroudi em Fevereiro.

As feministas iranianas lançaram uma campanha para reunir um milhão de assinaturas a pedir direitos iguais no que diz respeito ao casamento, o divórcio, a herança e a custódia dos filhos.

Recentemente várias militantes feministas foram presas pelas autoridades iranianas, algumas das quais ainda continuam encarceradas.” MZA Lusa/Fim

China: Pequim cancela o principal

festival de música pop do país 

O principal e mais antigo festival de música pop da China foi cancelado e não vai, portanto, realizarse como previsto em Pequim no dia 01 de Maio, informou hoje a imprensa chinesa, segundo as agências. Não se sabe se o festival foi anulado ou simplesmente adiado, mas esta decisão acontece depois do cancelamento de outro festival, o Shanghai Midi, e da introdução de medidas de controlo rígido das actuações de bandas estrangeiras no país, sobretudo depois da manifestação de apoio à independência do Tibete pela cantora islandesa Bjork no seu concerto em Xangai, em Fevereiro.

O alinhamento musical da edição deste ano, que coincidia com a contagem dos 100 dias para a realização dos Jogos Olímpicos, incluía a presença de várias bandas francesas.

O motivo invocado para esta decisão é "a falta de apoio policial e de condições de segurança". Mas a forte onda de nacionalismo que está a espalhar-se pelo país apelando ao boicote aos produtos franceses e à união contra as críticas da imprensa e da comunidade internacional à China pode ter motivado a decisão do governo de adiar o festival para evitar uma situação propícia a manifestações.

Segundo Zhang Fan, da organização do festival, citado pelo Sina.com, "é possível que se trate de um adiamento, mas a decisão final ainda não está tomada". À revista City Weekend de Pequim,  Zhang disse que "prefiro não fazer mais declarações para já. Dentro em breve faremos um comunicado sobre o assunto".

O esperado comunicado oficial dirá se o festival vai ser adiado ou cancelado, mas existe a possibilidade do evento se realizar na semana de feriados de Outubro, depois dos Jogos Olímpicos de Pequim 2008, que decorrem entre 08 e 24 de Agosto, segundo a City Weekend.

O Midi Festival, que reune anualmente milhares de fans, começou em 2000.

HUMBERTO DELGADO CONTINUA

A SER VÍTIMA DOS SALAZARENTOS

Trinta e quatro anos depois do "25 d'Abril" e trinta e três anos depois do "25 de Novembro", eis que continua o Portugal salazarento em todo o seu esplendor. Ao contrário do que diz o provérbio, o bicho morreu mas a peçonha ainda anda por aí... Antídotos precisa-se:

 Humberto Delgado: Ministro da Justiça diz "não ter conhecimento" de deficiente conservação do processo

Lisboa, 23 Abr (Lusa) - O ministro da Justiça disse hoje "não ter conhecimento" que o processo relativo ao homicídio de Humberto Delgado estava a deteriorar-se numa cave de um tribunal, onde foi encontrado pelo investigador e neto do general. 

O ministro da Justiça disse hoje "não ter conhecimento" que o processo relativo ao homicídio de Humberto Delgado estava a deteriorar-se numa cave de um tribunal, onde foi encontrado pelo investigador e neto do general. "Não me chegou nenhuma referência ao que agora foi mencionado", afirmou Alberto Costa, no final da entrega do processo, com 18 volumes, ao Arquivo Distrital de Lisboa (Torre do Tombo).

O governante revelou ter mantido contactos duas vezes esta semana com familiares de Humberto Delgado e nunca lhe ter sido referida a situação de abandono em que foi encontrado o processo no Tribunal da Boa-Hora, Lisboa.

O caso foi relatado terça-feira à Agência Lusa por Frederico Delgado Rosa, neto do general assassinado pela PIDE, em 1965, em território espanhol junto à fronteira portuguesa. Alberto Costa considerou "negativo" que seja realçado esse facto no dia em que o processo vai para uma instituição que pode "dar-lhe melhores condições do que o Tribunal (da Boa Hora) podia garantir".

O antigo advogado de Humberto Delgado e ex-Presidente da República, Mário Soares, disse que esta cerimónia foi mais uma homenagem ao general que desafiou Salazar. "Foi-lhe feita justiça a seguir ao 25 de Abril [de 1974] com o julgamento" dos elementos da PIDE responsáveis pela sua morte, "tem o nome em ruas e praças de todo o país" e os restos mortais no Panteão Nacional, o que considerou ser raro e reservado só a algumas das grandes personalidades do país.

Durante a cerimónia, o ministro da Justiça elogiou Delgado pelo "vigoroso e excepcional contributo que deu à luta pela implantação da democracia e pela instituição do Estado de Direito em Portugal, sob cuja égide vivemos hoje". Aproveitando o facto da cerimónia decorrer na sala onde funcionava o Tribunal Plenário de Lisboa, que julgava os opositores à ditadura, Alberto Costa referiu que só no ano a seguir à campanha presidencial de Delgado foram presas 3.811 pessoas, 256 das quais julgadas naquele espaco entre Outubro de 1959 e Agosto de 1960. Apesar dos apoiantes do general assegurarem que Humberto Delgado venceu as eleições de 1959, a vitória foi atribuída ao candidato do regime, Américo Tomás.

Numa alusão ao 34º aniversário da revolução que derrubou a ditadura que se comemora sexta-feira, o ministro da Justiça fez ainda questão de salientar que a entrega daquele processo histórico ao Arquivo Distrital de Lisboa "é um acto que evoca o 'general sem medo' e, ao mesmo tempo, um momento que celebra o 25 de Abril". Na intervenção que fez como convidado para a cerimónia, Mário Soares contou episódios que protagonizou ou a que assistiu enquanto advogado de Delgado e terminou a afirmar que o "Doutor Salazar foi o autor moral do crime", porque "deu a ordem e sabia que o matavam se ele reagisse, como aconteceu".

Defendeu, contudo, que a intenção da operação que acabou na morte do general teria como objectivo capturá-lo em Espanha e trazê-lo para Portugal. Mas como Delgado andava sempre armado, terá reagido e acabou por ser abatido pelos elementos da PIDE, sustenta.” AMN/FC. - Lusa/Fim

A"Tortilla's Revolution" já

dá notícias todos os dias…

Venezuela: ALBA acorda fundo se segurança alimentar

Caracas, 24 Abr (Lusa) - A Venezuela, Bolívia, Nicarágua e Cuba assinaram, quarta-feira, um acordo para a implementação de programas de soberania alimentar, para criar um fundo de segurança alimentar e uma Rede de Comercialização Alimentar.

Brasil: Governo suspende exportações de arroz para proteger mercado interno

Rio de Janeiro, 24 Abr (Lusa) - O Governo brasileiro suspendeu as exportações de arroz das reservas públicas e vai pedir ao sector privado que faça o mesmo, num esforço para defender o mercado interno e contra-atacar a alta dos preços do cereal.

Food Crisis 2008: The Tipping Point

by info@stratfor.com

The global shortage of grains has reached a geopolitical tipping point, and governments around the world are taking action...

Micaela Ramazzotti, Lucilla Agosti, Michela Quattrociocche e Violante Placido, pelo Tibete

 via "E deus criou a mulher"

Escolas islâmicas

via Pitigrili 

 

.
This story, part of a yearlong investigation, is the first in an occasional series on trafficking and exploitation of children in West and Central Africa. Related stories will move in the coming months.
DAKAR, Senegal - On the day he decided to run away, 9-year-old Coli awoke on a filthy mat.
Like a pup, he lay curled against the cold, pressed between dozens of other children sleeping head-to-toe on the concrete floor. His T-shirt was damp with the dew that seeped through the thin walls. The older boys had yanked away the square of cloth he used to protect himself from the draft. He shivered.
It was still dark as he set out for the mouth of a freeway with the other boys, a tribe of 7-, 8- and 9-year-old beggars.
Coli padded barefoot between the stopped cars, his head reaching only halfway up the windows. His scrawny body disappeared under a ragged T-shirt that grazed his knees. He held up an empty tomato paste can as his begging bowl.
There are 1.2 million Colis in the world today, children trafficked to work for the benefit of others. Those who lure them into servitude make $15 billion annually, according to the International Labor Organization.
It's big business in Senegal. In the capital of Dakar alone, at least 7,600 child beggars work the streets, according to a study released in February by the ILO, the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Bank. The children collect an average of 300 African francs a day, just 72 cents, reaping their keepers $2 million a year.
Most of the boys — 90 percent, the study found — are sent out to beg under the cover of Islam, placing the problem at the complicated intersection of greed and tradition. For among the cruelest facts of Coli's life is that he was not stolen from his family. He was brought to Dakar with their blessing to learn Islam's holy book.
In the name of religion, Coli spent two hours a day memorizing verses from the Quran and over nine hours begging to pad the pockets of the man he called his teacher.
It was getting dark. Coli had less than half the 72 cents he was told to bring back. He was afraid. He knew what happened to children who failed to meet their daily quotas.
They were stripped and doused in cold water. The older boys picked them up like hammocks by their ankles and wrists. Then the teacher whipped them with an electrical cord until the cord ate their skin.
Coli's head hurt with hunger. He could already feel the slice of the wire on his back.
He slipped away, losing himself in a tide of honking cars. He had 20 cents in his tomato can.
Children seen as entry to paradise
Three years ago, a man wearing a skullcap came to Coli's village in the neighboring country of Guinea-Bissau and asked for him.
Coli's parents immediately addressed the man as "Serigne," a term of respect for Muslim leaders on Africa's western coast. Many poor villagers believe that giving a Muslim holy man a child to educate will gain an entire family entrance to paradise.
Since the 11th century, families have sent their sons to study at the Quranic schools that flourished on Africa's western seaboard with the rise of Islam. It is forbidden to charge for an Islamic education, so the students, known as talibe, studied for free with their marabouts, or spiritual teachers. In return, the children worked in the marabout's fields.
(Ler o resto em http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24229321/)

Posted by Pitigrili at 7:13 AM 0 comments

Labels: Escolas, Guiné-Bissau, Islão

AS NTIC AFIRMAM-SE COMO

INDÚSTRIA MOTORA DO NOVO

MODELO ECONÓMICO GLOBAL

O high-tech dá mostras de não se deixar atingir pela crise. Nem crise de investimentos, nem de vendas, nem de criatividade…  Novos avanços tecnológicos, novas propostas de serviços, novos usos e novas formas, as empesas a reequipar-se e os investimentos a manter o sector como motor de crescimento. Apesar da crise geral, aqui se apresenta um mundo cada vez mais novo e inovador. As NTIC (com o C a significar cada vez mais “conhecimento” e já não o velho “comunicação”…) definem-se e afirmam-se como indústria motora do próximo (mas já apercebível no horizonte) modelo económico global. Vejam-se algumas notícias da última semana:

Applications - Web 2.0 : les entreprises mettent la main à la poche
Les dépenses des entreprises en technologies interactives et collaboratives vont croître de manière spectaculaire. Une évolution qui fera la part belle aux réseaux sociaux.

Investissements - Le secteur high-tech ne connaît pas de crise de l'investissement
Aux Etats-Unis, les venture capitalistes ont moins investi en 2008. Seul secteur épargné par ce ralentissement : les nouvelles technologies, qui restent un moteur de la croissance.

Infrastructures - L'optimisation des systèmes critiques en entreprise
Indicateurs, niveaux de services... Toutes les problématiques liées à la conception, à la création et au suivi des systèmes critiques ont été abordées lors de la conférence proposée par la filiale de services aux entreprises de Thales.

Sécurité - Protectoria sécurise les mails par mobile
Le fournisseur lance une solution de sécurisation des e-mails basée sur l'obtention d'un code de sécurité via un simple combiné portable.

E-marketing - La génération Y séduite par le mobile banking
Aux USA les opérations financières sur téléphone portable sont un secteur prometteur. Ce sont les 18 - 34 ans qui portent ce type de services mobiles.

Usages - Quand le site web est un organisme qui se régénère
Creative Synthesis développe un logiciel permettant aux sites Internet d'évoluer au rythme de leurs utilisateurs. Le système est capable de changer automatiquement une police ou une couleur qui rencontre peu de succès.

Recherche - Le robot pressent l'utilité d'un objet
Kurt3D sera prochainement capable d'identifier spontanément à quoi peut servir un objet et l'utiliser pour réaliser une tâche. Ce, sans avoir été programmé au préalable.

DALAI LAMA PROPÕE A PEQUIM

UM “DIÁLOGO SEM CONDIÇÕES”

O monge budista francês, Matthieu Ricard, filho do filósofo Jean-François Revel, fala em entrevista ao L’Express sobre a situação real no Tibete, fazendo revelações sobre a realidade prática da ocupação chinesa e sobre a desinformação conduzida por Pequim… E reafirma que o Dalai Lama está disponível para um diálogo sem condições prévias.

TIBET: "Le dalaï-lama veut

 dialoguer sans conditions"

Proche du guide spirituel des Tibétains, le moine bouddhiste Matthieu Ricard compte sur la mobilisation internationale pour forcer la main de Pékin. Et contrecarrer sa politique de sinisation forcée. Entretien.

(…)

La perspective des Jeux olympiques de Pékin a-t-elle été, selon vous, le déclencheur des événements?

Beaucoup de Tibétains se sont dit: «Si la comédie des Jeux se joue et qu'il ne se passe rien, c'est fichu pour nous.» Le dalaï-lama, en exil, préconise le dialogue mais, à l'intérieur du pays, les jeunes se sont radicalisés. Pour eux, l'attitude de l'occupant encourage le terrorisme. A Lhassa, il y a désormais des trains qui viennent de Chine quatre fois par jour. 80% des résidents de cette capitale sont chinois. Au total, ils sont 7 millions sur le territoire, pour 6 millions de Tibétains. Les ressources naturelles sont pillées. La déforestation a été massive, et aujourd'hui les Tibétains n'ont même plus le droit de récolter du bois pour construire leurs maisons. Le tourisme est devenu le principal moteur de l'économie. Il y a, en proportion, plus de prostituées à Lhassa que dans n'importe quelle ville de Chine. Ils veulent la transformer en une sorte de Las Vegas. Les Tibétains ne supportent plus cette situation, qui s'ajoute à la dictature et à la sinisation forcée, semblable à celle imposée à la Mongolie-Intérieure. Toutes les écoles enseignent en chinois. Les fonctionnaires tibétains ont l'obligation de s'exprimer en chinois. S'ils ne sont pas vêtus à la chinoise, s'ils refusent de boire de l'alcool, ils sont suspects. Et puis il y a la propagande. On raconte aux Chinois que les Tibétains se nourrissent de la chair des nouveau-nés. Je me souviens d'avoir discuté avec une avocate qui y croyait dur comme fer.

© J. Robine/ AFP

Matthieu Ricard avec le dalaï-lama, à Paris, en 2003. «Il est d'abord une figure spirituelle qui défend ses valeurs: la non-violence, l'altruisme, la compassion. Il n'est pas un chef.»

En France, quelques voix dénoncent le caractère théocratique du bouddhisme tibétain. Le retour du dalaï-lama pourrait-il se traduire par un système dans lequel tout le pouvoir irait aux moines?

Ça, c'est l'argument du pouvoir en place à Pékin. C'est à peu près comme si on parlait d'un retour à la France de Louis XVI! Aucun Tibétain ne veut revenir soixante ans en arrière. Le dalaï-lama a maintes fois répété que son projet d'autonomie s'inscrivait dans un cadre démocratique et laïque. Une Constitution a été rédigée. Un Parlement a été élu en exil dans le respect strict de la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat. Il faut bien comprendre que le dalaï-lama est d'abord une figure spirituelle qui défend ses valeurs: la non-violence, l'altruisme, la compassion. Ce n'est pas un chef. Il ne délivre pas des encycliques comme le pape.

Gandhi, autre adepte de la non-violence, avait une dimension politique que le dalaï-lama n'a pas...

On ne peut pas comparer. L'Inde était confrontée à une puissance coloniale qui n'était pas totalitaire: l'Empire britannique. Aujourd'hui, le dalaï-lama vit à l'extérieur de son pays avec un soixantième de la population. A l'intérieur, le territoire est immense, les 6 millions de Tibétains sont dispersés. Il doit compter sur le soutien des nations, afin d'effectuer une véritable pression sur la Chine. S'il ne dispose pas d'un appui politique fort, comme celui des Etats-Unis à Taïwan ou à Israël, il n'arrivera à rien. Il est sincère dans ses revendications, il ne réclame pas l'indépendance. Le dalaï-lama demande l'ouverture d'un dialogue sans conditions.

(…) continua aqui

Dossier: Le combat du Tibet

Le combat du Tibet

Le Tibet ou la quête de l'inaccessible

Chat, jeudi 24 avril à 16h, avec Jean-Paul Ribes

Jours de colère à Dharamsala

·                               Le combat du Tibet

o                                                   Le combat du Tibet

o                                                   Un royaume sur le Toit du monde

o                                                   La quête de l'inaccessible

o                                                   Tibetintin

o                                                   Jours de colère à Dharamsala

o                                                   «Le dalaï-lama demande un dialogue sans conditions»

§                                                                          Un porte-parole converti

o                                                   Rebelles en robe pourpre

·                               Le Tibet, une cause française

·                               JO: le casse-tête chinois

·                               Un réseau de soutien planétaire

·                               Samdhong Rinpoché: un sage pour le Tibet

·                               Pékin souffle le chaud et le froid

·                               La résistante de Lhassa

·                               Samdhong Rinpoché, l'autre voix du Tibet

·                               Tibet: la résistance des religieuses

·                               La fuite du 17e karmapa

·                               Lhassa la mort dans l'âme

·                               Entretien avec le dalaï-lama

·                               Repères

·                               Voir le dossier sur la Chine

L’Inde tiraillée entre Chine et Tibet

Manifestation hier à New Dehli, à l'occasion du passage de la flamme olympique.

BARROSO TENTA SALVAR A CHINA

Neuf commissaires européens évaluent

la situation en Chine [FR][en][de] 

Publié: mardi 22 avril 2008

Le président de la Commission européenne José Manuel Barroso prendra la tête d'un groupe fort de neuf commissaires lors d'une visite en Chine les 23 et 24 mars. C'est la plus grande délégation de l'exécutif européen à se rendre sur un sol étranger pour une visite bilatérale.

Officiellement, l’objectif principal de la visite est d’ouvrir le dialogue avec le Premier ministre chinois Wen Jiabao et le gouvernement chinois qui se concentreront sur les défis du changement climatique et du développement durable. Une réunion avec le président  Hu Jintao est également prévue à l’ordre du jour. M. Barroso est accompagné des commissaires S. Dimas, A. Piebalgs, J. PotoÄ�nik, B. Ferrero-Waldner, P. Mandelson, L. Michel, V. Špidla, M. Kuneva et L. Kovács.

Prête à devenir la plus grande économie au monde, la Chine est déjà le plus grand émetteur de gaz à effet de serre et la Commission compte amener Pékin à contribuer à la lutte contre le changement climatique en engageant le pays à respecter des objectifs internationaux contraignants de réduction des émissions (EurActiv 04/12/07). 

Mais M. Barroso et son équipe sont également confrontés à la tâche difficile consistant à améliorer le climat général des relations entre l’UE et la Chine au moment où d’importants groupes de pression du Vieux Continent, notamment au sein du Parlement européen, appelle au boycott des Jeux Olympiques de cet été à Pékin – ou au moins, au boycott de la cérémonie d’ouverture. Suite à la répression chinoise des manifestants tibétains, le Parlement européen a également prévu d’inviter le leader spirituel du Tibet, le Dalaï Lama, à l’une de ses sessions plénières.

Les récentes manifestations au Tibet ont déjà marqué les cérémonies de la flamme olympique dans les pays occidentaux et ont provoqué la fureur des autorités chinoises. Des messages anonymes sur les téléphones mobiles ont mobilisé des manifestants chinois contre certaines entreprises occidentales présentes en Chine, comme le détaillant français Carrefour.

M. Barroso s’est néanmoins déclaré opposé au boycott des cérémonies d’ouverture, ce qui pourrait jouer en sa faveur avec ses homologues chinois. Il prévoit d’utiliser cet avantage pour parler des Jeux Olympiques et montrer la contradiction entre les plus grands festivals de jeunesse dans le monde et la répression et les violations des droits de l’homme.

M. Barroso et le Premier ministre Wen lanceront également un mécanisme économique et commercial de haut niveau UE-Chine. Proposé par les autorités chinoises et approuvé lors du sommet UE-Chine à Pékin en novembre 2007, ce mécanisme apportera un nouvel outil pour faire face aux problèmes auxquels sont confrontées les entreprises européennes qui tentent de s’établir en Chine, en particulier dans les domaines de l’investissement, de l’accès au marché et de la protection des droits de propriété intellectuelle.

A la veille de la visite des commissaires à Pékin, BusinessEurope a fait circuler une lettre énumérant certains des problèmes rencontrés par les entrepreneurs en Chine.

Positions:

Le professeur Mario Telo, président de l’Institut des études européennes à l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, a déclaré à EurActiv qu’il ne faut pas s’attendre à des résultats importants à l’issue de la visite de M. Barroso. « Mais il est important que les Chinois sachent que la question des droits de l’homme fait partie des politiques bilatérale et multilatérale avec l’UE », a-t-il souligné.

Il estime également que la visite est un pas en avant comparé à l’ancienne approche. Avec le commissaire au Commerce Peter Mandelson, l’approche était uniquement concentrée sur le commerce, montrant ainsi une certaine réticence à faire face à Pékin sur la question des droits de l’homme. Aujourd’hui, l’UE traite avec son homologue asiatique sur un vaste agenda comprenant des questions mondiales, notamment le développement durable. C’est extrêmement important, a-t-il déclaré, ajoutant : « si nous n’impliquons pas la Chine dans Kyoto, nous sommes perdus ».

Le 19 avril à Londres, le commissaire européen au Commerce Peter Mandelson a déclaré qu’il ne soutiendrait pas le boycott des Jeux Olympiques de Pékin dans la mesure où cela ne ferait que nuire aux intérêts des Européens ordinaires ainsi que des Chinois. Il a déclaré que l’interdépendance entre la Chine et le Royaume-Uni, ainsi qu’avec l’Europe au sens large, grandit rapidement. En outre, l’Europe devra travailler en collaboration avec la Chine pour résoudre les problèmes émergeants dans le processus de développement. M. Mandelson a ajouté qu’il s’agisse des Européens ou des Américains, le succès de la Chine serait essentiel à leurs propres intérêts. Par conséquent, tout boycott contre la Chine ne serait pas conforme aux intérêts européens, a-t-il souligné.

Tout en insistant sur le fait qu’il est opposé à un boycott des Jeux Olympiques dans leur ensemble, le président du Parlement européen Hans-Gert Poettering, a déclaré qu’il était en faveur d’une position commune entre les leaders de l’UE. Sur une chaîne de la télévision allemande, il a affirmé que le Parlement demandera aux gouvernements des Etats membres de l’UE, en d’autres termes, aux équipes dirigeantes, de parvenir à un accord sur une politique commune pour la cérémonie d’ouverture des Jeux Olympiques le 8 août.

Prochaines étapes:

• 8 août : Début des Jeux Olympiques de Pékin, la cérémonie d’ouverture étant prévue à 20:08:08 (12:08:08 UTC). Les Jeux termineront le 24 août.

Liens

Documents officiels de l'UE

• European Union–China relations:
• European Union–China trade:

Fédérations

• Business Europe: Letter to President Barroso:

Articles de Presse

• Global Politician: China’s Crackdown on Tibet Divides Europe

Contexte:

En octobre 2006, la Commission a présenté sa stratégie avec la Chine dans une communication intitulée « UE-Chine : rapprochement des partenaires, accroissement des responsabilités ». La communication dresse le bilan des relations entre l’UE et la Chine dans le contexte de la réémergence du pays en tant que puissance économique et politique mondiale. Elle signale la volonté de l’UE de poursuivre et d’intensifier son vaste engagement envers la Chine.

La communication poursuit une stratégie axée sur le soutien en faveur de la transition de la Chine vers une société plurielle, la promotion du développement durable, l’amélioration des relations commerciales et économiques et le renforcement de la coopération bilatérale, régionale et internationale.

D’une façon plus générale, la communication souligne également que l’augmentation de l’influence de la Chine et sa position dans le monde vont de pair avec l’augmentation de ses responsabilités et de ses attentes.

Publié le même jour que la communication, le document de travail sur le commerce et l’investissement entre l’UE et la Chine, intitulé « concurrence et partenariat » complique encore les options politiques pour garantir des relations commerciales mutuellement avantageuses. L’accent est mis sur les avantages de l’ouverture, de la concurrence et de l’accès au marché, tout en insistant sur la nécessité de soutenir les entreprises européennes en concluant des affaires en Chine et d’améliorer notre connaissance du marché chinois.

Le Conseil a salué la communication et le document de travail sur le commerce et a approuvé leurs recommandations dans les conclusions adoptées le 11 décembre 2006, soulignant que pour développer l’ensemble du potentiel du partenariat UE/Chine, il doit être équilibré, réciproque et mutuellement avantageux.

A lire aussi:

News:   Le Parlement européen appelle au boycott des JO en Chine [FR]

Interview:   Barroso : le changement climatique et l’énergie sont les priorités politiques de l’UE

Autres articles:

• Les principaux émetteurs promettent plus de négociations sur le climat [FR]
• Les dirigeants européens rejettent le plan de la Maison Blanche sur le climat [FR]
• Entretien: Shell veut financer la séquestration du CO2 avec l’argent public [FR]
• L’UE voit de bonnes possibilités de coopération avec l’Asie Centrale
• Entretien : le changement climatique aggravera les problèmes sanitaires [FR]

A STRATFOR ANALISA

The Politics of the Improbable

April 23, 2008

By Peter Zeihan

Fear is a powerful motivator, even getting results when the threat is exceedingly remote. It makes us cross at crosswalks even when traffic is thin, pay more over time for fire insurance than our homes are worth, and shy away from snakes even when signs clearly inform us they are not poisonous. Humans instinctively take steps to prevent negative outcomes, oftentimes regardless of how likely — or more to the point, unlikely — those unpleasant outcomes are.

As with individuals, the same is true for countries. Anyone can blithely say Cuba or Serbia would not dare ignore the will of their more powerful neighbors, or that Brazil’s or Egypt’s nuclear programs are so inconsequential as not to impact the international balance of power. But such opinions — even if they truly are near-certainties — cannot form the foundation of state power. National leaders do not have the luxury of ignoring the plethora of coulds, mights and maybes that pepper their radar screens every day. An analyst can dismiss a dark possibility as dubious, but a national leader cannot gamble with the lives of his countrymen and the existence of his state. They must evaluate even improbable threats against the potential damage to their respective national interests.

Many of the standing policies we take for granted have grown from such evaluations. While the likelihood of Israel bombing the Aswan High Dam is rather remote, Egypt cannot afford to risk the possibility, which contributed to Cairo’s burying-of-the-hatchet with Israel. Worrying about continental European countries sublimating their national differences, uniting into a federated superstate and invading the United Kingdom may seem to flirt with lunacy, but within that lingering concern lies the root of the Anglo-American alliance. Similarly, worrying about China using the archipelagos of Southeast Asia as a staging point for an invasion of Australia may seem ludicrous, but that fear dominates military planning in Canberra.

Predicting national management of improbable outcomes is among the more difficult tasks presented to Stratfor’s staff. Such empathetic analysis requires not just a deep and dispassionate understanding of a country’s strengths and weaknesses, but also a deep and extremely passionate understanding about how a country’s neighbors perceive it. Our work is not simply about what is, but about what leaders fear might come to be. And that requires not merely understanding reality, but developing an accurate evaluation of the sorts of risks national leaders are willing to take with their actions — and their inactions.

This management of improbable outcomes also dominates the question of the day: Iraq.

Currently, the Iranians and Americans are locked into increasingly public negotiations over Iraq’s future. Buried at the heart of those talks are two nightmare scenarios. Iran wants to ensure that a Sunni-controlled Iraq is never resuscitated, while the United States desires a framework to guarantee that Iran cannot invade the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula.

Neither of those nightmares is particularly likely to occur.

The Sunnis of Iraq not only are the smallest of Iraq’s three major ethno-sectarian groups, but as a community, they are just as fractured as the country’s notoriously squabbling Shia. The Sunnis thus sport splits between secular Baathist nationalists and Islamist militants, among other fractures. Yes, the Sunnis under Saddam Hussein rose to command all of Iraq, but even with strong American support the recreation of such a constellation could come neither quickly nor easily. And even were that to occur, it is not as if Iraq’s Sunnis are itching for a genocidal war with a neighboring country sporting a population more than ten times the size of Iraq’s Sunni community.

On the flip side, the Iranian military is hardly capable of marching into the Saudi oil fields. The mountainous nature of Iran means the country is packed with minority groups — in fact nearly half of all Iranians are not ethnically Persian — that could rise up and threaten the regime in Tehran. Managing this country requires an infantry-heavy military better suited toward domestic control than to a 350-mile slog through swamps and very flat, very hot, dry deserts where the Iraqi army discovered it was very easy to see one’s entire force become very destroyed.

Yet what may seem remote to one side cannot be ruled out as impossible by the other, and in that sliver of possibility lies a foe’s worst fear — and American and Iranian leaders alike do not dare ignore the risks of those nightmares arising. The last Persian-Mesopotamian war (known in modern vernacular as the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war) claimed a million casualties. Would you like to be the Iranian leader who allowed a Sunni-ruled Iraq to re-emerge? Nearly 25 million barrels per day of crude oil — nearly one-third of global output — is produced in the Persian Gulf. Would you like to be the American president who failed to prevent all that power from becoming concentrated under a single (hostile) state?

The topic of the American-Iranian negotiations is not to get past these fears — no amount of Carter-esque goodwill is going to convince Washington and Tehran to trust the other — but instead to embed these fears in the final settlement and craft a solution that is institutionally neutral. For this a template does indeed exist. In fact, the United States has done precisely this, in partnership with a country for which it held far more vitriol and anger that it does for Iran.

At the end of World War II, the Soviets wanted to ensure that Finland could never again bloody the Russian nose (casualty ratios in the Russo-Finnish War, or Winter War, of 1941 were the worst Soviet Russia ever suffered). Yet the bulk of Finland was not in Soviet hands at war’s end, and the Western powers certainly did not want to see the balance of power in the Baltic states altered. The settlement was that Finland would have a Western-style participatory democracy, but the Soviet Union would enjoy a de facto veto over all decision-making. The result was a “free” Finland with a capitalist economy and a robust defense force, but a country that did not join either NATO or the European Economic Community and remained strictly neutral in international affairs.

Replicating the Finnish example in Iraq would create a united Iraq with American security guarantees that could prevent any Iranian incursion into Arabia, but with sufficient Iranian aspects to prevent the formation of a powerful offensive military. The fears of both sides would be managed by being built into the foundation of a new Iraqi state. Should Washington seek to double-cross Tehran and begin a serious Iraqi rearmament campaign, Iran could use its influence over the Shia to tear Iraq down and revive the threat to Arabia. And should Iran play the Shiite card, the United States could side militarily with the Sunnis. No one would really “win,” but neither would anyone really lose.”

Ainda não se habituaram?

no "Vida das Coisas" 

Não se pode esperar verdade, quando a verdade não faz parte do quotidiano. Não se pode esperar espontaneidade, quando muita mentira se embrulha com pouca verdade. Não pode se esperar seguidismo simplório, quando a manipulação é de uma clareza chocante. Não se pode esperar inteligência, quando todos os dias nos tratam como palermas. Paciência...
Convenhamos, porém, que a dois passos das eleições, a vida da coisa vai ser de "face humana", ou lá o que isso quer dizer. Por isso façamos a pose de gente atenta ao espectáculo da autenticidade, avisados, desde já, que a crueldade faz parte do ofício de governar, mas que vai abrandar circunstancialmente, para aliviar o ambiente e as cabeças dos cidadãos/eleitores/contribuintes - salazarentos incluídos - uma população de artificiosos crédulos, felizmente fora de qualquer teatro de guerra cruel.
É sempre aconselhável fazer uma leitura, mesmo que em diagonal, dos escritos e das opiniões do Professor Doutor em Direito Excelentíssimo Senhor Vital Martins Moreira. Na circunstância, recomenda-se um texto com o título "O mal-estar nacional", publicado em primeira mão no Público, anotado na íntegra no blog A aba da causa. Trata-se, tão somente, de uma forte critica aos fazedores de manchetes, as quais, ao que parece, malvados, só revelam os aspectos sórdidos, mórbidos, falsos, espectaculares ("É evidente que a vulnerabilidade da opinião pública ao enviesamento informativo e opinativo é tanto maior quanto mais atávica for a propensão para o derrotismo social e quanto menor for o nível de educação e de autonomia crítica na sociedade.") da nossa vida colectiva que, ao contrário deste e tortuoso caminho das pedras sem sentido perceptível, deveria - para inglês ver - ser o sítio onde termina o arco-íris.

"O tratamento noticioso é claramente enviesado para seleccionar e sublinhar os lados mais negativos da actualidade. Em princípio, só as más notícias são notícias, mesmo quando não são verdadeiras. É notícia o aumento da criminalidade, não a sua redução; a subida da inflação, não a sua descida; a elevação do desemprego, não o seu decréscimo; a erupção de um surto infeccioso, nunca a sua debelação; uma maior área de floresta ardida pelo Verão, não uma menor extensão; e assim por diante. Há dias, por exemplo, um jornal "popular" anunciava em manchete que os encargos dos empréstimos para compra de casa iam "voltar a aumentar", mas provavelmente nunca houve nem haverá nenhuma manchete a anunciar a descida de tais encargos, quanto tal ocorre. Há uma propensão atávica da generalidade dos media - incluindo os de serviço público - para uma certa dose de populismo noticioso, sublinhando a grosso os aspectos socialmente mais chocantes da realidade social e omitindo ou depreciando em geral as notícias que poderiam atenuar aquela impressão negativa."

Professor Doutor Vital Martins Moreira, in Público e A aba da causa A aba da causa Blogspot Etiquetas: Vidas, Vital Moreira  

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posted by Vidas @ 30.3.08 0 comments links to this post "

Retomo este post do Rui Perdigão, no Vida das Coisas, apenas porque me apeteceu, de repente, lembrar ao Professor Doutor de Coimbra Vital Martins Moreira que o tipo de media que ele defende e invoca tem uma larga história: durante décadas uma verdade muito escorreita e correcta foi destilada diariamente no bem chamado Pravda... Também em Portugal nos foi servido em Diário a verdade a que temos direito (e, claro, nenhuma mais). Lamentavelmente, não se vendiam, nem dados alguém os queria, por iso, fecharam ou mudaram (a actual edição do Pravda está cheia de rabos e mamas de "gajas boas", a ver se...). Mas, para matar saudades desses belos tempos e ouvir e ver as notícias à sua maneira, destacando e sublinhando o que atenua as impressões negativas, ao Professor Doutor em Coimbra Vital Martins Moreira basta-lhe ligar a televisão no canal de quem partilha com ele as mesmas concepções da "pravda a que temos direito" - o Senhor Coronel na Venezuela Hugo Chavez...

Assim se vê também a diferença emtre as primárias, provinvianas e algo bárbaras concepções do tipo "pravda" (que lamenta a existência de uma imprensa livre e só quando não pode a não suprime) e uma certa arte de gestão das percepções que não só convive com a imprensa livre como a supõe e exige (porque sem imprensa livre não seria necessário gerir a imagem em função do alvo...).

Depois ainda se admiram quando se diz: "once a communist, always a communist"... À minha avó Luzia, sempre eu ouvi dizer que o que se bebe no biberão nunca mais nos deixa. Claro...

MISTÉRIOS E RUMORES DE GUERRA

NO MÉDIO ORIENTE - Alerta a Stratfor

 

Rumores de guerra no Médio Oriente e outros mistérios analisadas pela sempre muito atenta e bem informada Stratfor: 

 

A Mystery in the Middle East

April 8, 2008

By George Friedman

The Arab-Israeli region of the Middle East is filled with rumors of war. That is about as unusual as the rising of the sun, so normally it would not be worth mentioning. But like the proverbial broken clock that is right twice a day, such rumors occasionally will be true. In this case, we don’t know that they are true, and certainly it’s not the rumors that are driving us. But other things — minor and readily explicable individually — have drawn our attention to the possibility that something is happening.

The first thing that drew our attention was a minor, routine matter. Back in February, the United States started purchasing oil for its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The SPR is a reserve of crude oil stored in underground salt domes. Back in February, it stood at 96.2 percent of capacity, which is pretty full as far as we are concerned. But the U.S. Department of Energy decided to increase its capacity. This move came in spite of record-high oil prices and the fact that the purchase would not help matters. It also came despite potential political fallout, since during times like these there is generally pressure to release reserves. Part of the step could have been the bureaucracy cranking away, and part of it could have been the feeling that the step didn’t make much difference. But part of it could have been based on real fears of a disruption in oil supplies. By itself, the move meant nothing. But it did cause us to become thoughtful.

Also in February, someone assassinated Imad Mughniyah, a leader of Hezbollah, in a car bomb explosion in Syria. It was assumed the Israelis had killed him, although there were some suspicions the Syrians might have had him killed for their own arcane reasons. In any case, Hezbollah publicly claimed the Israelis killed Mughniyah, and therefore it was expected the militant Shiite group would take revenge. In the past, Hezbollah responded not by attacking Israel but by attacking Jewish targets elsewhere, as in the Buenos Aires attacks of 1992 and 1994.

In March, the United States decided to dispatch the USS Cole, then under Sixth Fleet command, to Lebanese coastal waters. Washington later replaced it with two escorts from the Nassau (LHA-4) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), reportedly maintaining a minor naval presence in the area. (Most of the ESG, on a regularly scheduled deployment, is no more than a few days sail from the coast, as it remains in the Mediterranean Sea.) The reason given for the American naval presence was to serve as a warning to the Syrians not to involve themselves in Lebanese affairs. The exact mission of the naval presence off the Levantine coast — and the exact deterrent function it served — was not clear, but there they were. The Sixth Fleet has gone out of its way to park and maintain U.S. warships off the Lebanese coast.

Hezbollah leaders being killed by the Israelis and the presence of American ships off the shores of Mediterranean countries are not news in and of themselves. These things happen. The killing of Mughniyah is notable only to point out that as much as Israel might have wanted him dead, the Israelis knew this fight would escalate. But anyone would have known this. So all we know is that whoever killed Mughniyah wanted to trigger a conflict. The U.S. naval presence off the Levantine coast is notable in that Washington, rather busy with matters elsewhere, found the bandwidth to get involved here as well.

With the situation becoming tense, the Israelis announced in March that they would carry out an exercise in April called Turning Point 2. Once again, an Israeli military exercise is hardly interesting news. But the Syrians apparently got quite interested. After the announcement, the Syrians deployed three divisions — two armored, one mechanized — to the Lebanese-Syrian border in the Bekaa Valley, the western part of which is Hezbollah’s stronghold. The Syrians didn’t appear to be aggressive. Rather, they deployed these forces in a defensive posture, in a way walling off their part of the valley.

The Syrians are well aware that in the event of a conventional war with Israel, they would experience a short but exciting life, as they say. They thus are hardly going to attack Israel. The deployment therefore seemed intended to keep the Israelis on the Lebanese side of the border — on the apparent assumption the Israelis were going into the Bekaa Valley. Despite Israeli and Syrian denials of the Syrian troop buildup along the border, Stratfor sources maintain that the buildup in fact happened. Normally, Israel would be jumping at the chance to trumpet Syrian aggression in response to these troop movements, but, instead, the Israelis downplayed the buildup.

When the Israelis kicked off Turning Point 2, which we regard as a pretty interesting name, it turned out to be the largest exercise in Israeli history. It involved the entire country, and was designed to test civil defenses and the ability of the national command authority to continue to function in the event of an attack with unconventional weapons — chemical and nuclear, we would assume. This was a costly exercise. It also involved calling up reserves, some of them for the exercise, and, by some reports, others for deployment to the north against Syria. Israel does not call up reserves casually. Reserve call-ups are expensive and disrupt the civilian economy. These appear small, but in the environment of Turning Point 2, it would not be difficult to mobilize larger forces without being noticed.

The Syrians already were deeply concerned by the Israeli exercise. Eventually, the Lebanese government got worried, too, and started to evacuate some civilians from the South. Hezbollah, which still hadn’t retaliated for the Mughniyah assassination, also claimed the Israelis were about to attack it, and reportedly went on alert and mobilized its forces. The Americans, who normally issue warnings and cautions to everyone, said nothing to try to calm the situation. They just sat offshore on their ships.

It is noteworthy that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak canceled a scheduled visit to Germany this week. The cancellation came immediately after the reports of the Syrian military redeployment were released. Obviously, Barak needed to be in Israel for Turning Point 2, but then he had known about the exercise for at least a month. Why cancel at the last minute? While we are discussing diplomacy, we note that U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visited Oman — a country with close relations with Iran — and then was followed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. By itself not interesting, but why the high-level interest in Oman at this point?

Now let’s swing back to September 2007, when the Israelis bombed something in Syria near the Turkish border. As we discussed at the time, for some reason the Israelis refused to say what they had attacked. It made no sense for them not to trumpet what they carefully leaked — namely, that they had attacked a nuclear facility. Proving that Syria had a secret nuclear program would have been a public relations coup for Israel. Nevertheless, no public charges were leveled. And the Syrians remained awfully calm about the bombing.

Rumors now are swirling that the Israelis are about to reveal publicly that they in fact bombed a nuclear reactor provided to Syria by North Korea. But this news isn’t all that big. Also rumored is that the Israelis will claim Iranian complicity in building the reactor. And one Israeli TV station reported April 8 that Israel really had discovered Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, which it said had been smuggled to Syria.

Now why the Bush administration wouldn’t have trumpeted news of the Syrian reactor worldwide in September 2007 is beyond us, but there obviously were some reasons — assuming the TV report is true, which we have no way of establishing. In fact, we have no idea why the Israelis are choosing this moment to rehash the bombing of this site. But whatever their reason, it certainly raises a critical question. If the Syrians are developing a nuclear capability, what are the Israelis planning to do about it?

No one of these things, by itself, is of very great interest. And taken together they do not provide the means for a clear forecast. Nevertheless, a series of rather ordinary events, taken together, can constitute something significant. Tensions in the Middle East are moving well beyond the normal point, and given everything that is happening, events are moving to a point where someone is likely to take military action. Whether Hezbollah will carry out a retaliatory strike or Israel a pre-emptive strike in Lebanon, or whether the Israelis’ real target is Iran, tensions systematically have been ratcheted up to the point where we, in our simple way, are beginning to wonder whether something has to give.

All together, these events are fairly extraordinary. Ignoring all rhetoric — and the Israelis have gone out of their way to say that they are not looking for a fight — it would seem that each side, but particularly the Americans and Israelis, have gone out of their way to signal that they are expecting conflict. The Syrians have also signaled that they expect conflict, and Hezbollah always claims there is about to be conflict.

What is missing is this: who will fight whom, and why, and why now. The simple explanation is that Israel wants a second round with Hezbollah. But while that might be true, it doesn’t explain everything else that has happened. Most important, it doesn’t explain the simultaneous revelations about the bombing of Syria. It also doesn’t explain the U.S. naval deployment. Is the United States about to get involved in a war with Hezbollah, a war that the Israelis should handle themselves? Are the Israelis going to topple Syrian President Bashar al Assad — and then wind up with a Sunni government, or worse, an Israeli occupation of Syria? None of that makes a lot of sense.

In truth, all of this may dissolve into nothing much. In intelligence analysis, however, sometimes a set of not-fully-coherent facts must be reported, and that is what we are doing now. There is no clear pattern; there is no obvious direction this is taking. Nevertheless, when we string together events from February until now, we see a persistently escalating pattern of behavior. In fact, what we can say most clearly is that there is escalation, without being able to say what is the clear direction of the escalation or the purpose.

We would like to wrap this up with a crystal clear explanation and forecast. But we can’t. The motives of the various actors are opaque; and taken separately, the individual events all have quite innocent explanations. We are not prepared to say war is imminent, nor even what sort of war there would be. We are simply prepared to say that the course of events since February — and really since the September 2007 attack on Syria — have been startling, and they appear to be reaching some sort of hard-to-understand crescendo.

The bombing of Syria symbolizes our confusion. Why would Syria want a nuclear reactor and why put it on the border of Turkey, a country the Syrians aren’t particularly friendly with? If the Syrians had a nuclear reactor, why would the Israelis be coy about it? Why would the Americans? Having said nothing for months apart from careful leaks, why are the Israelis going to speak publicly now? And if what they are going to say is simply that the North Koreans provided the equipment, what’s the big deal? That was leaked months ago.

The events of September 2007 make no sense and have never made any sense. The events we have seen since February make no sense either. That is noteworthy, and we bring it to your attention. We are not saying that the events are meaningless. We are saying that we do not know their meaning. But we can’t help but regard them as ominous.

RAMSES 2008

indispensável

RAMSES 2008  l'encyclopédie annuelle de l'actualité internationale fournit les clés d'analyse et les repères indispensables pour décrypter la géopolitique de la planète.

En savoir plus | Sommaire | Commander l'ouvrage | Perspectives, par Thierry de Montbrial 

HUMOR FEMINISTA

Da minha amiga Rosário, recebi esta notável estória de humor feminista:

Os HOMENS SÃO COMO AS BATATAS:

Os novos... só DESCASCADOS!

Os velhos... só a MURRO!

La Chine médaille d'or de la peine de mort selon Amnesty

O QUE É A CHINA?

By George Friedman

Analyzing Chinese Geography

Let’s begin simply by analyzing Chinese geography, looking at two maps. The first represents the physical geography of China.

The second shows the population density not only of China, but also of the surrounding countries.

China’s geography is roughly divided into two parts: a mountainous, arid western part and a coastal plain that becomes hilly at its westward end. The overwhelming majority of China’s population is concentrated in that coastal plain. The majority of China’s territory — the area west of this coastal plain — is lightly inhabited, however. This eastern region is the Chinese heartland that must be defended at all cost.

China as island is surrounded by impassable barriers — barriers that are difficult to pass or areas that essentially are wastelands with minimal population. To the east is the Pacific Ocean. To the north and northwest are the Siberian and Mongolian regions, sparsely populated and difficult to move through. To the south, there are the hills, mountains and jungles that separate China from Southeast Asia; to visualize this terrain, just remember the incredible effort that went into building the Burma Road during World War II. To the southwest lie the Himalayas. In the northwest are Kazakhstan and the vast steppes of Central Asia. Only in the far northeast, with the Russian maritime provinces and the Yalu River separating China from Korea, are there traversable points of contacts. But the balance of military power is heavily in China’s favor at these points.

(click image to enlarge)

Strategically, China has two problems, both pivoting around the question of defending the coastal region. First, China must prevent attacks from the sea. This is what the Japanese did in the 1930s, first invading Manchuria in the northeast and then moving south into the heart of China. It is also what the British and other European powers did on a lesser scale in the 19th century. China’s defense against such attacks is size and population. It draws invaders in and then wears them out, with China suffering massive casualties and economic losses in the process.

The second threat to China comes from powers moving in through the underpopulated portion of the west, establishing bases and moving east, or coming out of the underpopulated regions around China and invading. This is what happened during the Mongol invasion from the northwest. But that invasion was aided by tremendous Chinese disunity, as were the European and Japanese incursions.

Beijing’s Three Imperatives

Beijing therefore has three geopolitical imperatives:

1. Maintain internal unity so that far powers can’t weaken the ability of the central government to defend China.
2. Maintain a strong coastal defense to prevent an incursion from the Pacific.
3. Secure China’s periphery by anchoring the country’s frontiers on impassable geographical features; in other words, hold its current borders.

In short, China’s strategy is to establish an island, defend its frontiers efficiently using its geographical isolation as a force multiplier, and, above all, maintain the power of the central government over the country, preventing regionalism and factionalism.

We see Beijing struggling to maintain control over China. Its vast security apparatus and interlocking economic system are intended to achieve that. We see Beijing building coastal defenses in the Pacific, including missiles that can reach deep into the Pacific, in the long run trying to force the U.S. Navy on the defensive. And we see Beijing working to retain control over two key regions: Xinjiang and Tibet.

Xinjiang is Muslim. This means at one point it was invaded by Islamic forces. It also means that it can be invaded and become a highway into the Chinese heartland. Defense of the Chinese heartland therefore begins in Xinjiang. So long as Xinjiang is Chinese, Beijing will enjoy a 1,500-mile, inhospitable buffer between Lanzhou — the westernmost major Chinese city and its oil center — and the border of Kazakhstan. The Chinese thus will hold Xinjiang regardless of Muslim secessionists.

The Importance of Tibet to China

Now look at Tibet on the population density and terrain maps. On the terrain map one sees the high mountain passes of the Himalayas. Running from the Hindu Kush on the border with Pakistan to the Myanmar border, small groups can traverse this terrain, but no major army is going to thrust across this border in either direction. Supplying a major force through these mountains is impossible. From a military point of view, it is a solid wall.

Note that running along the frontier directly south of this border is one of the largest population concentrations in the world. If China were to withdraw from Tibet, and there were no military hindrance to population movement, Beijing fears this population could migrate into Tibet. If there were such a migration, Tibet could turn into an extension of India and, over time, become a potential beachhead for Indian power. If that were to happen, India’s strategic frontier would directly abut Sichuan and Yunnan — the Chinese heartland.

The Chinese have a fundamental national interest in retaining Tibet, because Tibet is the Chinese anchor in the Himalayas. If that were open, or if Xinjiang became independent, the vast buffers between China and the rest of Eurasia would break down. The Chinese can’t predict the evolution of Indian, Islamic or Russian power in such a circumstance, and they certainly don’t intend to find out. They will hold both of these provinces, particularly Tibet.

The Chinese note that the Dalai Lama has been in India ever since China invaded Tibet. The Chinese regard him as an Indian puppet. They see the latest unrest in Tibet as instigated by the Indian government, which uses the Dalai Lama to try to destabilize the Chinese hold on Tibet and open the door to Indian expansion. To put it differently, their view is that the Indians could shut the Dalai Lama down if they wanted to, and that they don’t signals Indian complicity.

It should be added that the Chinese see the American hand behind this as well. Apart from public statements of support, the Americans and Indians have formed a strategic partnership since 2001. The Chinese view the United States — which is primarily focused on the Islamic world — as encouraging India and the Dalai Lama to probe the Chinese, partly to embarrass them over the Olympics and partly to increase the stress on the central government. The central government is stretched in maintaining Chinese security as the Olympics approach. The Chinese are distracted. Beijing also notes the similarities between what is happening in Tibet and the “color” revolutions the United States supported and helped stimulate in the former Soviet Union.

It is critical to understand that whatever the issues might be to the West, the Chinese see Tibet as a matter of fundamental national security, and they view pro-Tibetan agitation in the West as an attempt to strike at the heart of Chinese national security. The Chinese are therefore trapped. They are staging the Olympics in order to demonstrate Chinese cohesion and progress. But they must hold on to Tibet for national security reasons, and therefore their public relations strategy is collapsing. Neither India nor the United States is particularly upset that the Europeans are thinking about canceling attendance at various ceremonies.

A Lack of Countermoves

China has few countermoves to this pressure over Tibet. There is always talk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That is not going to happen — not because China doesn’t want to, but because it does not have the naval capability of seizing control of the Taiwan Straits or seizing air superiority, certainly not if the United States doesn’t want it (and we note that the United States has two carrier battle groups in the Taiwan region at the moment). Beijing thus could bombard Taiwan, but not without enormous cost to itself and its own defensive capabilities. It does not have the capability to surge forces across the strait, much less to sustain operations there in anything short of a completely permissive threat environment. The Chinese could fire missiles at Taiwan, but that risks counterstrikes from American missiles. And, of course, Beijing could go nuclear, but that is not likely given the stakes. The most likely Chinese counter here would be trying to isolate Taiwan from shipping by firing missiles. But that again assumes the United States would not respond — something Beijing can’t count on.

While China thus lacks politico-military options to counter the Tibet pressure, it also lacks economic options. It is highly dependent for its economic well-being on exports to the United States and other countries; drawing money out of U.S. financial markets would require Beijing to put it somewhere else. If the Chinese invested in Europe, European interest rates would go down and U.S. rates would go up, and European money would pour into the United States. The long-held fear of the Chinese withdrawing their money from U.S. markets is therefore illusory: The Chinese are trapped economically. Far more than the United States, they can’t afford a confrontation.

That leaves the pressure on Tibet, and China struggling to contain it. Note that Beijing’s first imperative is to maintain China’s internal coherence. China’s great danger is always a weakening of the central government and the development of regionalism. Beijing is far from losing control, but recently we have observed a set of interesting breakdowns. The inability to control events in Tibet is one. Significant shortages of diesel fuel is a second. Shortages of rice and other grains is a third. These are small things, but they are things that should not be happening in a country as well-heeled in terms of cash as China is, and as accustomed as it is to managing security threats.

China must hold Tibet, and it will. The really interesting question is whether the stresses building up on China’s central administration are beginning to degrade its ability to control and manage events. It is easy to understand China’s obsession with Tibet. The next step is to watch China trying to pick up the pieces on a series of administrative miscues. That will give us a sense of the state of Chinese affairs.

CHINA: INFORMAÇÃO & DESINFORMAÇÃO

Informação e desinformação sobre a China é o tema de capa da última edição do "Monde chinois". Um tema de absoluta actualidade nesta altura em que o Tibete marca a conjuntura asiática e mundial e promete a Pequim a medalha de ouro olímpica da barbaridade.

Edições anteriores:

N° 10  Un monde chinois en transition
Printemps-Eté 2007

Know More

Order the journal

N° 9  Chine, les enjeux de la mondialisation
Hiver 2006-2007

Know More

Order the journal

N° 8  La Chine en Afrique
Eté/automne 2006

Know More

Epuisé

N° 7  Diasporas chinoises
Printemps 2006

Know More

Epuisé

SECURITÉ GLOBALE

INTELIGÊNCIA ECONÓMICA

‘ESTRATÉGIA DE LISBOA’ JÁ

UM "SMALL BUSINESS ACT" EUROPEU

RADARES EM ESTADO "CRITICAL"

Uma estória muito, mesmo muito, "very critical". Ou, como dizia a minha avó Luzia, as novas tecnologias, filho, às vezes só amplificam velhos e maus hábitos... Um grande trabalho de investigação jornalística de Valentina Marcelino, no Expresso desta semana:

"GUERRA ECONÓMICA"  

"Espanha: Falta de água em Barcelona" é hoje título da Lusa. Notícia... Surpresa! De facto, estamos aqui ao lado do Estado Espanhol mas temos uma quase inultrapassável dificuldade em ver e perceber o que lá se passa... E somos surpreendidos deixamo-nos surpreender - por qualquer coisa, como esta "notícia" da Lusa prova.

Há alguns dias um site francês de "Inteligência Económica" - o Knowckers.org - publicava uma interessante análise da "guerra económica" no interior do Estado Espanhol, ou seja, entre as suas regiões e a "ausência de solidariedade nacional"... Principal alvo desta guerra? Barcelona e toda a região da Catalunha.

A escassez de água em Barcelona e em toda a Catalunha é apenas um dos aspectos das consequências dessa guerra económica. De facto, praticamente todos os sistemas de infraestruturas da Catalunha (transportes incluídos) estão esgotados e a rebentar pelas costuras. A água é apenas o mais visível e tocante...

Veja-se a análise do Knowckers.org sobre "Le débat sur les intérêts stratégiques de l’Espagne":

“Espagne: une contradiction à

dimension de guerre économique”

Quand le discours contredit les faits: le PP en flagrant délit.

"Vous n'avez aucune vision de ce qu'est l'Espagne" lançait le candidat du PP, la veille des élections espagnoles, à Zapatero, finalement vainqueur du choix démocratique. Le premier ministre socialiste ne s'est pas privé de lui répondre que l'"on peut défendre l'Espagne sans attaquer la Catalogne". Malgré la défaite des élections, le PP continue de de se présenter comme le seul défenseur de l'intérêt général espagnol et de la grande Espagne.

Un tel discours est en contradiction avec les longues années de pouvoir d'Aznar. En effet, les politiques fortement centralisatrices qui ont été alors menées ont eu pour corollaire logique une forte hostilité aux régions, en particulier à la Catalogne. Ainsi, pour le PP, l'intérêt n'est général que lorsqu'il est à Madrid. Le parti de droite n'a pas oublié de profiter de ces années dorées pour placer ses amis à la tête des entreprises et banques : BBVA, Endesa, Repsol, Telefonica… l'intérêt général a trouvé ainsi une étrange traduction: la centralisation de l'économie autour de Madrid. Jusqu'alors cette ville avait monopolisé le pouvoir administratif mais elle a su utiliser les instrument politiques pour dévier les circuits économiques de Barcelone .

Le déclin économique de la capitale catalane suscite aujourd'hui un malaise dans cette région. L'étrange politique "d'intérêt général" a stimulé les mouvements régionalistes, autonomistes, nationalistes, en Catalogne. Economie, politique et sentiments nationaux sont intimement liés. Les relations économiques avec Madrid sont donc devenues antagoniques sur plusieurs points qui constituent autant de terrains de batailles.

Impôts: la fatigue catalane ou le manque de solidarité nationale.

Depuis l'avènement de la démocratie, la Catalogne a payé, pendant des dizaines d'années, les plus lourds tribus à l'Etat espagnol. Ce poids fiscal était justifié en fonction de la richesse de la région. Toutefois, aprés les prélèvements et les redistributions entre régions, le revenu catalan par tête se retrouvait au dessous de la moyenne nationale. 

Cependant, au delà de cette absurdité mathématique, un problème plus pesant se fait , encore aujourd'hui, sentir. Madrid réinjecte une grande partie de ces recettes dans l'amélioration de l'ensemble des infrastrutures mais Barcelone se trouve en marge de cette poliitque. Ainsi, le centre catalan se caractérise par l'asphixie de son réseau routier, la saturation de son aéroport et le symbolique retard de sa liaison à Madrid par TGV. Par conséquent, la region perd en termes d'attractivité pour les investissements étrangers.

La spirale de la décapitalisation publique et du déclin de la Catalogne en tant que marché attrayant a amené Barcelone à privilégier la question fiscale lors du nouveau statut qu'elle a négocié en 2006. Le Parlement Catalan n'a cependant pas réussi à obtenir de Madrid les réformes structurelles qu'il voulait faire passer: le modèle instauré en 1979 a été maintenu.Toutefois, les ressources de la Generalitat (gouvernement de Catalogne) ont été accrues et l'Etat s'est engagé à mettre en place de nouveaux mécanismes de contrôle de solidarité entre les différentes régions.

La Caixa : symbole du modèle économique catalan.

La Catalogne constitue un marché caractérisé par des traits spécifiques. En effet, l'entreprise familiale est un acteur économique typique dans la region; celle ci est devenue un territoire oú les familles et les entreprises se respectent entre elles. A un niveau macro, cela se traduit par un modèle qui favorise le statu quo: le changement (fusions, acquisitions…) n'est accepté qu'en dernière solution. Et lorsque l'entreprise catalane est confrontée à cette nécessité, elle s'y soumet sans grandes effusions; elle finit docilement par se laisser dévorer par un autre acteur. Cette faille a permis à Madrid d'absorber une grande partie du secteur catalan de la construction.

Comme la plupart de ses "compatriotes", La Caixa, société financière catalane, se caractérise par la culture de la discrétion; cependant, elle est redoutablement efficace. Les succès silencieux de La Caixa font d'elle à la fois un tabou et un symbole de la région. En effet, elle constitue le plus gros potentiel des sociétés financières espagnoles; elle possède une capacité d'innovation reconnue, une extraordinaire mainmise du marché du détail (1/3 des clients de banque en Catalogne et 1/5 dans toute l'Espagne)… mais surtout elle est caractérisée par une identité juridique ambigue: ce n'est pas une banque, elle n'a pas de propriétaires, elle ne peut pas efectuer des OPA, elle ne peut pas être l'objet d'une OPA… ce caractère fuyant est une arme redoutable face à la concurrence et irrite sérieusement les autres acteurs espagnols qui doivent lui faire face.

La Caixa vs. Endesa: le choc des titans.

En 2005, La Caixa lance, à travers Gas Natural, une OPA de 100% sur Endesa, grand opérateur énergéticien espagnol qui était à l'époque dirigé par Manuel Pizarro, nouvelle étoile montante du PP. Pour la vision nationaliste catalane, il était nécessaire, d'un point de vue stratégique, de construire un pôle financier et industriel "d'ici". La réactivité violente d'un certain establishment político-financier de Madrid et des media qui lui sont liés a contré l'opération qui s'est soldée par un échec.

Aujourd'hui, Gas Natural se maintient éloigné  des mouvements de concentration en cours sur le territoire espagnol. Depuis l'échec Endesa, le groupe gazier joue la carte solitaire mais il possède une solide position financière qui l'autorise à avoir de grandes ambitions en matière d'investissements. Comme Madrid lui bloque le chemin des acquisitions, le groupe se redéploie sur une logique de croissance organique. Ainsi, la Catalogne entend non seulement préserver sa forcé énergétique mais elle ne renonce pas à conquérir le marché énergétique espagnol.

Une guerre économique entre régions.

Sentiments nationalistes, économie, politique et doutes identitaires se mélangent en Espagne. Le boycott constitue le symbole de cette dynamique: à chaque grande action  catalane qui menace "de briser l'unité espagnole", des mouvements de boycott se mettent en marche, menés par le politique, les media et par des acteurs au sein même de la société civile (chaînes de magasins…) contre les entreprises installées en Catalogne (SEAT, Gerblé, Sony, Danone, Nestlé…).

Le discours du PP sur l'intérêt général n'efface donc pas la réalité: capitale politique  contre capitale culturelle, qui rafflera les circuits economico-financiers?

La guerre économique fait rage en Espagne: oú est la "grande Espagne unie" de Madrid? “

Alice Lacoye-Mateus (École de Guerre Économique), in Knowckers.org 

Na sua modalidade preferida,

é óbvio que a China já ganhou...

“China will execute 374 people during Olympics, Amnesty estimates

«An estimated 374 people will be executed in China during this summer's Olympic games in Beijing, Amnesty International has claimed.

A new league table of the world's most frequent executioners showed China officially used capital punishment 470 times last year. But some campaigners believe the true figure may be 8,000.

The human rights group called on Olympic athletes and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to press for greater openness about executions by the host country.

Amnesty's UK director Kate Allen said: "As the world's biggest executioner, China gets the 'gold medal' for global executions.”

Continua aqui, no Guardian

Chinese police display a group of prisoners at a sentencing rally in the east Chinese city of Wenzhou. Eleven prisoners were later executed. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

TÓQUIO SAI DO SILÊNCIO E ENFRENTA

PEQUIM  SOBRE A QUESTÃO DO TIBETE

Alegria e entusiasmo na blogosfera japonesa depois da decisão do governo de Tóquio de não permitir a presença em solo japonês dos ‘homenzinhos’ vestidos de azul e branco, os agentes especiais que a China tem espalhado pelo mundo ao longo do percurso da pálida tocha olímpica. Também a decisão de Tóquio de manifestar a sua “preocupação” com a situação no Tibete e a atitude pró-activa da diplomacia japonesa exigindo a Pequim que negoceie com o Dalai Lama “sem condições prévias” foi muito bem recebida pela opinião pública japonesa e, sobretudo, por todo o universo budista. Como noticia o Libération.

JO: le Japon ne veut pas des gardes chinois

Le Japon est le premier pays à dire non aux désormais célèbres agents de sécurité chinois en survêtement bleu et blanc. Pas question que ces mystérieux karatékas, lunettes noires et écouteur à l’oreille, chargés en théorie de veiller à la sécurité de la torche olympique - tout en étant prêts à l’éteindre en cas de débordement -, puissent accompagner, tout au long de son parcours, l’étape japonaise du relais de la flamme en provenance de Canberra, prévu à Nagano (centre du pays), samedi 26 avril.

Suspense. Le Japon a tranché et Yang Jiechi, le ministre chinois des Affaires étrangères, qui rencontrait avant-hier à Tokyo son homologue japonais Masahiko Komura en vue de préparer le voyage officiel au Japon du président chinois Hu Jintao prévu entre les 6 et 10 mai, a pris acte de cette décision de Tokyo. Il n’empêche que le suspense demeure et que sur des blogs et sites web, les internautes japonais s’en donnent à cœur joie. «Les gardiens de la flamme chinois seront-ils quand même là ?» interroge l’un. «S’ils sont privés de Nagano, le risque est que les petits hommes en bleu et blanc soient expédiés au Tibet pour des interrogatoires musclés», écrit un autre…

Revirement. À l’évidence, à trois mois des Jeux olympiques de Pékin, la diplomatie japonaise sort de ses gonds. Jeudi, le Japon, qui accueille souvent le dalaï-lama, a mis les pieds dans le plat en faisant part de sa «préoccupation» autour de la situation au Tibet et appelé la Chine à engager un dialogue «sans aucune condition» avec le leader spirituel tibétain. En réponse, Pékin a sèchement rétorqué que «la question du Tibet est une affaire interne à la Chine».

Au Japon, elle ne l’est pas, en tout cas, pour les autorités bouddhistes du célèbre temple Zenkoji de Nagano, d’où était censée partir, samedi prochain, la flamme olympique. Alors que ses moines avaient accepté à l’automne d’accueillir le coup d’envoi du relais, ils ont changé d’avis à la lumière des événements récents au Tibet. Le Zenkoji s’est retiré du parcours, «pour des raisons de sécurité» , et en signe de solidarité avec les chefs religieux tibétains en proie à la «répression» chinoise. Les organisateurs du parcours ont pris acte de ce revirement et annoncé qu’ils allaient changer le point de départ de la flamme, attendue ensuite à Séoul, en Corée du Sud.

UM PSD TENDENCIALMENTE

RESIDUAL E REGIONALIZADO?

Olhe-se para os candidatos que se alinham para a candidatura à liderança do PSD e veja-se como a maioria dos nomes mais sonantes são oriundos do Porto e… políticos de segunda linha (além de Cadilhe, que foi ministro de Cavaco mas saiu sem honra nem glória, nenhum foi além de secretário de Estado ou presidente da Câmara apesar de serem já cinquentões).

De Lisboa não há candidatos. Manuela Ferreira Leite parece não estar convencida a ser a “dama de ferro” do PSD e Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa mesmo se adoraria voltar não é hoje, para o PSD, senão um professor de direito que faz comentários na televisão. Passos Coelho é ainda um “jota” de Coimbra que foi presidente da JSD.

Cotado com 26% das intenções de voto, o PSD, em termos de quadros dirigentes, não parece ter hoje massa crítica a sul e aparece com uma distribuição orgânica muito assimétrica e desequilibrada para norte de Leiria. E a demissão de Luís Filipe Menezes pode ter como consequência colateral o fim político do “último barão de Lisboa”, Ângelo Correia (que começou da pior maneira, no Verão passado, uma carreira de king’s maker… enganando-se redondamente na escolha do “rei”). Não deixaria de ser imensamente irónico que o inoxidável Ângelo fosse liquidado por este “fogo amigo” do instável Menezes.

Mas a grande questão que desta perspectiva se levanta é a seguinte: será hoje o PSD uma formação política residual, concentrando a massa crítica restante dos seus dirigentes no Porto…? Não me parece haver ainda uma resposta clara e definitiva para a pergunta, mas nas próximas semanas ver-se-á se o PSD escapa ou não a esta tendência para a residualização e regionalização… Mas se ela se acentuar, abre-se o campo a uma marcante recomposição da paisagem política portuguesa.

O "CANDIDATO IDEAL"

MARA CARFAGNA

mas como e com que critérios políticos é que Berlusconi escolhe deputadas e ministras...?

A piquena abaixo chama-se Mara Carfagna e as suas medidas políticas estão à vista e convenceram Berlusconi... Há quem diga, porém, que a Itália precisa de outras medidas políticas. As da Carfagna não chegam para animar e insuflar o élan necessário a uma Itália deprimida...

L'Italie à l'épreuve d'une croissance atone et d'un moral en berne

Ralentissement de la croissance, compétitivité mal en point, perte de confiance dans les institutions, montée de l'antipolitique: c'est une Italie en proie à un profond malaise qui se

rend aux urnes les 13 et 14 avril.Evénement

Le choix de Milan pour organiser l'Exposition universelle 2015 a redonné un peu d'optimisme à l'Italie et lui a donné l'occasion de montrer son unité et son dynamisme alors que le pays souffre de l'image déplorable renvoyée par la crise des ordures à Naples ou l'agonie d'Alitalia.

Mais à court terme, le nouveau gouvernement va devoir affronter une conjoncture très morose, marquée par un brusque ralentissement de la croissance à seulement +0,6% du PIB pour l'année, après +1,5% l'an dernier, selon le ministère de l'Economie.

"La faiblesse de la croissance est due à une carence d'infrastructures, une dépendance énergétique abyssale, une fiscalité

inadaptée et des dépenses publiques élevées et peu efficaces", résume Alberto Quadrio Curzio, professeur d'économie à l'Université catholique de Milan et éditorialiste à Il Sole 24 Ore.

Pour relancer la croissance, "un accord bipartisan sera nécessaire après les élections sur ces points essentiels", dit-il soulignant la similitude des programmes des deux camps sur la baisse de la fiscalité et des dépenses publiques et les efforts sur les infrastructures.

La faiblesse de la croissance italienne comparée aux autres économies européennes se fait encore plus douloureusement sentir dans les années de vache maigre.

Malgré une situation des comptes publics en amélioration depuis 2 ans, le futur gouvernement disposera de marges de manoeuvres inexistantes avec un déficit public prévu de 2,4% cette année et une dette attendue à 103% du PIB.

Il devra aussi s'attacher à combler le fossé qui sépare schématiquement le nord du sud du pays, l'industrie de certains secteurs des services, d'autant plus que "les départs des travailleurs qualifiés du sud vers le nord ont repris, accentuant ce fossé", souligne le professeur Quadrio Curzio.

Aux perspectives internationales peu engageantes, s'ajoute une situation difficile pour les ménages qui affichent un moral en berne, leur indice de confiance calculé par l'Institut Isae ayant touché en mars son plus bas niveau depuis 4 ans.

Le chômage est pourtant au plus bas (6,6% au dernier trimestre 2007) mais sa baisse s'est ralentie en fin d'année.

Les difficultés économiques alimentent un sentiment diffus de perte de statut et se doublent d'une défiance croissante envers les institutions.

Un peu plus de la moitié des Italiens (51,4 %) estiment que leur situation économique personnelle s'est aggravée contre 36,1 % en mars 2006, selon un sondage de l'institut Demos-coop publié fin mars.

"Le sentiment du déclin est un sentiment partagé qui limite la projection dans l'avenir, obscurcit l'horizon, influence les attitudes envers la politique et les institutions", a commenté le sociologue Ilvo Diamanti à l'occasion de ce sondage, dans le journal La Repubblica.

La cote des institutions est au plus bas et le livre "La Caste" de deux journalistes du Corriere della Sera sur les dérives de la classe politique a remporté un succès retentissant, avec plus d'un million d'exemplaires vendus depuis sa parution en mai 2007.

La société et la classe politique ressemblent de plus en plus "à un couple séparé qui vit dans la même maison", commentait récemment le président de l'institut d'études politiques Eurispes, Gian Maria Fara. © AFP.

MENEZES PREMATURO

sai sem honra, nem glória

Não é Sarkozy quem quer…  Menezes andou a berrar que queria ser Sarkozy. E agora invoca "contrariedades" oriundas do partido para justificar o abandono. Se o autarca de Gaia conhecesse dez por cento (ou mesmo até apenas cinco!) das “contrariedades” que Sarkozy enfrentou e venceu, Menezes num tal cenário não se demitia apenas: suicidava-se mesmo.

Ora, Sarkozy está no Eliseu e os seus adversários estão a explicar-se em tribunal. Diferenças…

PS: Guterres e Barroso, ao menos, ainda chegaram a PM  antes de fugirem... Talvez, por isso, puderam ser "emigrantes de luxo", fugiram para o estrangeiro, enquanto Menezes regressa a Gaia. Diferenças... também aqui.

ESPANHA: ZAPATERO INJECTA

NA ECONOMIA 18.000.000.000

Zapatero está muito preocupado com a queda da economia de Espanha e faz do seu relançamento o objectivo central deste seu segundo mandato e anuncia um "plano" de 18 mil milhões de euros, para os próximos dois anos. Em tempo de crise, faz toda a diferença ter ou não ter dinheiro... Zapatero tem, pois ainda em 2007 o seu superavit orçamental foi de 23.000.000.000 de euros. Pode, por isso, tomar medidas que, para quem acumula défices orçamentais, são uma miragem:

L’Espagne annonce un plan de relance de 18 milliards d’euros

SOBRE O TERRORISMO NA EUROPA

Não são bons os resultados da análise à ameaça do terrorismo islamista na Europa. São mesmo preocupantes...

Europe's Road Ever More Difficult

By Douglas Farah

Several pieces today tie together to forma disturbing mosaic. The first two are the growing threat of radical Islam in Great Britain and the penetration of the structures of several elite universities there.

The second is the new report by the NEFA Foundation on the Muslim Brotherhood structure in Belgium.

The most disturbing to me is a report that Britain's Home Secretary Jaqui Smith believes the police are being overwhelmed by the growing threat of radical Islam in Britain.

"There are 2,000 individuals who are being monitored. There are 200 networks involved and 30 active plots," she said.

And she warned the menace of Islamic fanatics is mounting so fast that police will be unable to cope within a year—unless they are given new powers to lock up terror suspects for longer.

At present cops can hold suspects for up to 28 days, but the Home Office wants that increased to 42 days.

"We can't wait for an attack to succeed and then rush in new powers," said Mrs Smith. "We have got to stay ahead."

"Because we now understand the scale of what is being plotted, the police have to step in earlier—which means they need more time to put evidence together."

If they are willing to talk about 2,000 individuals and 200 plots under observation, imagine what the real scale must be.

At the same time, the Daily Telegraph today reports a new study showing that Saudi Arabia and Muslim organizations operating from there have donated 233.5 pounds (about $460 million) to eight British universities since 1995. That is almost $40 million a year. My full blog is here.

Travessia Ferroviária do Tejo, TGV para

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16 de Abril de 2008

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Para  Celso Filipe e  Alexandra Noronha, jornalistas do Jornal de Negócios,

Transmitiram-me a vossa notícia publicada hoje no Jornal de Negócios sobre o contrato que será (?) formalizado amanhã entre o Arquitecto Calatrava e a RAVE para expansão da gare do Oriente. Surpreende-me que esta obra, inteiramente dependente das soluções que vierem a ser adoptadas para  a travessia ferroviária do Tejo e para a entrada do TGV para o Porto em Lisboa, seja desde já decidida.

Se o trajecto deste TGV não vier a ser pelo vale do Trancão, como a RAVE pretende com base em estudos, a meu ver, absolutamente irrisórios, será dinheiro deitado à rua.   Surpreende-me, também, que jornalistas se permitam  afirmar, agora, num título, que a GARE DO ORIENTE NUNCA PODERÁ SER A ESTAÇÃO CENTRAL DE LISBOA, SÓ QUEM NÃO ENTENDE DE COMBOIOS PODE FAZER A PROPOSTA. Este título teria sido extremamente útil em  1996, antes da Gare do Oriente ser encomendada ao Arquitecto Calatrava.

A cidade dispunha, então, do local ideal para construir uma estação Central. Era o espaço da antiga gare de triagem de Beirolas que pertencia à CP e que a CP vendeu à EXPO que fez nele  uma urbanização. Falei sobre este assunto com o antigo Comissário da EXPO, Engenheiro Cardoso e Cunha que me disse que  tecnicamente tinha razão, mas que o que propunha não podia ser feito por razões financeiras. Estamos, portanto, numa cidade onde foi vendido para  uma urbanização o espaço ideal para fazer a estação central de caminhos de ferro.

Mas o tempo não volta para trás e temos a Gare do Oriente que é um apeadeiro de luxo. O problema, agora,   é o de saber onde deve ser a estação terminal dos TGV para o Porto (e para Badajoz e para os shuttle para o novo Aeroporto) que um dia entrarão em Lisboa. Surpreende-me que jornalistas venham agora afirmar que  SÓ QUEM NÃO ENTENDE DE COMBOIOS PODE FAZER A PROPOSTA de ser na gare do Oriente. É difícil, mas pode com alguns arranjos, certamente muito mais baratos do que a construção de um anexo encomendada ao Arquitecto Calatrava (que será desaproveitado  se os TGV não vierem a seguir pelo vale do Trancão).  

Permito-me enviar-vos, a seguir, a parte da proposta relativa à gare do Oriente incluída na proposta para a travessia do Tejo e a entrada do TGV em Lisboa, que apresentei  no passado dia 13 de Março, na Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa. Nesta proposta, os TGV saídos de Lisboa vão pela actual linha do Norte até um pouco depois de Alverca onde atravessam o Tejo.

" Na Gare do Oriente, com 8 cais, mas que não foi pensada como estação terminal, é fácil passar duas das vias a bitola standard, mas os comboios não poderão nelas ficar estacionados nem inverter a marcha.  Os comboios ao sair da estação terão, assim, de seguir no mesmo sentido. A solução  é prever perto de Braço de Prata, onde há espaço para isso, uma zona onde estes comboios de bitola standard possam estacionar, ser limpos e esperar a hora para reentrar na Gare do Oriente, já em sentido contrário. "

É manifesto que a Comunicação Social ainda não se apercebeu de que é necessária uma crítica muito mais atenta às propostas exaustivamente apresentadas para o TGV e para a travessia ferroviária do Tejo  podendo eventualmente existirem soluções muito mais económicas e convenientes. Peço, assim,  a vossa atenção para o modo de tratamento destes assuntos.

Com os meus melhores cumprimentos

António Brotas

Professor Jubilado do ‘Técnico’

O ASSALTO CHINÊS A ÁFRICA

BRUXELAS VOLTA AO LOBBY

e inclui aí advogados e ONG

Les lobbyistes surveillés par Bruxelles

Selon Euractiv, la commission Affaires constitutionnelles du Parlement a appelé, dans un rapport adopté le 1er avril dernier, à la création d'un registre public obligatoire pour les lobbyistes, commun au Conseil, à la Commission et au Parlement et « divulguant toutes les sources de financement » selon des paramètres significatifs plutôt que par des chiffres exacts. Le registre comprendrait également un code commun de déontologie. Les lobbyistes devront respecter ce code de conduite ou seront confrontés à des sanctions, comme l'exclusion éventuelle du registre par un mécanisme commun.

L'eurodéputé finlandais Alexander Stubb (PPE-DE) (à priori futur ministre des Affaires étrangères de son pays) est le rédacteurd e ce rapport. Selon lui, la définition des lobbyistes inclut les « lobbyistes professionnels », « les représentants internes d'une entreprise » ainsi que « les ONG, les groupes de réflexions, les groupements de professionnels, les syndicats et les organisations d'employeurs ». Il cite également les « avocats, dès lors que ces derniers ont l'intention d'influer non pas sur le droit jurisprudentiel mais sur l'orientation d'une politique ».

François JEANNE-BEYLOT, no FJB - weblog

MENEZES GARANTE ABOLIR A

LEI DA OFERTA E DA PROCURA