CLARO

John Robb analisa um problema central do mundo de hoje: como iniciar e lançar a "open source insurgency"... Uma problemática cujo quadro John Robb já tinha estabelecido e abordado no seu recente livro "Brave New War - The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization"... "In his new book, Brave New War, he forecasts how these "open source guerrillas" will continue to grow in strength -- and how they might eventually be stopped." Como diz John Robb: “Right after 9-11, the analysis that I saw from the media and military was insufficient to explain what we were facing -- too much hype and too little analysis. (…) Global systems themselves like the Internet amplifies actions in a non-linear way which creates feedback loops that can dramatically escalate the impact of violence.
9-11 is a great example of how the underlying dynamics of globalization make a radical acceleration in conflict possible. Small groups can now produce results from actions that far exceed anything in history. However, this isn’t restricted to Islamic terrorists. Warfare is evolving is across the board at a rapid rate. I see it everywhere from Brazil to Columbia to Nigeria and Iraq.
That poses a big problem for the US military. They don’t have an historical guide to work from. Our previous experience with guerrilla groups in Vietnam, and beyond, operated substantially differently than what we see out there today. Today, there are no cohesive centralized movements to fight. No wars of national liberation. Warfare is now an open-source framework of loose organizations. (…) It is a ground-up phenomenon that challenges the Nation-state’s monopoly on violence.”

OPEN SOURCE INSURGENCY >> How to start

Superempowerment -- an increase in the ability of individuals and small groups to accomplish tasks/work through the combination of rapid improvements in technological tools and access to global networks -- has enabled small groups to radically increase their productivity in conflict. For example, if a small group disrupts a system or a network by attacking systempunkts, it can amplify the results of its attacks to achieve as much as a 1,400,000 percent return on investment.

Open source warfare is an organizational method by which a large collection of small, violent, superempowered groups can work together to take on much larger foes (usually hierarchies). It is also a method of organization that can be applied to non-violent struggles. It enables:

Here are some suggestions (this is but one of many methods based on recent history, I'm sure that over time a better method will emerge) for building an open source insurgency:

A)The plausible promise. The idea that holds the open source insurgency together. The plausible promise is composed of:

B)The foco. Every open source insurgency is ignited by a small founding group, a foco in guerrilla parlance. The foco sets the original goal and conducts the operation that provides the insurgency with its demonstration of viability. It's important to understand that in order to grow an open source insurgency, the founding group or individuals must follow a simple path:

Will keep adding to this doctrine over the next couple of months. Could potentially package it into a PDF document for wider distribution when done.

Format A5, 100 pages, 14,50€ TTC frais de port inclus
Publié par le Haut comité français pour la défense civile

Tal como já tínhamos escrito aqui no Correio da Manhã, a Administração Bush vai propor revisão da regulação do sector financeiro, já na próxima segunda-feira, com o alargamento dos poderes da FED, a Reserva Federal ou banco central americano.

Claro que é

no 025 cms de neve

Em quatro anos, a selecção portuguesa de futebol enfrentou por outras tantas vezes a grega. O saldo é de três derrotas e um empate. Ainda pergunta Scolari se é burro. Só o facto de perguntar confirma a suspeita.

com muitos, muitos elogios a José Sá Fernandes e ainda uma prestação especial do Eduardo Dâmaso

A Terra é plana e é o Sol, muito mais pequeno, que gira! Veja-se esta pérola: Iraqi TV Debate: Is the Earth Flat?

"Nada no Corão diz que a Terra é redonda... e a ciência que o afirma é herética. Tudo o que não estiver no Corão é falso." Esta gente vive num tempo pré-Galileu… E querem impor isto ao mundo!

L'assassinat, par deux commandos de l'ETA, d'un ancien élu socialiste, dans la localité basque de Mondragon, vendredi 7 mars à quelques heures de la clôture de la campagne électorale, relance le débat sur la capacité opérationnelle de l'organisation terroriste. En effet, le discours officiel sur l'efficacité de l'antiterrorisme développé depuis le traumatisme du 11 mars 2004 brossait le portrait d'une ETA affaiblie. Certes il s'agit toujours d'une organisation armée disposant d'un arsenal létal (plusieurs tonnes d'explosifs et deux tonnes de nitrométhane) cependant le noyau des 250 etarra, serait en pleine déliquescence. Ainsi, le manque d'entraînement militaire de sa centaine de commandos constitue une première faille dans le dispositif humain.

Ensuite, la politique de Madrid de répression et d'incarcération a contraint l'ETA à reconsidérer ses structures. Le cloisonnement qui existait, pour des motifs de sécurité, dans les domaines (logistique, recrutement, …) et dans les missions, a aujourd'hui disparu au profit d'un petit groupe d'hommes à tout faire : par conséquent, chaque coup de filet a un impact d'autant plus important sur l'organisation. Enfin, l'ETA semble négliger ses troupes, erreur impardonnable dans une structure paramilitaire. Ainsi, lors de l'attentat de Capbreton, le chef de groupe a abandonné à leur sort deux militants sans moyens ni infrastructures dans le Sud Ouest français ; ceux qui fuient en France ont l'air d'être logés au premier domicile venu ; enfin, les commandos paraissent déboussolés comme en témoigne l'exemple d'Ander Múgica qui, avant d'être arrêté, a fui en abandonnant deux fois en quelques jours le matériel dont il était chargé, entre autres des explosifs. En somme, l'ETA serait aujourd'hui un petit groupe de fervents qui délaisseraient leurs troupes. Or, les rapports de force au sein de l'organisation ne permettraient pas à l'ETA de se remettre en cause, condition sine qua non pour dépasser sa faiblesse structurelle.

En outre, les etarra doivent faire face à une pénurie financière. L' «impôt révolutionnaire» constitue l'intégralité du financement et aurait rapporté, en 2004 selon le ministère de l'Intérieur espagnol, 15 millions d'euros alors que l'organisation aurait eu besoin au moins du double. Ces prélèvements, qui oscillent entre 18 000 et 400 000 euros, sont effectués par le biais de lettres d'extorsion qui exigent à la cible, un industriel ou une profession libérale, une somme déterminée en fonction des moyens financiers que lui attribue l'organisation. Elles sont rédigées en basque et espagnol, sur un papier qui porte en filigrane le symbole de l'organisation afin d'éviter des contrefaçons ; dans la marge supérieure droite, un code alphanumérique est attribué à chacune des victimes. Une telle logistique s'accompagne de menaces de représailles sur la personne, son entreprise ou sa famille. Le pilier financier de l'ETA est donc un chantage de type mafieux.

Entre sa faiblesse structurelle et son caractère mafieux, l'ETA a-t-elle une véritable dimension politique ? mérite-t-elle cette qualification ? « L'ETA, c'est trois pelés, plus un tambour pour faire beaucoup de bruit. L'ETA n'a pas de doctrine, juste de la haine » affirme Xavier Zumalde qui a intégré l'ETA en 1965 et en a été le premier chef militaire sous la dictature de Franco. Mais au-delà de l'inconsistance idéologique, Zumalde pointe l'absence de résultats concrets sur le long terme : «[…] si l'ETA n'avait pas existé, le Pays Basque jouirait du même degré d'autonomie qu'aujourd'hui.». L'inefficacité de la stratégie sanglante d'ETA contraste avec la conquête d'autonomie catalane ; cette dissonance conforte les critiques à l'égard de l'organisation.

L'absence d'aboutissement confirme-t-il le manque d'idéologie ? Dans l'histoire de l'ETA, la boucle semble bouclée. En effet, l'organisation est née dans les années 50 lorsque les cadres du PNV, parti conservateur de droite, qui luttaient contre Franco ont du émigré en France ou en Amérique du Nord ou du Sud ; les nouvelles générations restées au pays, trop jeunes pour avoir lutté lors de la guerre civile mais conscientes dans l'âme de la réalité politique de la région, forment alors le projet Egin qui deviendra plus tard l'ETA en reprenant à leur compte la lutte antifranquiste et pro-régionaliste du PNV. Avec l'avènement de la démocratie, les anciens rentrent au pays et reprennent la lutte autonomiste mais cette fois-ci dans le cadre institutionnel du PNV. L'ETA se retrouve ainsi délestée de toute une dimension idéologique qu'elle n'a pas su alimenter par elle-même. Aujourd'hui sa vision politique semble aussi courte que son slogan : « Que se vayan !».

L'ETA a déjà tué une quarantaine d'élus non nationalistes, une pratique qu'elle a systématisée dans la deuxième moitié des années 90. De nombreuses réactions de répulsion ont eu lieu à la suite de l'homicide de ce vendredi : à Mondragon, l'alliance Esker Batua (alliance communiste-écologiste) a coupé les ponts avec l'ANV , les candidats ont exprimé leur réprobation, les syndicats ont appelé à des manifestations, l'évêque de Saint Sébastien a appelé les basques à aller voter… L'ETA veut prouver qu'elle existe mais la société espagnole de matrice chrétienne et, aujourd'hui, démocratique, exige de ses acteurs une autre logique que celle de la pure destruction pour leur accorder une légitimité politique. C'est ainsi que l'on doit comprendre l'affirmation de Juan-José Ibarretxe, président de la communauté autonome d'Euskadi : "Après cet acte barbare, je ne veux pas faire une lecture politique de cet assassinat : ce serait donner à ETA l'importance qu'elle veut avoir et ne mérite pas.". Un problème se pose quand les moyens utilisés passent exclusivement par la destruction de l'autre : cette logique utilitaire de la violence finit par s'étendre à une logique d'objectif, par atteindre une justification en elle-même, pour l'être humain qui la pratique et met en œuvre, d'autant plus fragile psychologiquement qu'il est dans une perspective existentielle d'engagement total.

Dans le climat tendu de fin de campagne électorale, de jeunes basques parcouraient les rues en criant des slogans en faveur des prisonniers etarra. Ainsi, la fadeur de la dimension politique de l'ETA ne conjure pas le mythe de l'organisation. En effet, une fois de plus, les nouvelles générations peuvent aisément se sentir fascinées par l'imaginaire révolutionnaire que l'ETA s'attribue. C'est pourquoi Xavier Zumalde reconnait qu'il est «préoccupé par le pouvoir psychologique d'attraction» que l'organisation exerce sur «la jeunesse basque». Or, la politique répressive du gouvernement s'est traduite par la multiplication des arrestations des dirigeants et des cadres de l'ETA. Madrid s'est réjouie de la perte d'initiative et de la déstructuration qu'une telle stratégie causait à l'organisation indépendantiste. Cependant, cette méthode s'est traduite dans les faits par l'incarcération de la plupart des «têtes pensantes» qui avaient la capacité de négocier. L'ETA a été ainsi reconduite à un groupe d'inconditionnels radicalisés, jeunes pour la plupart, et qui se sentent acculés. Une stratégie brutale obtient toujours des effets, collatéraux ou non, brutaux ; le problème se pose pour le stratège, dans ce cas Madrid, quand l'objectif est justement d'éviter ce genre d'effets.

Li, um dia que fumar tabaco fazia mal. Deixei de fumar.

Outro dia, li que beber fazia mal. Deixei de beber. E li,

Une étude révèle la présence de résidus de pesticides dans le vin

Une étude menée par le European Pesticides Action Network (PAN) révèle que les vins en vente en Europe contiennent des résidus de 10 pesticides différents potentiellement dangereux pour la santé humaine. Cependant, les viticulteurs affirment que les quantités sont si faibles que la consommation de vin n'a pas d'incidences sur la santé.

TAIWAN À CONQUISTA DA CHINA

Um ponto de vista muito interessante sugerido pelo L'Express e que já há tempo me parece uma perspectiva imprescindível na análise estratégica da relação entre as duas Chinas: o da conquista do continente comunista pela ilha democrática...

"Chine: Taiwan à la conquête du continent

Le nouveau président de Taïwan, élu samedi dernier, est prêt à faire un pas vers Pékin et à réchauffer les relations entre les deux Chine. Son élection s'explique en grande partie par l'attrait du marché chinois.

À quelques mois des Jeux olympiques, les bonnes nouvelles sont rares pour le régime de Pékin, entaché par la répression au Tibet. La victoire à l'élection présidentielle taïwanaise, samedi dernier, de Ma Ying-jeou, 57 ans, candidat de l'opposition, en est une.

Contre son adversaire malheureux, indépendantiste, il a fait campagne en faveur du réchauffement des relations entre les deux Chine. Un thème qui explique largement la victoire de ce juriste diplômé de Harvard, cadre du Guomindang (le parti de Tchang Kaï-chek). Dans le même temps, faute de participation suffisante à deux référendums, la proposition de demande d'adhésion à l'ONU a été repoussée.

Le choix des électeurs taïwanais tient largement à la fascination pour le gigantesque potentiel du marché chinois. Celui-ci abrite déjà la moitié des investissements de l'île à l'étranger et sert de débouché à 40 % de sa production. Mais l'économie chinoise est lancée à un tel train d'enfer... Comment résister? Ma s'est prononcé pour le rétablissement de liaisons aériennes directes avec le continent, l'ouverture de Taïwan aux touristes de la Chine populaire, l'accès de cette dernière aux banques de l'île et même pour un "marché commun"...

En attendant un éventuel "traité de paix" avec Pékin, le nouveau président entend mettre en place des mécanismes de confiance destinés à réduire la tension militaire dans le détroit. Des contacts devraient reprendre par des canaux semi-officiels.

Restera à régler l'épineuse question de la souveraineté. Pékin comme Taipei prétendent représenter la Chine et chacun nie à l'autre toute légitimité. La solution, évoquée par le nouvel élu, d'un "non-déni mutuel" ouvre une nouvelle voie. Reste à la concrétiser. "

e duas notas muito penetrantes do "jornal" de John Robb, uma sobre a ameaça de descarrilamento e explosão da China e outra sobre a vertente ciber-guerra entre chineses e tibetanos, que mostra mais uma vez que toda a "guerra" e qualquer guerra passa hoje através net e pela open source war:

JOURNAL: Tibet and beyond

JOURNAL: Vigilante Hackers

PREVER O INESPERADO... E AINDA

9 OUTRAS TECNOLOGIAS DO M.I.T.

Les 10 technologies émergentes 2008 selon le MIT

Le MIT vient de publier dans Technology Review (Mars/Avril) ses prédictions concernant les 10 technologies émergentes pour l'année 2008. Au palmarès on trouve :

Les laboratoires de Microsoft se sont lancés un défi : résoudre le paradoxe qui consiste à prévoir des événements inattendus ou hors norme. L'idée n'en est qu'à ses débuts, mais elle pourrait avoir le même impact que les réseaux de neurones. Réseaux que les équipes de Microsoft exploitent pour permettre à leur logiciel de faire émerger des schémas logiques à partir de très grandes quantités d'information. Pour l'instant, Microsoft commence à pouvoir prédire les aberrations (au sens statistiques) du trafic routier de Seattle."

Technology Review presents its annual list of the 10 most exciting technologies.

© AFP, le 27-03-2008 . Film "Fitna", du député néerlandais Geert Wilders, mis en ligne le 27 mars 2008. En dépit des appels des responsables néerlandais, qui craignent une crise internationale comparable à celle des caricatures danoises de Mahomet, et des menaces contre les Pays-Bas, un député d'extrême-droite a mis jeudi soir sur internet un film amalgamant terrorisme et islam.

depois do caso do guia espiritual, a vez do conselheiro político e do assessor militar

Last week, Barack Obama's military adviser and national campaign co-chairman Merrill "Tony" McPeak accused former President Bill Clinton of "using divisive tactics and unfairly trying to question Barack Obama's patriotism." McPeak, a former chief of staff of the Air Force, previously supported Howard Dean and then John Kerry. He has campaigned for Obama and cut commercials claiming that Obama has the "right stuff" to be Commander in Chief. His job is to burnish Obama's image as a guy tough enough to be President. So who better to go after Bill Clinton and get the Obama campaign back on offense? In off-the-cuff remarks to reporters Friday he even compared the former president's comments with the actions of Joseph McCarthy, the 1950s communist-hunting senator. (…)

Well, it is likely that Obama will soon be having to retract Merrill McPeak. McPeak, who was arrested last year for driving under the influence, apparently has a problem controlling more than his thirst for fermented beverages. He also has a penchant for bashing

Israel

or, more particularly, Jews who oppose negotiating with terrorists. (…)

In recent years McPeak has echoed the Mearsheimer-Walt view that American Middle East policy is being controlled by Jews at the expense of

America

's interests in the region. In a 2003 interview with the Oregonian, McPeak complained of that the "lack of playbook for getting Israelis and Palestinians together at...something other than a peace process....We need to get it fixed and only we have the authority with both sides to move them towards that. Everybody knows that."

The interviewer asked McPeak: "So where's the problem? State? White House?" McPeak replied: "New York City. Miami. We have a large vote -- vote, here in favor of

Israel

. And no politician wants to run against it." Translation (as if it's needed): Jews -- who put Israel over every American interest -- control America's policy on the Middle East.

And McPeak has the audacity to accuse Bill Clinton of McCarthyism.

(…) McPeak (in his Oregonian interview) also equated terrorist organizations with neoconservative supporters for Israel:

Interviewer: "Do you think...there's an element within Hamas, Hezbollah, that doesn't want

Israel

to exist at all and always will be there?" McPeak: "Absolutely." Interviewer: "So this is -- this is multilateral." (…)

Dateline USA....

Regarding Democratic White House hopeful Barack Obama, a frankly frightening pattern of relationships has emerged, which most mainstream media outlets have been trying to ignore or trivialize.

It seems that while the anti-American and anti-Semitic pastor Jeremiah Wright was Barack Obama's spiritual adviser, an ex-terrorist named William ("Bill") Ayers has been Obama's friend and political adviser, or ideological mentor.

Ayers is an especially odious and surprisingly successful character. A former member of the radical Weather Underground Organization that claimed responsibility for a dozen bombings between 1970 and 1974, he now holds the position of distinguished professor of education at the University of Illinois-Chicago. Although never convicted of any crime, he was quoted by The New York Times ... on 9/11 ... as finding a "certain eloquence" in bombs. (…)

Wikipedia has this to say about Ayers:

William C. ("Bill") Ayers (born 1944) is a former member of the Weather Underground who is now a Distinguished Professor of Education at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Ayers was a 1960s-era political activist and Weather Underground member. He grew up in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago in a highly privileged family (his father, Thomas Ayers, was Chairman and CEO of Commonwealth Edison) and attended Lake Forest Academy. According to Ayers' memoir Fugitive Days, he became radicalized at the University of Michigan. During his years there, he became involved in the New Left and the SDS.

Ayers went underground with several comrades including Brandy Diekman and Arion, after their co-conspirators' bomb accidentally exploded on March 6, 1970, destroying a Greenwich Village townhouse and killing three members of the Weather Underground (Ted Gold, Terry Robbins, and Diana Oughton, who was Ayers' girlfriend at the time). He and his colleagues invented identities and traveled continuously. They avoided the police and FBI while bombing high-profile government buildings—including the United States Capitol (two bombs on March 1, 1970), The Pentagon (May 19, 1972), and the Harry S. Truman Building which houses the United States Department of State (on January 29, 1975)—along with several banks, police department headquarters and precincts, state and federal courthouses, and state prison administrative offices.

Ayers and Bernardine Dohrn raised two children, Zayd and Malik, underground before turning themselves in in 1981, when most charges were dropped because of prosecutorial misconduct during the long search for the fugitives. They also adopted a son, Chesa Boudin, who is the biological son of former Weathermen David Gilbert and Kathy Boudin.

Ayers published his memoirs in 2001 with the book Fugitive Days. His interview with the New York Times to promote his book was published on September 11, 2001, and includes his reaction to Emile De Antonio's 1976 documentary film about the Weathermen: "He was 'embarrassed by the arrogance, the solipsism, the absolute certainty that we and we alone knew the way,' he writes. 'The rigidity and the narcissism.'" In this interview, he also was quoted as saying, "I don't regret setting bombs; I feel we didn't do enough." The book has been criticized for numerous important factual inaccuracies, among other things.

Ayers has also edited and written nearly a dozen books on education theory, policy and practice.

In the fall of 2006, Ayers was disinvited to a conference for progressive educators on the grounds that his position supporting political terrorism would tarnish the reputation and standing of the progressive education movement.

O primeiro milho é dos pardais, já há qualquer de novo e até ao lavar dos cestos é vindima... E só lá depois do S. Martinho é que se vai poder provar o vinho... O 'Courier', entretanto, cita o NYT sobre a novidade:

A Argentina tem, há muito, as condições necessárias (mas, pelos vistos, não as suficientes) para ser um caso exemplar de sucesso económico e político na América do Sul. A realidade, porém, tem sido outra. Nas últimas décadas, os argentinos cometeram toda a espécie de disparates fatais. Desde o patético regresso de Juan Domingo Peron e sua corte canalha (incluindo a "baby" do velho, o bruxo e os financeiros da Opus Dei...) que lançou a Argentina num plano inclinado assustador e levou os militares a recorrerem ao "mais honrado" dos oficiais, Videla, para travar essa queda, decisão que lançou os peronistas na guerrilha e iniciou um período de guerra suja e ditadura militar. Este processo ultrapassa Videla e lança uma dinâmica militar autista que culmina na invasão das Malvinas onde o choque com as tropas de Sua Magestade britânica liquidaram a loucura da ditadura militar argentina e abriram a porta ao regresso da democracia à argentina. E que fizeram os argentinos com essa oportunidade? Elegeram para presisente Menem, uma espécie de Santana Lopes do hemisfério sul já bastante decrépito e vagamente a cheirar a peronismo com muita naftalina. Poucos anos depois, a Argentina mergulhava na pior crise da sua história que descapitalizou o país, destruiu toda a classe média e lançou a maioria dos argentinos na fome e na mais negra miséria. Depois de anos desta austeridade, a Argentina ganha alguma normalidade e já se sente capaz de andar... Que faz? Pois o que a foto mostra, arma uma guerra dos exportadores agrícolas com a presidente Cristina Kirchner. A AFP fala, ironicamente de "opposition musclée" e legenda a foto: "un opposant à Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner frappe un partisan de la présidente en marge d'une manifestation de soutien aux agriculteurs mardi. Le bras-de-fer entre le gouvernement et les producteurs de céréales s'est durci après un discours de Fernandez de Kirchner critiquant les fermiers, en grève depuis 2 semaines. Ce mardi, des milliers de personnes sont descendues dans les rues de la capitale Buenos Aires contre les autorités qui ont décidé d'augmenter les taxes à l'exportation des céréales."

Pobre Argentina! A síntese das últimas décadas leva à conclusão de que os argentinos utilizam toda a energia de que dispõem, em cada momento, para... empobrecerem, para destruírem a sua riqueza e as condições indispensáveis para a sua criação. Às vezes, pergunto-me se a Argentina não é uma espécie de Portugal mais avançado... se não podemos ver na Argentina aquilo que nos espera e, mutatis mutantis, nos vai acontecendo!

Sarkozy está de visita a Londres. Claro, Carla Bruni fará as delícias de fotógrafos e câmaras e arrisca-se a ocultar muito do que é importante nesta visita. Nestes dois dias, Sarkozy ensaia o início da criação de um quadro geo-político para uma nova política externa francesa que passa pela (inconfessável) reconfiguração das relações com a Alemanha, pela afirmação do poder mediterrânico da França, pela reintegração nas estruturas NATO (que é prato forte da agenda desta visita) e aproximação ao mundo anglo-axónico. Tudo isto, claro, com o objectivo de garantir a Paris o papel pivot na Europa pós-"federalismo". A AFP dá conta desta visita:

Le président français Nicolas Sarkozy effectue à partir de mercredi une visite d'Etat de deux jours en Grande-Bretagne sur fond de pompe royale et d'entente cordiale, dont Paris et Londres espèrent une relance spectaculaire et tous azimuts de leur coopération. (…)Le chef d'Etat français et son épouse l'ancien mannequin Carla Bruni doivent atterrir à 11h25 locales (même heure GMT) à l'aéroport londonien d'Heathrow avant de se diriger vers le château de Windsor, dans l'ouest de la capitale, où un accueil royal, marque rare de considération, leur sera réservé.

Le couple effectuera en carrosse les derniers mètres qui les séparent de la résidence royale, en compagnie de la reine Elizabeth II et de son époux le duc d'Edimbourg. M. et Mme Sarkozy seront dans la soirée les hôtes d'un banquet d'Etat avant de passer la nuit au château.

Le discours présidentiel devrait être l'occasion de célébrer plus d'un millénaire de rivalités et d'amitié franco-britanniques, selon l'entourage de Nicolas Sarkozy. (…)

Autre privilège, Nicolas Sarkozy s'exprimera devant les Chambres des Communes et des Lords réunies dans le cadre solennel du palais de Westminter. L'occasion de célébrer plus d'un millénaire de rivalités et d'amitié franco-britanniques dans ce qui sera, selon son entourage, le "discours-cadre" de sa visite.

"Il dira à nos amis anglais que ce qui nous rapproche est beaucoup plus important que ce qui nous sépare", annonce-t-on à l'Elysée. "Que nous avons toujours des différences mais que nous sommes capables de les surmonter pour inventer une nouvelle fraternité franco-britannique au XXIe siècle", poursuit-on, "c'est tout le sens de sa visite".

Après cette proclamation, Nicolas Sarkozy retrouvera jeudi le Premier ministre Gordon Brown pour les travaux pratiques de leur premier sommet bilatéral. D'abord à la résidence de son hôte britannique au 10 Downing Street, puis dans le cadre plus inattendu de l'Emirates Stadium, le stade d'Arsenal, le plus français des clubs de football d'Outre-Manche.

Le temps d'une séance de travail et d'un déjeuner, les deux responsables doivent passer en revue les principaux dossiers internationaux de l'heure, dont l'Afghanistan où Paris devrait envoyer un millier de soldats supplémentaires, les priorités de la présidence française de l'Union européenne (UE), à partir du 1er juillet, et les questions bilatérales.

Dans un entretien diffusé mercredi par la radio BBC, M. Sarkozy a d'ailleurs justifié le renforcement annoncé de la présence militaire française en Afghanistan, estimant que l'Alliance atlantique ne pouvait "se permettre de perdre" contre le terrorisme.

"Est-ce que l'on peut se permettre, nous, l'Alliance, les alliés, de perdre en Afghanistan ? La réponse est non. Parce qu'en Afghanistan se joue une partie de la lutte contre le terrorisme mondial, donc on doit gagner", a déclaré M. Sarkozy.

La réforme des institutions internationales, comme le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) ou le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, l'élargissement du G8 en G13 ou G14, l'immigration et la transparence des marchés financiers doivent permettre aux deux capitales d'afficher "leur très grande proximité de vues", selon le mot réjoui d'un diplomate britannique.

A trois mois de la présidence française de l'UE et même si elle reste délicate dans une Grande-Bretagne eurosceptique en plein processus de ratification du traité de Lisbonne, la question de l'Europe de la défense devrait également être évoquée par les deux pays, qui fournissent à eux seuls 40% de l'effort militaire des 27 pays membres de l'UE.

Tout à leur lune de miel, Paris et Londres ont promis un sommet "plein de substance". La presse britannique a déjà commencé à en dévoiler les contours en annonçant la signature par MM. Brown et Sarkozy d'un plan commun destiné à construire de nouvelles centrales nucléaires en Grande-Bretagne, puis à en exporter la technologie dans le monde.

"Nous avons beaucoup de choses à faire avec les Britanniques", résume-t-on côté français. "Pour faire avancer l'UE, le moteur franco-allemand n'est plus suffisant. La conviction de Nicolas Sarkozy, c'est que, même si nous avons des différences, la Grande-Bretagne a un rôle spécial à y jouer". © AFP.

PARIS COM NOVA ESTRATÉGIA

PARA UMA EUROPA PÓS-FEDERAL

A deslocação das placas tectónicas da política externa francesa – que se revelam e deixam ver no projecto de reintegração das estruturas NATO e na “União Mediterrânica” ou no reforço da posição dura frente ao Irão - implicam a vontade de reconfigurar as relações com a Alemanha. E a perda de ilusões sobre o “federalismo” europeu. É ao nascimento da política externa francesa pós-“federalismo” que estamos a assistir. A Stratfor nota “pequenas mudanças com largas implicações”… Como um afastamento da Alemanha e um aceitar de trabalhar com os Estados Unidos.

“A New French Strategy

French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the week of March 16 that France is cutting its nuclear arsenal to less than 300 warheads, which he said was less than half the number France had during the Cold War. Meanwhile, plans are under way in Paris to return to full membership in NATO; Sarkozy will travel to London the week of March 23 to discuss reintegration.

Sarkozy spoke while attending the launch of France’s newest nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in Cherbourg. During his speech, he added that, at present, none of France’s nuclear weapons is aimed at anyone. During the same appearance he said, “All those who threaten to attack our vital interests expose themselves to a severe riposte by France.” This was said in the context of discussions of Iran, which he said was among those countries in the process of developing nuclear weapons. France is simultaneously calling attention to its nuclear capability and adopting an increasingly hostile posture toward Iran. While the media focus is on Sarkozy, it seems to us that this issue goes deeper than personalities. Processes are under way that are shifting French foreign policy.

The shift is not a dramatic one yet; there is more continuity than discontinuity in French foreign policy. Like all French leaders for the last half-century, Sarkozy is focusing on his country’s strategic independence, particularly on its nuclear capability. At the same time, France is aligning itself more closely with the U.S. view of Iran, and, to some extent, with the U.S. view of the Middle East. In doing so, France is creating stresses within the European Union and reshaping its relationship with Germany. These small changes have broad implications that need to be understood.

Foreign Policy Since 1871

Since 1871, France has had two foreign policies. The year 1871 saw German unification. Prior to 1871, the fragmentation of Germany into numerous ministates secured France’s eastern frontier; France concerned itself with the rest of Atlantic Europe, particularly Spain and England. German unification redefined French geopolitics by creating a major power to its east. This major power was insecure because it was caught between France, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. German insecurity made it a threat to France. A united Germany had to deal with the causes of that insecurity, and France was one of those causes. German unification effectively coincided with the defeat of France by Prussia, and drove home the significance of a unified Germany.

From German unification and the Franco-Prussian war until 1945, the essence of French foreign policy consisted of managing Germany. That meant France had to change its relationship with its historic rival, the United Kingdom, and keep Russia aligned with the Anglo-French alliance. For more than 80 years, French foreign policy could be boiled down to containing Germany. The strategy proved successful, assuming one accepts the losses incurred in World War I and five years of occupation during World War II. In the end, France survived.

This set in place France’s second post-1871 strategy, which evolved over the 1950s until its institutionalization by Charles de Gaulle. This postwar strategy consisted of two parts. The first part involved embedding France into multinational institutions, particularly the European Economic Community (EEC) — which evolved into the European Union — and NATO. The second part involved using these institutions to preserve French sovereignty and independence. Put differently, France’s strategy was to participate in multinational structures while using them for its own ends, or at least defining a limited relationship with the structures.

France

’s overriding concern was to avoid getting caught in a third world war after having been devastated by the first two world wars. Preventing this outcome meant exploiting German disunification, effectively ending France’s primordial fear of Germany. It did this in two ways. The first involved drawing close to West Germany economically, creating a system of relationships that would make Franco-German conflict impossible. The second involved blocking the Soviet threat by participating in NATO.

France

’s problem was that the deeper that it went into European institutions and NATO, the more tenuous its sovereignty became. It needed the economic and military relationship with Germany, but it had to retain its room for maneuver. More precisely, it wanted to draw closer to Germany and take advantage of a collective security scheme, but not become a client state of the United States. It therefore belonged to NATO, but pulled out of the alliance’s integrated military command structure in 1966. NATO’s military structure made certain responses to a Soviet invasion automatic. France refused to allow its response to be automatic, but remained committed to collective defense.

France

was concerned with maximizing its autonomy, but it had a deeper fear as well. The defense of Western Europe was predicated on U.S. intervention. The doctrine of massive response held that, in the event of a Soviet invasion that could not be contained conventionally, the United States would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The U.S. position was thus to initiate a nuclear war that would potentially see America’s cities decimated, all in order to protect Europe.

The French problem, however, was that Paris would not know whether Washington would honor this commitment until after the initiation of hostilities. From the French point of view, it would be irrational for the United States to invite its own devastation to protect Europe. Therefore, the American commitment was at best untestable. At worst, it was an implausible and transparent attempt to jeopardize Europe so as to deter a Soviet attack without the United States risking anything fundamental.

An Independent Deterrent

The need to protect French sovereignty intersected with what Paris saw as a genuine requirement to maintain a military capability outside the framework of NATO, all the while remaining part of NATO and the EEC. France wanted NATO to function. It wanted to be close to Germany. And it wanted a set of options outside the context of NATO that would guarantee that France would not be reoccupied, this time by the Soviets.

The decision to construct an independent French nuclear deterrent was based on this reasoning. As de Gaulle put it, France wanted to retain the ability to tear off an arm if the Soviets attacked France through Germany. It was unsure whether the United States would act to deter the Soviet Union, but even a small nuclear force in the hands of a power likely to suffer occupation — and thus a force very likely to be used — would deter the Soviets. Therefore, the French developed (and retain) the nuclear force that Sarkozy decided to cut but not eliminate.

This issue remained at the heart of U.S.-French tensions both during and after the Cold War. The American view was that the United States and all of Western Europe (plus some Mediterranean countries) had a vested interest in resisting the Soviets, and they could do so most effectively by joining in multilateral economic and military organizations allowing them to operate in concert. The Americans viewed the French reluctance to follow suit as France seeking a free ride. From the American point of view, the U.S. bore the brunt of the cost of defending Europe, as well as underwriting Europe’s economic recovery in the early years. France benefited from both, and would benefit as long as the United States defended Germany. Paris wanted the benefits of the American presence without committing itself to burden-sharing. Put another way, how could the Americans be certain that, in the event of war, France would protect Germany, Italy or Turkey? Perhaps Paris would remain alo of unless France were attacked.

The French mistrust of the credibility of U.S. commitment to Europe collided with American mistrust of French reasons for being part of NATO without committing itself to collaborate automatically in NATO’s response to the Soviets. France was comfortable with this ambiguity. It needed it. It needed to integrate economically with the Germans, to be part of NATO, but to retain its own options for national defense. If this meant increasing American distrust, and even a sense of betrayal, this was something France must tolerate to achieve its strategic goals.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, France entered a new strategic phase. The French responded to the Soviet collapse and to German reunification by maintaining and extending its core policy. It remained ambiguously part of NATO, participating as it saw fit. It really concentrated on transforming the European Union into a multinational federation, with its own integrated foreign policy and defense policy.

This position appears paradoxical. On the one hand, France wanted to maintain its national sovereignty and freedom of action. On the other, it wanted to be a counterbalance to the United States and to draw ever closer to Germany — permanently eliminating the historic danger from its eastern neighbor, however distant the German threat might appear under current circumstances. France could not resist the United States alone. It could do so only in the context of a European federation, which would of course include the critical French relationship with

Germany

Independence vs. Europe

France

therefore had to choose between a wholly independent foreign policy and federation with Europe. It tried to have its cake and eat it too. It supported the principle of federation, and within this federation it sought a particularly close relationship with

Germany

. But its view of this new federation was that while, in a formal sense, France would abandon a degree of sovereignty, in practical terms — so long as France could be the senior partner to Germany — the French would dominate a European federation. In effect, federation would open the door to a Europe directed, if not dominated, by Paris.

This is why Central Europe revolted against French President Jacques Chirac on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Central Europeans were not particularly enthusiastic about the war, but they were far less enthusiastic about Chirac’s actions. From their point of view, he was using the Iraq issue to create a European bloc, led by France in opposition to the United States. For a country such as Poland that had relied on French (and British) guarantees prior to World War II, the idea that France should lead a Europe in opposition to the United States was unacceptable. Chirac gave a famous press conference in which he condemned the Central European rejection of French opposition to the invasion as representing nations that were “not well brought up.” This was the moment in which French frustration welled over.

France

was not going to get the federation it hoped for. Too many countries of Europe wanted to retain their freedom of action, this time from France. They were not opposed to economic union, but the creation of a federation with a joint foreign and defense policy was not enthusiastically greeted by smaller European countries (and some not-so-small countries such as Britain, Spain and Italy). As anti-federationism grew, it swept forward to include

France

as well, which rejected the European constitution in a plebiscite.

This moment was the existential crisis that created the Sarkozy presidency. Sarkozy has raised two questions that have been fundamental to France. The first is France’s relationship to Germany. France has been obsessed with Germany since 1871, at first hostile, later nearly married, but always obsessed. The second question relates to France’s relationship to the United States. Chirac represented postwar Gaullism’s view in its most extreme form: Convert European institutions into a French-dominated multinational force to balance

U.S.

power. This attempt collapsed, so Sarkozy had to define the relationship France might have with the United States if France could not counterbalance the

United States

The Mediterranean Union

The questions of Germany and of the

United States

were addressed in the French idea of a Mediterranean Union. Since German unification in 1871, France has obsessed about the north German plain. But France is also a Mediterranean power, with long-term interests in North Africa and the Middle East in such countries as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Syria. Where Germany is entirely a northern European power, France is not. Therefore, Chirac proposed that, in addition to being a member of the European Union,

France

should create a separate and distinct Mediterranean Europe. The latter grouping would include the rest of th e Mediterranean basin, extending as far as Turkey and Israel. It would exclude non-Mediterranean powers such as Germany and

Britain

, however.

France

had no intention of withdrawing from the European Union, but saw the Mediterranean Union as a supplemental relationship, and argued that it would allow EU expansion without actually admitting new EU members. The Germans saw this as a French attempt to become Europe’s strategic pivot, leading both unions and serving as the only member that was both a northern European and a Mediterranean power. The Germans did not like this scenario one bit. The French then backed off, but did not abandon the idea.

If the French are going to be a Mediterranean power, they must also be a Middle Eastern power. If they are playing in the Middle East, they must redefine their relationship with the United States. Sarkozy has done that by drawing systematically closer to American views on Iran, Syria and Lebanon. In other words, to pursue this new course, the French have drawn away from the Germans and closer to the Americans.

This is all very early in the game, and the moves so far are very small. But the French have slightly backed off from their German obsession and their fear of the United States. The collapse of European federationism has set off a reconsideration of France’s global role, a reconsideration that will — if continued — radically redefine

France

’s core relationships. What the French are doing is what they have done for years: They are looking for maximum freedom of action for

France

without undue risk. Though

France

has long pursued its interests with consistency, its current moves are different. It appears to be pulling away from Germany and seeking power in the Mediterranean. And that means working with the Americans.”

Lors des élections présidentielles taïwanaises, Ma Ying-jeou a remporté samedi une écrasante victoire avec plus de 58% des suffrages. S'il cultive une image de modéré à l'égard de la Chine et bénéficie des faveurs de celle-ci, le nouveau président souhaite cependant maintenir le statu quo qui prévaut sur l'île: ni indépendance, ni réunification.

"State Department warns American spectators at Olympics not to expect privacy but monitoring

planning to attend the Olympics in Beijing this summer that they should take care and be mindful they could be under surveillance.

Why not make your own with non-toxic dye? Fun and educational for both you and the children.

Nicolas Sarkozy inova nos dispositivos de comunicação do Eliseu com a criação de um serviço profissional de vela* centrado na reputação... Antes da chegada de Sarkozy, o Eliseu só prestava atenção a jornais, rádios e televisões. Estava na pré-história da comunicação.

"La réorganisation de la communication de l'Elysée annoncée par le JDD dès ce week-end, passe par un renforcement du service Internet avec notamment, la mise en place d'un dispositif de veille sur Internet. L'Elysée veut ainsi renforcer sa réactivité face aux "buzz" dont a souffert récemment le Président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy. La Toile se souviendra en effet encore longtemps de sa première visite au salon de l'agriculture ou de sa rencontre avec les pécheurs du Havre.

François de la Brosse, en charge des activités Internet à l'Elysée sera donc maintenant épaulé par un jeune normalien-HEC de 24 ans, Nicolas Princen. Ce dernier prend en charge la veille sur Internet, en surveillant tout ce qui fait référence au Président de la République. "Outre la presse et les médias traditionnels, Nicolas Princen devra également surveiller les sites moins connus, les blogs... Bref, tout ce qui circule sur le Net". On peut lire sur Le Post, "qu'avant son arrivée, personne ne jouait ce rôle à l'Elysée (...) la veille n'était pas du tout professionnelle." François JEANNE-BEYLOT 18 mars 2008 dans Actualité, Intelligence économique et veille, Recherche d'information sur Internet | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) |

* Vela: tradução que me parece a que, em português, melhor corresponde ao ‘veille’ francês e que retoma o portuguesíssimo ‘estar de vela’ ou ‘velar’. O ‘vigilância’ é outro conceito... que, de resto, também existe no francês ‘vigilance’ e que não é coincidente com ‘veille’. Mas, assinalo, que o debate sobre esta matéria está em curso no seio dos estudiosos e praticantes portugueses destes saberes. Por exemplo, na primeira tese de doutoramento sobre IE, a ser brevemente, apresentada, o termo ‘veille’ é traduzido por ‘vigilância’ (a minha opinião sobre isto é, aliás, do conhecimento, embora tardio, do autor) e na primeira tese de mestrado, que foi apresentada na Universidade Católica, regista-se o mesmo. Mal, quanto a mim, mas o debate, como disse, ainda está em curso.

o anúncio da tourada que gerou uma 'tourada' à volta do anúncio... enfim, o miúdo dá largas ao génio e os estúpidos do costume dão largas à habitual estupidez. Aprecie-se a exibição do talento no making of e no anúncio fabuloso.

John Robb analisa os recentes acontecimentos do Tibete e suas consequências para a China...

“Tibet is proving to be much more than a flash of unrest in a remote Chinese province. It may be the trigger for much greater dislocation and disruption (from "When China Derails"):

So, what happens when China's high performance, globally connected capitalist economy which is flying at dangerously high speeds hits the inevitable speed bump? The answer is: it will derail (hollow out and fragment). The chaos it will produce in SE Asia is the real threat we have to deal with. Predicting the black swan that kicks off the death spiral is impossible... In anticipation of this, the Chinese government is following the lead of many other nations by radically improving the capabilities of its paramilitary force for domestic security (to the tune of one million men). However, this many not be enough. Global guerrilla theory indicates that endemic corruption will combine with the same forces of anti-state guerrilla action we have seen in other places to disconnect portions of China from the central government.

«Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa resolveu dar um "curso" sobre o PSD. Não o ouvi pessoalmente. Mas, pelos jornais, fiquei com a ideia de que era uma espécie de história mítica do "partido que resiste a tudo", como os militantes mais furiosos gostam de o ver. Segundo Marcelo, o PSD sempre viveu num incurável conflito interno e no fim sempre emergiu unido e triunfante. O conflito interno, com os condimentos da intriga e do ódio, começou, de facto, com a fundação e continua ainda com entusiasmo. De Miller Guerra a Emídio Guerreiro e a Sousa Franco, da "cisão de Aveiro" à "cisão Inadiáveis" (de que Marcelo fez parte), da "Nova Esperança" (que Marcelo dirigiu) e da gente que execrava Cavaco às várias facções que sucessivamente se esforçaram por remover Nogueira, Barroso, Santana e Marques Mendes, nunca a agitação do PSD parou - nem por um dia, nem por uma hora. E, apesar disso, Sá Carneiro e Cavaco chegaram ao poder e Barroso, embora sem poder, a primeiro-ministro.

O extraordinário Ribau interpretou a seu favor o estranho "curso" de Marcelo e concluiu que a trapalhada de hoje ia, como de costume, acabar numa arrasadora vitória em 2009. É uma boa consolação para Menezes. Não ocorreu, infelizmente, a Ribau que Marcelo podia, e devia, ter contado a história ao contrário. O PSD governou pouco tempo: um ano com Sá Carneiro e dois com Balsemão (em aliança com o CDS), dez com Cavaco, uns meses com Barroso e uns meses com Santana (também com o CDS). Pior ainda: Balsemão, sem autoridade e sem prestígio, não passou de um efeito póstumo da Aliança Democrática e Santana de um absoluto desastre. No fundo, como o próprio Marcelo indirectamente reconhece, o PSD foi até agora Sá Carneiro e Cavaco. Fora as câmaras, claro. E as clientelas.

No seu "curso", Marcelo atribui a perpétua desordem do PSD à natureza misteriosa e particular da agremiação, sobre a qual desce de quando em vez um enviado divino, que a regenera e a conduz, como um rebanho, para a terra prometida do Estado. O sebastianismo desta fábula é mais do que evidente e não conta com a hipótese provável de já não existir no nevoeiro mais nenhum D. Sebastião. O Portugal que produziu o PSD desapareceu; e o PSD não se adaptou. A heterogeneidade, que dantes permitia uma acção comum, é neste momento uma força de desagregação. E o partido não tem um papel no país. Não vai haver outro Sá Carneiro, nem outro Cavaco.»

Wafa Sultan, a psicóloga síria, residente nos Estados Unidos e com passaporte americano, voltou recentemente aos écrans da al-Jazeera, mostrando que continua sem papas na língua, com uma cultura e uma erudição fabulosas e um reciocínio claro e fulguerante... Vale a pena, além de a ouvir, observador como o pivot da al-Jazeera a hostiliza e se entende com o taliban que está no estúdio e que, claro, também hostiliza "essa mulher"... que chega amplamente para ele e o esmaga. "The Wafa is back":

Não sou capaz de não tornar público o mail que acabo de receber de uma amiga que saiu ontem do Tibete e que testemunhou o início de tudo (deixo o mail como me chegou, acentos incluídos). A Clara e o Miguel - é deles que se trata - têm enviado aqui para o Minscente as crónicas da sua volta ao mundo - que me desculpem! Sei bem que me irão desculpar:

Cheguei ontem ao Nepal, apos dias muito violentos passados no Tibete.Estou muito muito cansada. Um cansaco diferente... estou sem energia. Tenho que comer e descansar, para conseguir por as ideias mais claras e escrever sobre tudo o que aconteceu. Espero que para o Miniscente, Luis, se conseguir.

Mas, agora que posso, tenho que comecar a falar. Devem saber o que se passa no Tibete... O que vos posso dizer eh que tudo eh muito mais violento do que mostram na televisao. Foi muito muito violento. Para os tibetanos vai ser um massacre. Nunca vamos saber quantos morreram ou morrerao. Para nos, alem de violento psicologicamente, foi mais perigoso porque acabou por se saber que fomos os dois (eu e o Miguel) as unicas testemunhas do principio de tudo (no mosteiro de Drepung, onde estavamos no dia 10 de Marco, por acaso).

Ficamos imediatamente controlados pela policia ao ponto de, a caminho para o Nepal, nos dizerem que estavamos presos no hotel. Nunca tinha sentido o que era estar "presa" nao porque tivesse feito alguma coisa mas porque nao queriam que falassemos. O nosso mail e telefone ficaram, tambem, imediatamente controlados e as nossas maquinas fotograficas bem inspeccionadas.

Vimos a maior violencia policial que podem maginar, sobre pessoas desarmadas. Nao vimos ninguem morrer, mas sabemos que muitos dos monges com quem estivemos durante todo o dia 10, morreram depois, nesse mesmo dia. Vai ser um massacre em Lassa. Tudo o que disserem nas noticias de contrario podem acreditar que eh mentira. Ha lugares no mundo onde pessoas morrem por terem opiniao. Nao se passa apenas na distancia da televisao, ou em filmes com actores conhecidos, passa-se na realidade e muito perto de nos.

Desculpem a violencia do mail. Nao vos contei nem metade do que vi e vivi nestes dias. Mas nao posso ficar mais dias em silencio.
Espero que compreendam...
ee
Muitos beijos. Adoro-vos.

(Espero que o que se esta a passar no Tibete nao seja esquecido mal comece o Europeu de Futebol...)"

No meio da confusão e do bruaá da campanha eleitoral americana, um ouvido mais atento já detecta, lá no fundo, os andamentos e o tempo da música de Karl Rove…

As famílias da Frelimo ocupam-se cada vez mais de negócios e de criar consultoras. Projectos de investimento e reestruturação de empresas ficam com o filho do general e ex-ministro da Defesa Alberto Chipande e a área da saúde com o dirigente da Frelimo Hermenegildo Gamito, enquanto a holding do partido, a SPI, lança mais uma sociedade comercial de retalho.... continua no Correio da Manhã

Uma análise ao "modelo" chinês e suas consequências, internas, externas e globais, divulgada em nota de leitura da Infoguerre.

Aniversário da guerra do Iraque:

a Stratfor faz o ponto da situação

Stratfor's War: Five Years Later

Graphic for Geopolitical Intelligence Report

By George Friedman

Five years have now passed since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Vice President Dick Cheney, in Iraq with Sen. John McCain — the presumptive Republican nominee for president — summarized the five years by saying, “If you reflect back on those five years, it’s been a difficult, challenging, but nonetheless successful endeavor. We’ve come a long way in five years, and it’s been well worth the effort.” Democratic presidential aspirant Sen. Hillary Clinton called the war a failure.

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It is the role of political leaders to make such declarations, not ours. Nevertheless, after five years, it is a moment to reflect less on where we are and more on where we are going. As we have argued in the past, the actual distinctions between McCain’s position at one end (reduce forces in Iraq only as conditions permit) and Barack Obama’s position (reduce them over 16 months unless al Qaeda is shown to be in Iraq) are in practice much less distinct than either believes. Rhetoric aside — and this is a political season — there is in fact a general, but hardly universal, belief that goes as follows: The invasion of Iraq probably was a mistake, and certainly its execution was disastrous. But a unilateral and precipitous withdrawal by the United States at this point would not be in anyone’s interest. The debate is over whether the invasion was a mistake in the first place, while the divisions over ongoing policy are much less real than apparent.

Stratfor tries not to get involved in this sort of debate. Our role is to try to predict what nations and leaders will do, and to explain their reasoning and the forces that impel them to behave as they do. Many times, this analysis gets confused with advocacy. But our goal actually is to try to understand what is happening, why it is happening and what will happen next. We note the consensus. We neither approve nor disapprove of it as a company. As individuals, we all have opinions. Opinions are cheap and everyone gets to have one for free. But we ask that our staff check them — along with their personal ideologies — at the door. Our opinions focus not on what ought to happen, but rather on what we think will happen — and here we are passionate.

Public Justifications and Private Motivations

We have lived with the Iraq war for more than five years. It was our view in early 2002 that a U.S. invasion of Iraq was inevitable. We did not believe the invasion had anything to do with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — which with others we believed were under development in Iraq. The motivation for the war, as we wrote, had to do with forcing Saudi Arabia to become more cooperative in the fight against al Qaeda by demonstrating that the United States actually was prepared to go to extreme measures. The United States invaded to change the psychology of the region, which had a low regard for American power. It also invaded to occupy the most strategic country in the Middle East, one that bordered seven other key countries.

Our view was that the Bush administration would go to war in Iraq not because it saw it as a great idea, but because its options were to go on the defensive against al Qaeda and wait for the next attack or take the best of a bad lot of offensive actions. The second option consisted of trying to create what we called the “coalition of the coerced,” Islamic countries prepared to cooperate in the covert war against al Qaeda. Fighting in Afghanistan was merely a holding action that alone would solve nothing. So lacking good options, the administration chose the best of a bad lot.

The administration certainly lied about its reasons for going into Iraq. But then FDR certainly lied about planning for involvement in World War II, John Kennedy lied about whether he had traded missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba and so on. Leaders cannot conduct foreign policy without deception, and frequently the people they deceive are their own publics. This is simply the way things are.

We believed at the time of the invasion that it might prove to be much more difficult and dangerous than proponents expected. Our concern was not about a guerrilla war. Instead, it was about how Saddam Hussein would make a stand in Baghdad, a city of 5 million, forcing the United States into a Stalingrad-style urban meat grinder. That didn’t happen. We underestimated Iraqi thinking. Knowing they could not fight a conventional war against the Americans, they opted instead to decline conventional combat and move to guerrilla warfare instead. We did not expect that.

A Bigger Challenge Than Expected

That this was planned is obvious to us. On April 13, 2003, we noted what appeared to be an organized resistance group carrying out bombings. Organizing such attacks so quickly indicated to us that the operations were planned. Explosives and weapons had been hidden, command and control established, attacks and publicity coordinated. These things don’t just happen. Soon after the war, we recognized that the Sunnis in fact had planned a protracted war — just not a conventional one.

Our focus then turned to Washington. Washington had come into the war with a clear expectation that the destruction of the Iraqi army would give the United States a clean slate on which to redraw Iraqi society. Before the war was fought, comparisons were being drawn with the occupation of Japan. The beginnings of the guerrilla operation did not fit into these expectations, so U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the guerrillas as merely the remnants of the Iraqi army — criminals and “dead-enders” — in their last throes. We noted the gap between Washington’s perception of Iraq and what we thought was actually going on.

A perfect storm arose in this gulf. First, no WMD were found. We were as surprised by this as anybody. But for us, this was an intellectual exercise; for the administration, it meant the justification for the war — albeit not the real motive — was very publicly negated. Then, resistance in Iraq to the United States increased after the U.S. president declared final victory. And finally, attempts at redrawing Iraqi society as a symbol of American power in the Islamic world came apart, a combination of the guerrilla war and lack of preparation plus purging the Baathists. In sum, reshaping a society proved more daunting than expected just as the administration’s credibility cracked over the WMD issue.

A More Complex Game

By 2004, the United States had entered a new phase. Rather than simply allowing the Shia to create a national government, the United States began playing a complex and not always clear game of trying to bring the Sunnis into the political process while simultaneously waging war against them. The Iranians used their influence among the Shia to further destabilize the U.S. position. Having encouraged the United States to depose its enemy, Saddam Hussein, Tehran now wanted Washington to leave and allow Iran to dominate Iraq.

The United States couldn’t leave Iraq but had no strategy for staying. Stratfor’s view from 2004 was that the military option in Iraq had failed. The United States did not have the force to impose its will on the various parties in Iraq. The only solution was a political accommodation with Iran. We noted a range of conversations with Iran, but also noted that the Iranians were not convinced that they had to deal with the Americans. Given the military circumstance, the Americans would leave anyway and Iran would inherit Iraq.

Stratfor became more and more pessimistic about the American position in 2006, believing that no military solution was possible, and that a political solution — particularly following the Democratic victory in 2006 congressional elections — would further convince the Iranians to be intransigent. The deal that we had seen emerging over the summer of 2006 after the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al Qaeda in Iraq, was collapsing.

The Surge

We were taken by surprise by U.S. President George W. Bush’s response to the elections. Rather than beginning a withdrawal, he initiated the surge. While the number of troops committed to Iraq was relatively small, and its military impact minimal, the psychological shock was enormous. The Iranian assumption about the withdrawal of U.S. forces collapsed, forcing Tehran to reconsider its position. An essential part of the surge — not fully visible at the beginning — was that it was more a political plan than a military one. While increased operations took place, the Americans reached out to the Sunni leadership, splitting them off from foreign jihadists and strengthening them against the Shia.

Coupled with increasingly bellicose threats against Iran, this created a sense of increasing concern in Tehran. The Iranians responded by taking Muqtada al-Sadr to Iran and fragmenting his army. This led to a dramatic decline in the civil war between Shia and Sunni and in turn led to the current decline in violence.

The war — or at least Stratfor’s view of it — thus went through four phases:

Winter 2002-March 2003: The period that began with the run-up to invasion, in which the administration chose the best of a bad set of choices and then became overly optimistic about the war’s outcome.
April 2003-Summer 2003: The period in which the insurgency developed and the administration failed to respond.
Fall 2003-late 2006: The period in which the United States fought a multisided war with insufficient forces and a parallel political process that didn’t match the reality on the ground.
Late 2006 to the present: The period known as the surge, in which military operations and political processes were aligned, leading to a working alliance with the Sunnis and the fragmentation of the Shia. This period included the Iranians restraining their Shiite supporters and the United States removing the threat of war against Iran through the National Intelligence Estimate.

The key moment in the war occurred between May 2003 and July 2003. This consisted of the U.S. failure to recognize that an insurgency in the Sunni community had begun and its delay in developing a rapid and effective response, creating the third phase — namely, the long, grueling period in which combat operations were launched, casualties were incurred and imposed, but the ability to move toward a resolution was completely absent. It is unclear whether a more prompt response by the Bush administration during the second period could have avoided the third period, but the second period certainly was the only point during which the war could have been brought under control.

The operation carried out under Gen. David Petraeus, combining military and political processes, has been a surprise, at least to us. Meanwhile, the U.S. rapprochement with the Sunnis that began quietly in Anbar province spiraled into something far more effective than we had imagined. It has been much more successful than we had imagined in part because we did not believe Washington was prepared for such a systematic and complex operation that was primarily political in nature. It is also unclear if the operation will succeed. Its future still depends on the actions of the Iraqi Shia, and these actions in turn depend on Iran.

The Endgame

We have been focused on the U.S.-Iranian talks for quite awhile. We continue to believe this is a critical piece in any endgame. The United States is now providing an alternative scenario designed to be utterly frightening to the Iranians. They are arming and training the Iranians’ mortal enemies: the Sunnis who led the war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. That rearming is getting very serious indeed. Sunni units outside the aegis of the Iraqi military are now some of the most heavily armed Iraqis in Anbar, thanks to the Sunni relationship with U.S. forces there. It should be remembered that the Sunnis ruled Iraq because the Iraqi Shia were fragmented, fighting among themselves and therefore weak. That underlying reality remains true. A cohesive Sunni community armed and backed by the American s will be a formidable force. That threat is the best way to bring the Iranians to the table.

The irony is that the war is now focused on empowering the very people the war was fought against: the Iraqi Sunnis. In a sense, it is at least a partial return to the status quo ante bellum. In that sense, one could argue the war was a massive mistake. At the same time, we constantly return to this question: We know what everyone would not have done in 2003; we are curious about what everyone would have done then. Afghanistan was an illusory option. The real choices were to try to block al Qaeda defensively or to coerce Islamic intelligence services to provide the United States with needed intelligence. By appearing to be a dangerous and uncontrolled power rampaging in the most strategic country in the region, the United States reshaped the political decisions countries like Saudi Arabia were making.

This all came at a price that few of us would have imagined five years ago. Cheney is saying it was worth it. Clinton is saying it was not. Stratfor’s view is that what happened had to happen given the lack of choices. But Rumsfeld’s unwillingness to recognize that a guerrilla war had broken out and provide more and appropriate forces to wage that war did not have to happen. There alone we think history might have changed. Perhaps."

As duas curvas de evolução afastam-se cada vez mais, evoluem mesmo em sentidos contrários. Esperam-se records todos os dias, quer no disparo do preço do barril, quer no mergulho da economia. E espera-se, já, também um record na duração desta situação de crise estrutural e de mudança inevitável dos modelos há décadas dominantes, quer na organização global da economia-mundo, quer na estrutura do seu modelo energético. Análise, em podcast, da Stratfor:

Oil prices have hit record levels, and the economic downturn looks to be deeper and longer than expected. Colin Chapman says ...

O grande sacerdote do “aquecimento global” e do negócio do carbono, Al Gore, e algumas empresas que negoceiam no sector da venda de créditos de carbono estão ameaçados com um processo por fraude. A coisa promete aquecer o clima, nos próximos meses… A estória está aqui

«El Gobierno de Cuba autorizó, a través de un documento oficial, la venta de ordenadores, reproductores de DVD y electrodomésticos como hornos microondas o frigoríficos. Es la primera señal de que el nuevo presidente Raúl Castro cumplirá su promesa de eliminar algunas de la larga lista de prohibiciones que afectan la vida cotidiana en la isla y mejorar el acceso a bienes de consumo.» in 20 Minutos

Autorizada, então, a venda de micro-ondas e frigoríficos?! Isto é grave, muito mais grave do parece, num país de comunismo... Lembrem-se, em 1987, Moscovo autorizou a venda dos "tampax". E tendo, em 1987, penetrado os "tampax", na URSS, em 1989, caíu o muro e aconteceu toda aquela pouca-vergonha que derreteu o comunismo. E isto era na URSS e só com "tampax"... Agora, imaginem, com micro-ondas e frigoríficos, o que não vai ser! Este jovem Castro não tem juízo… A não ser que pretenda, inocentemente, passar o mano mais velho (há coisas destas nas melhores famílias...) pelo micro-ondas e guardá-lo no frigorífico...Talvez seja esta a inocente ideia de Raúl Castro, mas não pensou nas consequências de tasi elementos capitalistas e corruptores contactarem o bom povo revolucionário... Um perigo!

"Está tudo louco?" pergunta o Kaos

Não, o PC sempre foi isto, o pessoal é que tem

dificuldade em acreditar e se distrai... às vezes.

A percentagem de mulheres francesas que só admite ter tido um único parceiro sexual teve uma queda brutal, desde finais dos anos setenta até hoje: de 68% para 34% ! Ou seja, as francesas estão a mentir menos... E isso é bom já que a mentira é um pecado grave! Oh, pecadoras, arrependei-vos e emendai-vos!

O correspondente, em Paris, do Telegraph, repescando um título e um trabalho do Nouvel Observateur, faz um belo ponto de situação deste arrependimento das mentirosas das francesas. E, claro, não se esquece de meter umas referências a essa bela amante da verdade que é Carla Bruni, a “Carlita” de Sarkozy...

French women are becoming increasingly assertive in their sexual habits, while one-in-five younger French men "has no interest in sex", according to one of the most comprehensive surveys of the nation's love lives. Women now have more than twice as many partners as they did in the 1970s, according to the study by the French Aids research agency, which is backed by the government.

"Are women just like men?" asked Le Nouvel Observateur yesterday, which released extracts of the Study on Sexuality in

France

, a 600-page tome that brings together 12,000 in-depth interviews with people of all ages conducted during 2005-06.
One of the biggest changes in recent years, according to the report, was that male and female sexual behaviour had become increasingly similar.

The proportion of French women who claim to have had only one partner has dropped from 68 per cent in 1970, to 43 per cent in 1992 and 34 per cent in 2006. A woman's average number of partners has risen from under two in 1970 to over five today, while a man's has remained the same for four decades, almost 13.

French women's first experience of sex is now almost as early as that of the opposite sex: in 1950 there was a two-year difference, but the gap has narrowed to four months, to around 17 and a half. Meanwhile, more women remain sexually active for longer than previously: nine-out-of-10 women over 50 are sexually active today, compared to just 50 per cent of that age group in 1970.
"The good old dichotomy (male predators, females patiently awaiting the warrior's return in front of the cave entrance) is in big trouble", said Le Nouvel Observateur.
Female sexual emancipation has been a hot topic in France ever since President Nicolas Sarkozy met Carla Bruni, the Italian model and singer. The couple married last month.

Ms Bruni recently declared monogamy "terribly boring" and spoke in relaxed fashion about her numerous past conquests, including Mick Jagger and Eric Clapton. "I am a tamer [of men], a cat, an Italian", she told Le Figaro last year. "I am faithful... to myself. I am monogamous from time to time but I prefer polygamy and polyandry [its female equivalent]." At the same time, she reinforced old stereotypes that link status and virility, by reportedly declaring: "I want a man with nuclear power."
Despite the changes in female behaviour observed in the study, some things have not altered in 40 years. Men found it easier than women to disassociate sex from love, but the research suggested this was due to nurture rather than nature. The study said: "Young women are still educated to consider their entrance into sexuality as a sentimental-relationship experience."
One of the more surprising findings was that one-in-five French men aged between 18 and 24 "manifests no interest in sexuality", while abstinence rates for men under 35 was twice as high as for women.
The two sociologists who compiled the research said that the French had fewer sexual taboos and inhibitions than before, but were more anxious about lovemaking.
Never have sex counsellors been so busy in France: according to one estimate, they treat half a million patients per year.

Como é que o governador Spitzer foi vítima do dispositivo anti-terrorista?

Este mesmo dispositivo detectou e identificou muita outra coisa bizarra que passa por este Portugal, mas aqui, mesmo se as consequências foram de chumbo, o silêncio foi de ouro ... Mas isso são contas de outro rosário.

How Federal Banking Laws

Brought Down Eliot Spitzer

By Andrew Cochran

"But Spitzer had the money broken down into several smaller amounts of under $10,000 each, apparently to avoid getting around federal regulations requiring the reporting of the transfer of $10,000 or more, the sources said. The regulations are aimed at helping spot possible illegal business activities, such as frauds or drug deals. Apparently, having second thoughts about even sending the total amount in this manner because it still might reveal what he was doing, Spitzer then asked that the bank to take his name off the wires, the sources said. Bank officials declined, however, saying that it was improper to do so and in any event, it was too late to do so, because the money already had been sent, the sources said. The bank then, as is required by law, filed an SAR, or Suspicious Activity Report, with the Internal Revenue Service, reporting the transfer of the money that exceeded $10,000, but had been broken down into smaller amounts, the sources said."

And so began the federal investigation that resulted in the resignation of the Governor of New York, Eliot Spitzer (updated). Let's quickly run through the federal laws involved, for they are among the most important tools used to prevent, detect, and catch money laundering and terrorist financing. My sources are Congressional testimony in 2004 by a senior official of the Federal Reserve System, Jeffrey Breinholt's "The Bank Secrecy Act for Beginners," posted on February 14 on this year, and selected federal regulations.

These federal laws and regulations were added in layers as new transactions arose which exposed loopholes in existing law. In 1970, Congress passed the first such law, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, also known as the "Bank Secrecy Act" (BSA), with requirements for recordkeeping and reporting by banks and other financial institutions to identify the source, volume, and movement of funds for investigatory purposes. The BSA implemented the filing of Currency Transaction Reports, or CTRs, for currency transactions in excess of $10,000. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 imposed criminal liability for any person knowingly assisting in money laundering or structuring transactions to avoid reporting under the BSA. It also directed banks to establish and maintain BSA compliance procedures. In January 1987, all federal banking agencies issued regulations requiring banks to develop procedures for complying with the BSA and other AML requirements. By 1996, the federal financial regulators mandated that all banking organizations report any instances of known or suspected criminal or suspicious activity to the Treasury Department by filing a Suspicious Activity Report, or SAR (see this IRS website for more details). Unlike the CTR, there is no threshold dollar amount for filing a SAR. It was this form, filed by Spitzer's bank, which triggered the investigation.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, of which Title III was directed at mandating more anti-money laundering and terrorist financing mechanisms. Title III criminalized terrorist financing, for banks and other financial institutions, expanded the reach of the BSA filing requirements to all financial institutions (including broker-dealers and casinos), toughened customer identification requirements for those institutions, and greatly raised the awareness in the banking community of the need to watch for suspicious transactions and report them to law enforcement.

Would Spitzer had been discovered if he had engaged in his activity before the passage of the Patriot Act? Personally, I doubt it. But heightened awareness among bank employees, tougher bank examination procedures, numerous stiff penalties for BSA noncompliance, and extra press coverage all came in the past six years. These combined forces make it almost impossible for a highly public figure, such as a state Governor, to successfully structure transactions to avoid the BSA requirements. Financial institutions face even more regulatory requirements for "politically exposed persons" of Spitzer's rank.

These anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws and regulations have been the subject of numerous other posts here since we opened, including the following:

Spitzer's quaint capture

By Roderick Jones

One of the stranger sides to the unfolding Eliot Spitzer story is that he was caught by a wiretap in conjunction with some irregular banking activity. This seems an exceptionally quaint way to be caught out in 2008 and doesn't really say much for the New York Governors criminal skill-set. Traditional wiretapping has seemingly become a thing of the past (although clearly useful in catching dangerous high-end prostitution networks). The Economist ran a piece last week entitled 'bugging the cloud' highlighting the virtual impossibility of tracing calls that use VoIP and especially Skype. The article notes that the FBI is pushing Skype to build a special back-door that allows for lawful-intercept but so far this hasn't happened. This is a useful signpost as Skype's history is connected to that of Kazaa (the P2P file sharing software) through its founders. Kazaa evades certain legal requirements as its holding company (Sharman networks) is based in Vanuatu --a small Island nation in the South Pacific. It doesn't seem too much of a leap to imagine VoIP companies or virtual worlds similarly headquartered in Vanuatu seeking to evade regulation. Meanwhile the programmer who developed 'Pretty Good Privacy' is developing a free VoIP product called Zfone, which could be wholly wiretap proof. Most virtual worlds now also have VoIP built into them so if Skype is a current problem, it does stretch the mind to wonder how the intelligence community is going to keep up with encrypted VoIP communications in a virtual world.

The tension between technological innovation and government attempts to frame a legislative and operational response seems at times to be at breaking point. Governments do bite-back from time to time but this often appears to be piecemeal. The reported request from the Pentagon for Google to take down street-views of its military bases seems reasonable but it only works because Google is in the USA. But what about, EveryScape? A recently launched online tool that 'takes you through the doors of the world's cities'. This would appear to be of more use to a potential attacker than Google Street View but there have, as yet, been no attempts to limit its scope. So how can government frame a response to technological innovation, which is straining and breaking traditional law enforcement activity? There does at least seem to be a straightforward legislative case for western governments mandating that VoIP technology companies, based within their jurisdictions, comply with official requests to build in appropriate technical measures so lawful intercept can be conducted. This would blunt the potential problems associated with Skype and Zfone. In the case of visual products such as Everyscape or Google Street View this gets a little harder but the principle that analytical co-operation should be built into their systems should be maintained. This still leaves the problems of Pacific Islands being used as jurisdictional bases but for now this remains a seemingly inevitable possibility rather than current fact -- much like the New York Governors resignation.

Envio-vos a seguir o esquema da travessia feroviária do Tejo que vou amanhã apresentar na Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa.

Terei, obviamente, muito gosto se estiverem presentes técnicos do Ministério e da Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes.

A linha da Gare do Oriente até Alverca tem 4 vias, actualmente todas de bitola ibérica, que são usadas por comboios de longo curso, suburbanos e de mercadorias. Em Alhandra e Vila Franca a linha tem só duas vias e é muito dificil duplica-la à superfície numa extensão de cerca de 8 km.

O que se propõe é que duas das vias da Gare do Oriente a Alverca passem a bitola europeia e que seja estudada uma travessia ferroviária do Tejo a seguir a Alverca, por ponte ou tunel, aproximadamente na direcção do Porto Alto.

Perto do Porto Alto, deverá haver um ponto de encontro ( e talvez uma estação) onde se devem encontrar as linhas de bitola standard para Badajoz, para o novo Aeroporto (devendo esta linha ser prolongada até ao Pinhal Novo) e, uma linha pela margem esquerda do Tejo até perto da Chamisca, que servirá para a futura linha TGV para o Porto.

1- Os TGV de Lisboa para Madrid e outros comboios de bitola standard que usem a linha para Badajoz.

2- As navetes saidas da Gare do Oriente para o novo Aeroporto (algumas das quais devem ser prolongadas até ao Pinhal Novo). Estas navetes servirão também, nalguma medida, para o tráfego suburbano. No troço Alverca/Gare do Oriente devem ser previstos suburbanos que circularão só na margem Norte.

3- Para o TGV para o Porto, quando vier a ser construido e que deverá passar perto do Entroncamento, que deverá manter a sua vocação ferroviária. (É de prever, a relativo curto prazo, a passagem a bitola standard da linha da Beira Baixa que, ligada na Guarda à futura linha Aveiro/Vilar Formoso, permitirá o trânsito ferroviário das nossas mercadorias para o centro da Europa sem necessidade de passarem por Madrid).

As actuais linhas de bitola ibérica (incluindo a linha da cintura) pouco ou nada serão perturbadas por estas obras e preve-se que continuem a funcionar como actualmente por um largo periodo (talvez duas décadas). Assim, todos os actuais comboios que passam em Vila Franca, de longo curso, suburbanos e de mercadorias, continuarão em funcionamento como até agora

Actualmente, passam por hora, em Alverca, nas horas de ponta, 6 comboios suburbanos, 4 vindos de Vila Franca e dois que partem de Alverca. Estes últimos serão substituidos por comboios que circularão nas vias de bitola standard, que terão capacidade para mais suburbanos até à gare do Oriente, ou mesmo até Barço de Prata.

NOTA: Esta proposta não é muito diferente da apresentada pelo Eng. Luis Cabral da Silva no encontro promovido pela Ordem dos Engenheiros e pelo LNEC, em 12 de Fevereiro, podendo ser as duas consideradas variantes uma da outra.

Na Gare do Oriente, com 8 cais, mas pensada como apeadeiro de luxo e não como estação terminal, é facil passar duas das vias a bitola standard. Mas os comboios não poderão nelas ficar estacionados nem inverter a marcha. Estes comboios ao sair da estação terão, assim, de seguir no mesmo sentido. A solução é prever perto de Braço de Prata, onde há espaço para isso, uma zona onde estes comboios possam estacionar, ser limpos e esperar a hora para reentrar na Gare do Oriente, já em sentido contrário.

A travessia a seguir a Alverca pode ser feita por ponte, ou por tunel. As duas hipóteses devem ser estudadas. Tecnicamente, nenhuma parece levantar dificuldades de maior, mas há o problema da Reserva Natural do Estuário do Tejo. Numa travessia imediatamente a seguir a Alverca a Reserva é atravessada numa extensão de cerca de 2 km. Na travessia por tunel, é perturbada durante um periodo, mas depois é reconstruida nas condições iniciais. Na travessia por uma ponte prolongada por um viaduto, não se vê que espéciae animais serão prejudicadas. Um viaduto a atravessar a Reserva pode, aliás, proteje-la de ambições imobiliárias.

OPEN SOURCE INSURGENCY >> How to start

Claro que é

no 025 cms de neve

TAIWAN À CONQUISTA DA CHINA

Um ponto de vista muito interessante sugerido pelo L'Express e que já há tempo me parece uma perspectiva imprescindível na análise estratégica da relação entre as duas Chinas: o da conquista do continente comunista pela ilha democrática...

"Chine: Taiwan à la conquête du continent

JOURNAL: Tibet and beyond

JOURNAL: Vigilante Hackers

PREVER O INESPERADO... E AINDA

9 OUTRAS TECNOLOGIAS DO M.I.T.

Les 10 technologies émergentes 2008 selon le MIT

Plusieurs dizaines de moines tibétains favorables au dalaï lama ont manifesté ce jeudi à Lhassa, dans l'un des principaux temples, devant un groupe de journalistes étrangers, lors d'une interview officielle organisée par les autorités.

No Courier International:

TIBET Dans Lhassa coupé en deux

Geoff Dyer, du Financial Times, est l'un des 26 journalistes étrangers qui ont été autorisés à se rendre dans la capitale tibétaine dans le cadre du voyage de presse organisé par les autorités chinoises. Témoignage.

Les spoliations de terres à l’origine de la révolte

Centaines d'arrestations, premières inculpations

Trente intellectuels chinois s'engagent

Déclaration de Tibétologues au président chinois

DOSSIER: Comment faire pression sur la Chine ?

Le couple effectuera en carrosse les derniers mètres qui les séparent de la résidence royale, en compagnie de la reine Elizabeth II et de son époux le duc d'Edimbourg. M. et Mme Sarkozy seront dans la soirée les hôtes d'un banquet d'Etat avant de passer la nuit au château.

Le discours présidentiel devrait être l'occasion de célébrer plus d'un millénaire de rivalités et d'amitié franco-britanniques, selon l'entourage de Nicolas Sarkozy. (…)

Dans un entretien diffusé mercredi par la radio BBC, M. Sarkozy a d'ailleurs justifié le renforcement annoncé de la présence militaire française en Afghanistan, estimant que l'Alliance atlantique ne pouvait "se permettre de perdre" contre le terrorisme.

"Est-ce que l'on peut se permettre, nous, l'Alliance, les alliés, de perdre en Afghanistan ? La réponse est non. Parce qu'en Afghanistan se joue une partie de la lutte contre le terrorisme mondial, donc on doit gagner", a déclaré M. Sarkozy.

PARIS COM NOVA ESTRATÉGIA

PARA UMA EUROPA PÓS-FEDERAL

“A New French Strategy

Foreign Policy Since 1871

An Independent Deterrent

Independence vs. Europe

The Mediterranean Union

Tibete: Críticas aos massacres incomodam dirigentes chineses

Tibete: Críticas aos massacres

incomodam dirigentes chineses

A AFP informa hoje sobre o incómodo que as críticas e pressões internacionais para que os direitos do homem sejam respeitados no Tibete estão a causar aos dirigentes chineses e que já levaram a que “Pékin dénonce l'incident de la flamme olympique, pressions internationals”:

Protest Beijing 2008

Aniversário da guerra do Iraque:

a Stratfor faz o ponto da situação

Stratfor's War: Five Years Later

Public Justifications and Private Motivations

A Bigger Challenge Than Expected

A More Complex Game

The Surge

The Endgame

"Está tudo louco?" pergunta o Kaos Não, o PC sempre foi isto, o pessoal é que tem dificuldade em acreditar e se distrai... às vezes.

How Federal Banking Laws

Brought Down Eliot Spitzer

By Andrew Cochran

Spitzer's quaint capture

By Roderick Jones

TIBET
Dans Lhassa coupé en deux

Tibete: Críticas aos massacres

incomodam dirigentes chineses

"Está tudo louco?" pergunta o Kaos

Não, o PC sempre foi isto, o pessoal é que tem

dificuldade em acreditar e se distrai... às vezes.