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CHINA, RÚSSIA E CRISE ALIMENTAR

A crise alimentar mundial, o assalto da China a África e o horizonte da Rússia são (alguns) temas do último número do Foreign Policy. Interessante.

The World’s Worst Food Crises

Soaring energy prices, growing demand from India and China, and increasingly unpredictable weather have spawned a global food crisis that stretches from Port-au-Prince to Pyongyang. Here are the next places likely to be rocked by shortages, riots, and hunger.

• Plus, The Head of the World Food Program on the “Silent Tsunami” of Hunger

Their darkest dealings often go unreported and unnoticed. But from Nairobi to São Paulo, many urban gangs have become more sophisticated, more brutal, and more powerful than ever.

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When China Met Africa
It seemed a perfect match: A growing country looking for markets and influence meets a continent with plenty of resources but few investors. Now that China has moved in, though, its African partners are beginning to resent their aggressive new patron. What happens when the world’s most ambitious developing power meets the poverty, corruption, and fragility of Africa? China is just beginning to find out.
By Serge Michel

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Fake China By Joshua E. Keating

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Plus, Chinese blog pioneer Isaac Mao on the best sources for unfettered information on China

What Russia Wants
From Gorbachev to Yeltsin to Putin, every new Russian president has drastically altered his country’s relationship with the world. How will President Dmitry Medvedev change it again? Here are the clues that reveal what the Kremlin is thinking, and, more importantly, what it really wants.
By Ivan Krastev

NOVA BRONCA

A ASAE Cada Vez Mais Como

Uma Aberração Salazarenta

A ASAE de António Nunes continua a sua saga de desastres. E continua a demonstrar como este Estado mantém uma cultura e uma atitude salazarentas de rejeição da autonomia da sociedade civil, de permanente desconfiança dos cidadãos e de uma prática permanente de sujeição e condicionamento da iniciativa e da actividade dos cidadãos.

Esta ASAE é uma aberração, um instrumento de vingança contra os cidadãos da cultura que ainda ainda predomina neste Estado. À sombra dum falso álibi da "legislação europeia" (álibi sem a mínima consistência mas que procura tirar partido da falta de conhecimento dos cidadãos sobre a "Europa"), as práticas aberrantes da ASAE fazem-nos voltar aos tempos da salazarenta "leite 2005 do condicionamento industrial". Lei de Salazar que organizou o sub-desenvolvimento da economia portuguesa.

Mas, como os tempos são outros, este Estado está claramente em contradição com a Democracia e o Estado de Direito. Como os tempos são outros e Sócrates não é nem quer ser Salazar e se submete a escrutínios eleitorais e aceita os seus resultados, estas práticas aberrantes do Estado prejudicam gravemente o Governo (que é suposto dirigi-lo).

Atrevo-me assim a prever que que esta aberração dirigida por António Nunes (que raramente cumpre aquilo para que foi criada, proteger o cidadão consumidor, e prefere uma concepção normativa e condicionante da sua missão) vai custar muito caro a José Sócrates. Falo de votos, claro. E de uma previsível situação eleitoral em que escassos milhares de votos vão fazer toda a diferença entre ter ou não ter… maioria absoluta!

Paulo Portas, tendo percebido isto, apressou-se (e Passos Coelho também) a retirar a Sócrates espaço de manobra, exigindo a demissão do responsável máximo da aberração salazarenta… Eles sabem que assim retiram a Sócrates a margem necessária para o demitir e que assim vão mantendo António Nunes em funções e mantendo a possibilidade do aparecimento de novas broncas…

A GREVE COMO PROFISSÃO...

Jornalista, biógrafo de Mitterrand e actual director de jornal,  Franz-Olivier Giesbert assina, num dos seus últimos editoriais, um interessantíssimo requisitório sobre os profissionais da greve na função pública. Ou de como certos "funcionários" transformaram um direito numa profissão...

"La grève est un métier

Franz-Olivier Giesbert

La grève est un droit. Parfois, c'est même un métier.

En tout cas, dans le service public français. C'est ce qui explique tout le raffut fait autour de la nouvelle expérimentation du service minimum d'accueil des élèves, pour la prochaine journée de mobilisation de la fonction publique, le 15 mai. Certains syndicats d'enseignants hurlent à la provocation contre Xavier Darcos, notre excellent ministre de l'Education nationale. Pensez ! Cet homme refuse que l'on prenne nos enfants en otages. Il refuse, le malotru, qu'ils restent à traîner dans les rues. L'indignation s'impose.

Les grèves à répétition de l'Education nationale ont pour particularité de pénaliser les classes les plus défavorisées, qui n'ont pas les moyens de faire garder leurs enfants. Le bien nommé service minimum d'accueil (SMA) permet d'assurer la surveillance des élèves par les fonctionnaires territoriaux, dans les communes. Une bonne mesure, équitable et sociale.

Apparemment, pas pour tout le monde.

Le 24 janvier, lors de la dernière grève, 2. 023 communes seulement sur 22.000 ont eu recours au SMA. Les socialistes prétendent qu'ils ne veulent pas jouer les briseurs de grève. Ils montrent par là qu'après le remarquable aggiornamento de leur déclaration de principes, qui sera adoptée en juin, il leur reste encore du chemin à faire pour achever leur mue idéologique. En cessant d'être, avant toute chose, le parti des fonctionnaires et notamment de ceux qui sont toujours entre deux grèves.

Allez, encore un effort !"

TRAPALHADAS... SEM COMENTÁRIOS!

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ENERGIA: FAZER CONTAS À VIDA

Wind ($23.37) v. Gas (25 Cents)

May 12, 2008; Page A14

Congress seems ready to spend billions on a new "Manhattan Project" for green energy, or at least the political class really, really likes talking about one. But maybe we should look at what our energy subsidy dollars are buying now.

Some clarity comes from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), an independent federal agency that tried to quantify government spending on energy production in 2007. The agency reports that the total taxpayer bill was $16.6 billion in direct subsidies, tax breaks, loan guarantees and the like. That's double in real dollars from eight years earlier, as you'd expect given all the money Congress is throwing at "renewables." Even more subsidies are set to pass this year.

An even better way to tell the story is by how much taxpayer money is dispensed per unit of energy, so the costs are standardized. For electricity generation, the EIA concludes that solar energy is subsidized to the tune of $24.34 per megawatt hour, wind $23.37 and "clean coal" $29.81. By contrast, normal coal receives 44 cents, natural gas a mere quarter, hydroelectric about 67 cents and nuclear power $1.59.

The wind and solar lobbies are currently moaning that they don't get their fair share of the subsidy pie. They also argue that subsidies per unit of energy are always higher at an early stage of development, before innovation makes large-scale production possible. But wind and solar have been on the subsidy take for years, and they still account for less than 1% of total net electricity generation. Would it make any difference if the federal subsidy for wind were $50 per megawatt hour, or even $100? Almost certainly not without a technological breakthrough.

By contrast, nuclear power provides 20% of U.S. base electricity production, yet it is subsidized about 15 times less than wind. We prefer an energy policy that lets markets determine which energy source dominates. But if you believe in subsidies, then nuclear power gets a lot more power for the buck than other "alternatives."

The same study also looked at federal subsidies for non-electrical energy production, such as for fuel. It found that ethanol and biofuels receive $5.72 per British thermal unit of energy produced. That compares to $2.82 for solar and $1.35 for refined coal, but only three cents per BTU for natural gas and other petroleum liquids.

All of this shows that there is a reason fossil fuels continue to dominate American energy production: They are extremely cost-effective. That's a reality to keep in mind the next time you hear a politician talk about creating millions of "green jobs." Those jobs won't come cheap, and you'll be paying for them."

PRESIDÊNCIA US

na coluna do Correio da Manhã

Com Hillary Clinton  estão as mulheres adultas, os hispânicos e os ‘colarinhos azuis’; com Barack Hussein Obama, os jovens, os negros e as classes favorecidas das grandes cidades… Qualquer dos candidatos precisa do eleitorado do outro para se bater contra John McCain.

continua AQUI

Como toda a gente sabe, a sra.dra. Manuela licenciou-se em Harvard e doutorou-se em Stanford, tendo ainda feito, pelo meio, o mestrado na École de Guerre Économique de Paris. Compreende-se assim a sua sobranceria para com os licenciados e pós-graduados nas miseráveis e semi-analfabetas universidades portuguesas e a crítica que faz aos seus cursos:

"A ideia de que se tem um canudo estilo engenheiro Sócrates, que dá para tudo, já não serve e o desemprego de jovens (...)

“Fundos soberanos revelam finanças como instrumento da estratégia política”

Os fundos soberanos são actores com uma importância crescente no mercado de capitais. Banca, Indústria, em particular sectores estratégicos como o aeroespacial, e o sector da Energia são hoje os alvos mais apetecíveis, de acordo com a cartografia pioneira realizada pela investigadora da École de Guerre Économique Alice Lacoye Mateus.

Ler entrevista Aqui

QUEM MORREU EM “MAIO 68”

Maio 68 faz 40 anos. Toda a gente, todos os media, comemoram com edições especiais, “souvenirs” com mais ou menos torres eifeis, muita opinião douta e ex-catedra de pequenos e médios intelectuais, mais ou menos participantes ou meros observadores, tudo com um estruturante toque de saudade e nostalgia.

Muita foto, muita prosa, muito papel pintado, muito on-line… Mas não vi em nenhum lado, a pergunta adequada e a que os 40 anos passados tornam possível e imprescindível. A saber: Quem morreu, quem teve o seu enterro em Maio 68?

Foi De Gaulle? Depois de ganhar as eleições seguintes, impôs, contra a opinião de todos os seus colaboradores chegados, um referendo que sabia perdido d’avance, para poder ir-se embora… e deixar Pompidou sentado no trono da V República.

Foi a V República? Continuou, com Pompidou, e continua hoje… sem alternativa. Até Mitterrand e os seus aliados do PC se inseriram nos seus hábitos.

Foi a “civilização burguesa”? Nunca antes de 68 foi tão hegemónica em França como o foi depois e continua a ser hoje…

Então quem e/ou o quê?

No caos gerado em Maio 68 em França – mas também na Itália – só uma coisa soçobrou: a hegemonia comunista, dos PCs tradicionais e articulados com o Kremlin. E soçobrou definitivamente. Maio 68 tornou os PCs uma espécie em vias de extinção… Até mesmo, embora com o atraso regulamentar, em Portugal! Veja-se o nosso ano de 1970, o ano da explosão de todos os “grupelhos esquerdistas”… E também do aparecimento do próprio PS. Nesse ano, quebrou-se o duopólio que dominava Portugal havia décadas: o grupo salazarento dono do governo e o grupo cunhalento dono da oposição.

Na oposição ao regime, surge uma contestação de um tipo inédito que rapidamente adquire uma voz e uma presença. Nos inícios da década de setenta, o PC e as suas estruturas estudantis começam a perder votações em plenários de estudantes. A favor dos grupos de extrema-esquerda. Esta quebra da hegemonia comunista e o aparecimento de novos actores orgânicos no campo da oposição é decisiva para a viabilização do que veio a seguir: a queda do regime salazarento.

Salazar, de resto, sempre tivera o cuidado de criar as necessárias condições para reduzir a oposição aos comunistas… Isso, para ele, era um seguro de vida! Enquanto não houvesse outra alternativa viável que a dos comunistas, o regime estava seguro.

Do que por aí resta dos PCs, não se encontrará ninguém capaz de pensar que goste do “Maio 68” et la suite…

Quem se lembrou de utilizar a contestação juvenil europeia à guerra do Vietname e o seu anti-americanismo primário para criar as condições do fim de hegemonia comunista é (ou era) realmente um génio da estratégia!

Petraeus, Afghanistan

and the Lessons of Iraq 

May 6, 2008

By George Friedman

Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded the surge in Iraq, was recommended April 23 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to be the next head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, this means Petraeus would remain in ultimate command of the war in Iraq while also taking command in Afghanistan. Days after the recommendation, there was yet another unsuccessful attempt on the life of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on April 27. Then, media reports May 3 maintained the United States might strengthen its forces in Afghanistan to make up for shortfalls in NATO commitments. Across the border in Pakistan, Islamabad and the Taliban neared a peace deal April 25, the first fruits of the Pakistani government’s efforts to increase its dialogue with the Taliban — though these talks appeared to collapse April 28. Clearly, there appears to be movement with regard to Afghanistan. The question is whether this movement is an illusion — and if it is not an illusion, where is the movement going?

Petraeus’ probable command in Afghanistan appears to be the most important of these developments. In Iraq, Petraeus changed the nature of the war. The change he brought to bear there was not so much military as political. Certainly, he deployed his forces differently than his predecessors, dispersing some of them in small units based in villages and neighborhoods contested by insurgents. That was not a trivial change, but it was not as important as the process of political discussions he began with local leaders.

The first phase of the U.S. counterinsurgency, which lasted from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in mid-2003 until the U.S. surge in early 2007, essentially consisted of a three-way civil war, in which the United States, the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias fought each other. The American strategic goal appears to have been to defeat both the insurgents and the militias, while allowing them to attrit each other and civilian communities.

Reshaping the Struggle in Iraq

Petraeus reshaped the battle by observing that the civil war was much more than a three-way struggle. Tensions also existed within both the Iraqi Sunni and the Shiite communities. Petraeus’ strategy was to exploit those tensions, splitting both his opponents and forming alliances with some of them. Petraeus recognized that political power in the Sunni community rested with the traditional tribal leaders — the sheikhs — and that these sheikhs were both divided among themselves, and most important, extremely worried about the foreign jihadist fighters from al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda ultimately wanted to replace the sheikhs as leaders of their respective communities. It used its influence with younger, more radical Sunnis to create a new cadre of leaders. The more U.S. pressure on the Sunni community as a whole, the less room for maneuver the sheikhs had. U.S. policy was inadvertently strengthening al Qaeda by making the sheikhs dependent on its force against the United States. Similarly, the Shiite community was split along multiple lines, with Iran deeply involved with multiple factions.

Petraeus changed U.S. policy from what was essentially warfare against the Sunnis in particular, but also the Shia, as undifferentiated entities. He sought to recruit elements previously regarded as irredeemable, and with threats, bribes and other inducements, forced open splits among Sunnis and Shia. In doing so, Petraeus also opened lines to the Iranians, who used their fear of a civil war among the Shia — and a disastrous loss of influence by Iran — to suppress both intra-Shiite violence and Shiite violence against Sunnis.

The result of this complex political maneuvering coupled with the judicious use of military force was a decline in casualties not only among American forces, but also among Iraqis from intercommunal warfare. The situation has not by any means resolved itself, but Petraeus’ strategy expanded splits in the Sunni and Shiite communities that he tried to exploit. The most important thing Petraeus did was to reduce the cohesion of U.S. enemies by recognizing they were not in fact a cohesive entity, and moving forward on that basis.

The verdict is far from in on the success of Petraeus’ strategy in Iraq. The conflict has subsided, but certainly has not concluded. Indeed, we have seen increased attacks in Sunni regions recently, while conflict with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces in Baghdad is increasing. In many ways, the success of Petraeus’ strategy depends on Iran continuing to perceive the United States as a long-term presence in Iraq, and continuing to regard suppressing conflict among Shia important so the Iraqi Shia can constitute a united bloc in the government of Iraq. But the strategy is not foolproof; should the jihadists and some of the Sunni sheikhs decide to stage a countersurge in the months ahead of the U.S. election, the fabric of political relations would unravel with startling speed, and the military situation would change dramatically. Petraeus certainly has improved the situation. He has not won the war.

The Afghan Challenge

Applying Petraeus’ politico-military strategy to Afghanistan will be difficult. First, the ratio of forces to population there is even worse than in Iraq, making the application of decisive military force even more difficult. But even more important, unlike in Iraq — where the U.S. effort began purely on a military track — U.S. involvement in Afghanistan began on a political track much like Petraeus brought to bear in Iraq in 2007.

As we have pointed out many times, the United States did not actually invade Afghanistan in October 2001. That would have been impossible 30 days after 9/11. Instead, the United States made political arrangements with anti-Taliban factions and tribes to use their force in conjunction with U.S. airpower. The payoff for these factions and tribes was freedom from the Taliban and domination of the national government of Afghanistan, or at least their respective regions.

The first level of force the U.S. introduced into Afghanistan was a handful of CIA operatives followed by a small number of U.S. Army Special Forces teams and other special operations forces units. Their mission was to coordinate operations of new U.S. allies among the Northern Alliance — which had been under Russian influence — and among the Afghan Shia and Tajiks, who had been under Iranian influence. The solution ran through Moscow and Tehran on the strategic level, and then to these local forces on the tactical level.

Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007. This strategy was followed from the beginning in Afghanistan. Having forced the Taliban to retreat and disperse, the United States failed to prevent the Taliban from regrouping for two reasons. First, the political alliances it tried to create were too unstable and backed by too little U.S. force. Second, the Taliban enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan, which Islamabad was unable or unwilling to deny them. As a result, the Taliban regrouped and re-emerged as a capable force, challenging insufficient U.S. and NATO forces on the ground.

It must be remembered that the Taliban took control of most of Afghanistan in the first place because they were militarily capable and because they recruited a powerful coalition on their side. And there was another reason: The Pakistani government, worried about excessive Russian or Iranian influence in Pakistan and interested in a relatively stable Afghanistan, supported the Taliban. That support proved decisive. Various tribal and factional leaders calculated that given Pakistani support, the Taliban would be the most capable military force — and that therefore resisting the Taliban made no sense.

Petraeus faces a similar situation now. The amount of force the United States has placed in Afghanistan is not impressive. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force has just 47,000 troops deployed in a country of 31 million with a challenging geography. That 31 million has lived with war for generations, and has both adapted to war and is capable of fielding forces appropriate to the environment. Most tribes in Afghanistan calculate that the Americans do not have the ability to remain in Afghanistan for an extended period of time — as measured in generations. In due course, the Americans will leave.

The forces that had rallied to the U.S. standard in the first instance were those that had been defeated by the Taliban and forced to the margins. The majority of the country remained neutral on seeing the American entry or, at most, entered into tentative agreements with the Americans. Given their perceptions of U.S. staying power, the most rational thing for most of them to do is to pay lip service to the Karzai government — simply because it is there — while simultaneously either staying out of the fight or quietly aiding the Taliban. After all, the Taliban won before. If the Americans leave, there is no reason for them not to win again, at least in eastern and southern Afghanistan.

The Pakistani government also has paid lip service to fighting the Taliban, but clearly has not been effective in this fight. Moreover, the attempt of the new Pakistani government to negotiate with the Taliban signals that Pakistan’s old policy of accommodation toward the Taliban has not ended. While the Americans may go away, the Pakistanis are going nowhere. Standing with the Americans against a force that took Afghanistan once before — and still has not incurred the true enmity of Pakistan — is, put simply, a chump’s game.

Divide and Conquer?

Petraeus’ goal should be dividing the various factions of the Taliban as he did with the Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Attempting this very thing in Afghanistan has gone on for quite some time, but like trying to divide water, the Taliban flows back together remarkably quickly. The United States can always bribe the Taliban leaders, but it has been bribing them for years. They don’t stay bought.

In the meantime, the Afghan government remains in Kabul, ultimately dependent on the United States for its physical survival and infrastructure. Threats to Karzai and others are constant. Attempts are made to build national institutions, including military forces. But in the end, Afghan loyalty has never been to the nation, but to the tribe and the clan. So Karzai can rally the country only by building a coalition of tribes and clans. He has failed to do this.

In Iraq, the key was to supplement the military track with a political one. In Afghanistan, the problem is that there has always been a political track. And while pursuing this track worked at first, it has proven an unstable foundation for anything else. Its instability shook the Taliban out of power. And now the United States is facing this constant shifting.

If the problem in Iraq was introducing political suppleness, the problem in Afghanistan is the opposite: It is reducing the political suppleness. The way to do that is to introduce military force, to change the psychology of the region by convincing it that the United States is prepared to remain indefinitely and to bring overwhelming force to bear. That was the point of the U.S. announcement that it would take over the burden dropped by NATO.

The problem is that this is a bluff. The United States doesn’t have overwhelming force to bring to bear. The Soviets had 300,000 troops in Afghanistan. They held the cities, but the countryside was as treacherous for them as it is for the Americans. The force the United States can bring to bear is insufficient to overawe the tribes and cause them to break with the Taliban. And therefore, the United States is in a holding pattern, hoping that something will turn up.

That something is Pakistan. If Petraeus follows true to his Iraqi form — where he engaged the Iranians based on their own self-interest, inducing Tehran to rein in al-Sadr — then his key move must be to engage the Pakistanis in the fight against the Taliban. The problem is that it is not clearly in Pakistan’s self-interest to create a civil war in Pakistan with the Taliban, and the new government in Islamabad does not appear to have the appetite for such a struggle. And the Pakistani army continues to have elements sympathetic to the Taliban. If the army is not prepared to put up much of a fight in Pakistan’s northern tribal areas, it certainly is not looking for armed conflict with the Taliban — many of whose members are in fact Pakistani guerrillas — in Pakistan’s nontribal areas.

In sum, Petraeus improved the situation in Iraq, but he hasn’t won the war there. And applying those lessons to Afghanistan is simply repeating what has happened since 2001. Petraeus is a good general, so it is unlikely he will continue that same course. But it is also unlikely that he will be in a position to force the Pakistanis to deny Taliban sanctuary. We therefore don’t know what he will do in Afghanistan. But, as we have said before, it is a deteriorating situation, and he will be forced to act on it. That’s why he was placed at the helm of CENTCOM.

COMO O AUMENTO DO PETRÓLEO

FABRICOU ESTA CRISE ALIMENTAR

O aumento exponencial do preço do petróleo é o principal responsável da actual crise alimentar mundial. À medida que o preço do barril sobe em dólares, torna-se economicamente interessante, no mercado interno americano, o uso do milho (e outros cereais) em bio-combustíveis. Pôr os carros a “andar a milho”, além de ecologicamente correcto, também diminui a dependência e a factura americana do petróleo importado… E quanto mais o petróleo subir, mais esta tendência “bio” se acentuará, agravando a crise alimentar mundial. Contentes mesmo só estão os agricultores americanos e os produtores de máquinas agrícolas que nunca venderam tanto como agora… Combinado com os aumentos de consumo da China e da Índia, este factor “energia” tornou-se explosivo. Os ecologistas defensores dos bio-combustíveis e os produtores de petróleo que alimentam a alta de preços não imaginaram a encrenca em que iam meter o mundo. Os números da FAO não deixam margens para dúvidas:

“In the same period the consumption of cereals in the US, the world's largest economy, has been projected to have grown 11.81 per cent from 277.6 milliontonnes to 310.4 million tonnes. However, a large part of this spike is learnt to have been caused by the country's new-found appetite for bio-fuel made from corn.

With crude oil prices rising to over $115 a barrel, the US is learnt to have

utilised 30 million tonnes of corn to make bio-fuel. The FAO data show that

the usage of corn in the US to make bio-fuel increased two-and-a-half times between 2000 and 2006.

"About 30 million tonnes of corn was used in US to produce bio-fuels last

year," said Ashok Gulati, the Asia director of the International Food Policy

Research Institute.

(…) Various reports have now come round the view that it is not just the rising demand for food in China and India that has caused prices to spiral — it has been caused also by the rising demand for bio-fuels all across the world and speculative investments in commodity markets.